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1863 started off with a bang for rebel forces in Texas when they defeated the Yankees on both land and sea to retake the city of Galveston. The USS Westfield ran aground during the battle and was blown up to avoid capture. She wasn't the only Union man-of-war victimized that day by the treacherous shoals in the area and the crafty leadership displayed by the Confederates.
On New Year’s Day of 1863 at Galveston. Texas, there occurred what Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox bemoaned as “the most melancholy affair ever recorded in the history of our gallant navy.’’1 In early October 1862, a small Union Navy squadron had forced the Confederate evacuation of Galveston under threat of bombardment that the Confederates then had no means to counter. From that time until New Year’s Day, Union vessels in Galveston Bay held sway, of a sort, over the city. But that day witnessed a Navy foul-up culminating in a Union disaster.
The Texas coast had been included in the blockade ordered by President Abraham Lincoln at the war’s outset, and a Union blockader had taken station off the Galveston bar on 2 July 1861. The Union Navy, however, had so much else to do that the Texas coast had received little attention before the autumn of 1862.
Admiral David G. Farragut, commanding the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, was painfully aware of the needs on that coast. In mid-August, the supply of fresh provisions for the few vessels on 1 exas duty failed to the extent that two of them had to be sent home because their crews suffered from scurvy; by then, no blockaders were stationed beyond the vicinity of Galveston. Farragut was determined to correct that state of affairs.
Farragut was not content to maintain only an offshore blockade. Paralleling much of the Texas coast were long islands with inlets that made it difficult for blockaders to eye vessels slipping in and out. Inshore positions were needed to control what Farragut called “the inland navigation." One of his first steps in September was to order Commander William B. Renshaw, a principal lieutenant in previous Mississippi River operations, to attempt such control. Farragut suggested the port of Galveston as a likely objective. It was probably on his mind because he had just received a report insisting that a mere blockader off that city was of little use.
So it was that, in the first days of October, Commander Renshaw—with a few vessels—was forcing the Confederate evacuation of Galveston by threat of bombardment. On 9 October, he raised the Stars and Stripes over the city. But he kept them flying for only a half hour, since he had no force to occupy the city, though he maintained his squadron in the bay. He had four fighting vessels, all steamers: his flagship, the Westfield, with the Clifton (each a converted ferry side-wheeler), Harriet Lane (a converted Revenue Service cutter side-wheeler), and Owasco (a screw gunboat).
The city of Galveston was on long, slender Galveston Island, just off the mainland, with a railroad running from the city about four miles along the island, across a bridge to the mainland at Virginia Point, and thence on to Houston. Upon leaving the city, the Confederates had joined fellow troops in a fortification at Virginia Point, near the mainland end of the bridge; they even had left a detachment on the island near the bridge. Renshaw thought nearby enemy forces were close to 5,000 men. While that was an exaggeration, the Confederates easily could have concentrated such a number. Renshaw had written Farragut urging that a substantial military force be sent to occupy the island and that he receive shallow-draft mortar schooners to attack the Virginia Point fort.
Troops for Renshaw would have to come from Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s army in New Orleans. But Butler had been denied reinforcement from the north, and though he had been able to recruit some troops locally, that source soon was exhausted; his army remained small. Nor was Butler having his men simply sit behind breastworks. Hardly had Renshaw begun asking for troops than Butler was readying an offensive move of his own, for several good reasons, west of New Orleans. By late October, Butler had begun that move, so he had no troops to spare.
At first, it must have seemed that the Navy was quite able to take care of itself on the Texas shore. Even as it was succeeding at Galveston, there were similar successes—on a smaller scale—at Sabine Pass on the Louisiana-Texas border and on the coast southwest of Galveston. The Navy was achieving apparent control of nearly all the Texas coast, including much of its inshore waters. Yet Commander Renshaw continued to appeal for troops, and Farragut fully appreciated his need. Indeed, in Farra- gut’s first report to Butler of the Galveston success, he had added “beg to know if you can not let us have sufficient force to hold Galveston.” While Butler did not believe that there was an immediate emergency, he did give Farragut reason to hope that, with success on his move west of New Orleans, troops soon would be made available for Galveston.
From late October into December. Farragut kept after Butler, and Butler kept indicating intention to send help. By December, word reached the Unionists that a vigorous Confederate general .Major General John B. Magruder, had arrived to take command in Texas and was planning to assault Union coastal footholds with land forces and shallow-draft river boats. Renshaw, with no land troops, decided that inshore positions along the Texas coast should be abandoned, and so reported to Farragut in early December—Farragut was appalled. On 12 December, he wrote Renshaw of his disapproval and ordered him to “hold Galveston until the army arrives.” He added that “General Butler had all the troops ready to embark, and but for accidental cause would have been there by this time.”
On 14 December, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks arrived at New Orleans to supersede Butler, bringing the first troops of a large expedition to clear the northern Mississippi River area that he had organized during the fall. Pressured by Farragut, Butler, and others. Banks agreed to send a regiment to reinforce Renshaw in Galveston. For the mission, he picked the freshly recruited 42nd Massachusetts. Only three of its companies—all infantry—its colonel, Isaac S. Burrell, and some staff had arrived at the time. On 19 December, encamped near New Orleans, they were ordered to pull stakes and head for Galveston. The remainder of the regiment was to follow on its arrival. By midday of the 22nd, the steam transport Saxon, bearing Colonel Burrell and the three companies, a force of just over 260, emerged on the Gulf from the mouth of the Mississippi. The men of the 42nd were pleased; one of them recorded in his diary, “Galveston is our destination, and we like the idea of going to Texas very much. It is a healthy country, and I think we shall have as pleasant a time there as anywhere.” Few would have suspected the events that lay ahead.
On Christmas Eve, the Saxon was at the Galveston bar; her passengers were landed the next day. Although Burrell would have preferred to garrison his force in available quarters out in the bay on Pelican Spit (east of Pelican Island), at Commander Renshaw’s insistence they were billeted in a large building at the channel end of a 400-foot city wharf. Burrell was assured that Renshaw’s gunboats would provide protection and that, if need be, his men could be snatched from the wharf to shipboard safety in a few minutes.
The week between Christmas and New Year’s was no holiday for Colonel Burrell as he anxiously awaited the rest of his regiment. During the day, there was relatively free movement for Unionists on the island around the city and even toward the bridge to Virginia Point. But at night, while Union sentries were posted in the city and while Burrell reconnoi- tered beyond, Confederate General Magruder’s men infested the neighborhood. Indeed, one night Magruder himself daringly surveyed a key position near the end of the island northeast of the city. Two parties of Union scouts needed only to close in on him and Magruder would have been off to imprisonment—but, being unaware, they missed their opportunity.
1 Colonel Burrell was most disturbed that Renshaw
: had made no effort to destroy the bridge to Virginia
t Point. Renshaw himself, with Farragut’s acquies-
- cence, had regarded the bridge as needed to enable
: the people of Galveston to try to get provisions from
the mainland. While many had fled after the Con- federate evacuation, others had stayed, and Ren. shaw could not feed them. Even if Renshaw had
i wanted to destroy the bridge, the depth of draft of
i his four vessels (about eight to 11 feet) did not allow
r their getting within gun range, and Farragut had re; jected his request for shallow-draft mortar schooners.
. Two other fighting vessels joined Renshaw on 28
1 December; the Sachem, a converted merchant screw,
i had come into the bay for much needed boiler repair,
/ accompanied by the Coryplieus, a sailing yacht. But
they were too weak to attack the bridge alone, even ; if their drafts had allowed their getting in range.
! Also, the Unionists had no “efficient pilots' tor
, navigation in the bay. Of course, Renshaw had ini sufficient manpower to assault by land. So the bridge
: remained open for the Confederates.
; The reports that General Magruder was planning
- to attack the Unionists from the Texas shore were
i correct. Arrival of the Massachusetts contingent
- caused him to make Galveston his first objective,
r Available to him were men aplenty, including the
) Sibley Brigade, veterans of a New Mexico campaign
i earlier in the year.
- Magruder planned a night assault on Galveston
r by land and water. He would lead his land force;
of Magruder—would lead the water assault. Although Smith was never formerly commissioned by the Confederate forces, Magruder designated him a major nonetheless. For the attack, Magruder would be able to accomplish no more than preliminaries until night fell. Then he would have to get men and artillery all the way from Virginia Point to positions surrounding Colonel Burrell’s wharf. The artillery would be considerable; though one gun would be mounted on a railroad car, transporting the others would be a large task.
For the assault by the water, Leon Smith had two small steam riverboats, the Bayou City and the Neptune, that would steal down with steam tenders from the upper bay. Their drafts were so scant that they could navigate well in the shallowest of waters. The Bayou had but a single gun; the Neptune had a couple of howitzers. But each would be jammed with sharpshooting soldiers, ready to board any Union vessels that might be reached. For the men’s protection from enemy missiles, the boats’ decks would have cotton bale bulwarks.
Among Galveston's citizens were some Union loyalists, and intelligence flowed freely that Magruder was up to something. Colonel Burrell was ex-
Leon Smith—an experienced ship captain and friend
ceedingly apprehensive. At the outset, he had constructed from his wharf's planks a sturdy breastwork on the wharf about 100 feet from shore, leaving in its front a 50-foot gap, save for a single plank walkway. Soon, he constructed a second such breastwork toward the end of the wharf with a similar gap in its front.
Then, on 30 December, news came that Magruder would attack that night or the next. Burrell ordered that sleep be allowed for only one at a time of his three companies. During the last day of 1862, a Union lookout in the city reported that enemy troops were assembling on the island off toward the bridge; even within the city, there were suspicious faces. The Saxon that had brought Burrell and his men from New Orleans was still in the bay. Burrell decided that on the next day he would reembark his people to await in the bay the arrival of the rest of his regiment.
Commander Renshaw, heartened by Burrell’s troops and the imminent prospect of many more, seemed not to share Burrell’s nervousness. He appeared unconcerned about little cotton-clad river boats. Of his own four armed vessels, only the steam transport Maiy Ann Boardman and the Saxon. The Mary Ann Boardman had arrived at noon on the 31st laden with commissary stores, preparatory to the coming from New Orleans of Texas refugees recently organized as Union troops, who were to support Burrell’s regiment.
There was a bright moon that night; it would set somewhat after 0200 on I January. Around midnight, Colonel Burrell visited sentry posts in the city. Rumbling noises of artillery wheels and even locomotive whistling made it obvious that trouble was just ahead. A little later, perhaps shortly afier 0200, detecting from black smoke that enemy vessels were in the offing, the Westfield moved in the direction of a couple of dark objects up the bay. But she had gone only about three vessel lengths when she went hard aground just off Pelican Spit. On the Westfield's signal, the Clifton and later the Mary Ann Boardman went to help refloat her; the effort was in vain.
About 0400, artillery, supplemented by a great storm of musketry, opened on Burrell’s wharf position and his supporting vessels.1 The Confederate artillery was a six-gun light battery, 14 other field
Owasco had been originally designed for fighting, but all were formidably armed: the Westfield with six guns, the Clifton with eight, the Harriet Lane with five, and the Owasco with four. The Sachem, though limping from the bad boiler, had five good guns, and her companion—the little yacht Cory- phetts—had two.2
On the evening of the 31st, the Harriet Lane was stationed in the main channel near its abrupt shallowing about a mile west of Burrell’s wharf, and the Clifton was about 100 yards east of the wharf, with the Sachem and the Corypheus in between just off the wharf. The Owasco had been coaling in the bay northeast of the city but was not far away. The Westfield, with Renshaw on board, lay farther to the northeast near Pelican Spit. Also in the bay was the pieces, six siege guns, and an 8-inch Dahlgren on a railroad car. As to the number of men in the attack, Magruder himself was not sure, so hastily and loosely had they been assembled. Even raw volunteers had flocked to him. Indeed, Confederate Arizona Governor John R. Baylor, who happened to be there, joined in as a private in shirtsleeves, helping place and serve the guns. Magruder later was to guess that the total attacking force numbered between 5,000 and 6,000.
Burrell’s little band, never before under fire and only a few weeks away from civilian life, behaved remarkably well. Burrell had his men lay low behind the breastwork toward the end of the wharf, not wasting ammunition by firing blindly into the darkness. Apparently, his enemy made only one attempt
to storm the wharf with scaling ladders and planking thrown over the wharf s bared skeleton. The effort failed; the scaling ladders were too short, and good shooting by the defenders repelled the plank-crawlers.
From the opening of the battle, the vessels supporting Burrell provided effective gunfire, aided by enemy gun flashes; though the Owasco could not get into the action for a time, the Union gunnery after a while forced the enemy gunners to abandon their posts. Even the late-arriving Clifton did good work. On her way, she had first approached an especially annoying Confederate battery that had been placed at works toward the east end of Galveston Island; the Clifton quickly silenced it before moving farther into the fight.
Dawn came about 0600 with the battle still not over; the water attack was about to begin. The movement out in the bay that had led the Westfield to a grounding had been a tentative descent of Smith s flotilla, the Bayou City and the Neptune with their tenders, but it had drawn back to await development of the land attack. When again it descended at dawn's earliest light, it bore to the west of Pelican Island toward the nearest of the Union vessels, the Harriet Lane. At the opening of the land attack, the Harriet Lane had moved toward the city from her original station near the main channel’s shallowing and played a good part in the battle.
When the Confederate vessels were sighted, the Harriet Lane swung about in the narrow channel to go at them bow on. The Bayou City, with Smith on board, was somewhat ahead of the Neptune. The Harriet Lane soon opened fire, hitting but not stopping the Bayou City. Then, within about a half mile, the Bayou City opened fire with her one gun; the second shot hit the Harriet Lane but did little damage; on the third or fourth shot the gun exploded, killing the gun captain. But on came the Bayou City, with the Neptune following a little to the side; their intent was to board the Harriet Lane. The Harriet Lane's tactic was to ram the Bayou City, hoping to put her out of action and then board and capture the Neptune. But as the Harriet Lane maneuvered in the narrow channel, she went aground just as she was about to hit the Bayou City. This allowed the Bayou City, by swerving, to avoid the Harriet Lane s bow. The swerve prevented the Bayou City trom effecting her intended contact for boarding, but did result in a glancing collision that happened to release the Harriet Lane's anchor as the Bayou City slipped past. So there was the Harriet Lane, not only aground but anchored.
Close after came the Neptune. She, too, failed in the intended contact and bumped on past. She turned quickly to come back at the Harriet Lane, but a well-directed shot from the Harriet Lane smashed her bow, and she sank in shallow water at the channel’s edge. The Harriet Lane's crew cheered lustily, assuming that the Bayou City would be well cared for by the other Unionists down the channel. But that was not to be. The shallow-draft Bayou City, not confined to the channel, had rounded about and charged back, her sharpshooters busy, this time ramming into the Harriet Lane abaft the wheel- house. The two vessels were stuck fast together. Smith and his men leaped aboard the Harriet Lane. Before the boarding, the Harriet Lane’s commander, bravely but rashly exposing himself, had been killed and her second in command mortally wounded by the Bayou City's deadly sharpshooting. That left the Harriet Lane under command of an acting master who seemed in a daze. Almost at once he gave in, and Leon Smith had the Harriet Lane.
As the assault on the Harriet Lane developed, the Owasco, down off the city, started toward her. To the Owasco, it looked as though the two vessels attacking the Harriet Lane were backed by a third. It appears that then, and even long afterward, some of the Unionists thought that at least one of the tenders in Smith’s flotilla was an armed vessel.4 In any case, the Owasco moved to give the Harriet Lane support against what seemed a heavy attack. She had nearly reached the Harriet Lane when a hail of musketry issued from that vessel. Thus was it announced to the Owasco that the Harriet Lane was now an enemy. Quickly, the Owasco fired one gun in reply, so close to the Harriet Lane that it had to be fired through the Owasco's bulwarks. But that shot was the only one, for sharpshooting from the Harriet Lane hit some of the gunners and drove the others away. As the Owasco started backing down the narrow channel to get out of sharpshooters' range, the Harriet Lane displayed a white flag which stopped further shooting at her.
In the meantime, the Clifton had been moving toward the Harriet Lane, also intending to give support. She hailed the Owasco, asking “What was the matter of the LaneT' In the noise and turmoil, the reply was indistinct. As the Clifton moved on, her skipper—Lieutenant Commander Richard L. Law— thought he saw a Union flag and a white flag on the Harriet Lane. This, he assumed, meant that the Harriet Lane had captured the Confederate vessel, with a white flag indicating parley. He was soon disillusioned, for a boat from the Harriet Lane under a truce flag brought the Confederate Bayou City's captain and an acting master of the Harriet Lane with bad news.
The Owasco, in the meantime, had kept moving down the channel and passed Colonel Burrell's wharf. The colonel hailed her as she passed, requesting that she take his men aboard. He was ignored: perhaps the Owasco's captain. Lieutenant Commander Henry Wilson, was so preoccupied with what was happening up the channel that he neither saw nor heard Burrell.
Display of the white flag on the Harriet Lane had resulted from some fast thinking. When the Owasco began backing from sharpshooting range. Smith should have been in a quandary. To all appearance, the Confederate land attack was stalled; the Neptune was sunk. While Smith had the Harriet Lane, she was stuck to the Bayou City and so was immobilized and listing, limiting possible use of her guns. Though the Westfield was also immobilized. Smith could not yet know that; even had he known, he could not be sure that she would remain so. And the other Union vessels, though hemmed by the narrow channel, presumably by careful maneuvering could bring their guns to bear on the Harriet Lane. But Smith let no quandary stump him; he decided on a bold bluff. He raised a white flag, and by rowboat under a truce flag sent the Bayou City's captain, accompanied by the dazed acting master of the Harriet Lane (under parole to assure his return), to demand Union surrender.
As the Harriet Lane's master stepped on board the Clifton, he told one of the Clifton's officers that all of the Harriet Lane's company, except ten or a dozen, had been killed or wounded. Brought to Commander Law, he said that the Harriet Lane's commander had been killed, her second in command mortally wounded, and that “2/3rds of the officers and ship’s company were killed or wounded.” (In fact, of the Harriet Lane's 112 crewmen, only five had been killed and about 15 wounded.) Law asked whether the Harriet Lane could move; the master said that he did not know exactly, “but had heard of no damage to the machinery.” Thereupon, the Confederate Bayou City's captain informed Law that “the Lane and four other steamers were ready to move against the next vessel near them”—which would be Law’s Clifton—but that instead of continuing the attack, Smith would allow the Unionists to take any one of their vessels with all their people and depart the bay, the other vessels to be left to the Confederates. He added that the officers and crew of the Harriet Lane had been placed on deck, being killed by Union shelling, and that “they would kill 5 [more] for every shot [the Unionists] fired.”5
The death of the Harriet Lane's captain, who had been next in command to Renshaw, left Law as the ranking officer away from the Westfield. Law responded to the Confederate that he would convey the proposition to Renshaw, “provided that the steamers should not move from their position, and that sufficient time be given to communicate.” The Confederate agreed “and gave three hours.” Thereupon, Law informed the other Union vessels, ordering them to remain where they were, and all raised white flags. Law left the Clifton by small boat for the long trip to the Westfield off the far end of Pelican Spit, accompanied by the Harriet Lane's paroled master who would give Renshaw the same story he had given Law about the Harriet Lane's condition, “except that he said 75 people were killed or wounded, instead of 2/3rds.”
All this had happened quickly without a word to Colonel Burrell. The Confederates on land had kept updesultory musketry. Burrell was perplexed. Soon, he had raised a white flag for parley, at which he requested a half hour truce to communicate with the Navy. That was granted him on condition that he send off but one man. Burrell sent his adjutant in the only boat available. The adjutant’s mission was to ask one of the Union gunboats to come to the wharf and embark Burrell’s men; nearest was the Owasco. Burrell's adjutant boarded her, put the request to the Owasco's captain, Commander Wilson, and was told that he would have to await Law’s return from conference with Renshaw; presumably, he was told also that, under the truce, the Union vessels were required to stay in place.
So there was Burrell’s adjutant, frantically arguing to no avail with the Owasco's captain, while ashore the half hour was running. Burrell was still in complete ignorance save for his observation of alarming enemy preparation to renew the land attack with his essential Navy support under white flags. The Bayou City's captain who had granted the three- hour truce had come ashore to announce that it applied only to the water conflict. Hence, when the land’s half hour ended, the Confederates demanded Burrell’s surrender. After some sparring, Burrell yielded, and he and his men soon were marched off their wharf as prisoners of war. Before the day’s end, they—joined by the Harriet Lane's survivors—would be sent from Galveston to a sad captivity.
The irony of the entire affair is suggested by the casualty figures. So well had Burrell handled his men that, despite the shelling and musketry they had endured, none had been killed and but 15 wounded—only one mortally. The Confederates had suffered considerably; the number of their killed and wounded is unclear because of the loose organization of the improvised force. While General Ma- gruder would report only 26 killed and 117 wounded, there is evidence that as many as 75 were killed and many more wounded.
In the meantime, Commander Law had reached the still-grounded Westfield. Renshaw instructed him that the enemy proposition was rejected; that Renshaw would transfer the Westfield's company to the transports Saxon and Mant Ann Boardman and blow up the Westfield; that Law should return to the Clifton ; and that the whole Union squadron was to get out of the bay. Renshaw probably assumed that in the process, somehow, Colonel Burrell and his men ashore would be embarked by the fleet. Renshaw, of course, could not know what would be happening on the wharf.6
Law started back to carry out the instruction. Renshaw had his crew transferred to the transports, set a train of powder to the Westfield's magazine, lighted a slow match, and started down the ladder to his gig where the last of his officers and crewmen awaited him. But as he descended there came a great explosion. To the horror of onlookers in the transports, Renshaw, his gig, and its crew were blown to bits.
Law returned to the Clifton a little before the explosion, with the Harriet Lane's paroled master dutifully rowing back into enemy hands. Burrell and his men ashore were being marched off their wharf as prisoners, so whatever instruction Renshaw may have given for their rescue had become academic; Law devoted himself to carrying out the order to get the squadron out of the bay. At once, he observed that the enemy had moved the Harriet Lane and Bayou City to a wharf; he regarded that as a violation of the agreement that vessels were to stay in place. He still did not realize that the Harriet Lane and Bayou City were pinned together. Nor did he realize what proved to be the fact, that the Harriet Lane's machinery was so damaged that "the engine could not work.” He could see also that, on land, the Confederates had moved guns into menacing positions. So, regarding the enemy as infracting the truce, he communicated no further with his foe but ordered all the Union vessels to haul down white flags and leave the bay at once. All this was within the three-hour truce time.
As expiration of the truce neared. General Ma- gruder had directed the Bayou City's captain to get back to the Union squadron with a demand for its surrender. By the time he reached the Clifton, the Union vessels had started away before lowering the white flags. He protested the move violated the truce agreement. Law, believing that the enemy themselves were violators, "recriminated and dismissed" Magruder’s emissary. The squadron sailed on toward the bay mouth, with enemy artillery firing to no avail at the rearmost Sachem.
It was at about the bay’s mouth that Commander Law received the alarming news of Renshaw's death. Now Law was in full command, but he believed that Renshaw’s order to leave the bay remained binding. He sailed on, abandoning the two coal barks; one had been damaged in the shelling and the other was too far away to be readily reached for towing, as a head wind would have required. Afer navigating his ships back over the bar, Law decided the vessels were in such poor condition that they could no longer maintain an effective blockade. So he ordered them back to New Orleans.
To Farragut, the Galveston disaster seemed a nightmare” without excuse. Only his shortage of officers prevented him from sending Commanders Law and Wilson back north immediately. Later, he detained them, having been told to expect an order from the Navy Department to try them by court- martial. But, by late April, he was so preoccupied, notably by Mississippi River operations, that he could not handle a court-martial, and he sent them north. Finally, on 1 August, Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles preferred charges. Each officer was charged with two offenses: failing to do his utmost to recapture or destroy the Harriet Lane and leaving his blockading station without being regularly relieved.
On 18 November 1863 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the trial of Law began. On 30 November, he was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to dismissal from the service, with a clemency recommendation. Wilson’s trial followed at once; Law testified as a defense witness. On 9 December, Wilson was exonerated; responsibility had been Law’s as Wilson’s superior officer. On 7 January 1864, the Secretary of the Navy entered his order on review of Law’s case: "An officer could not well be convicted of offenses more derogatory to his professional character nor more imperatively requiring an example of severe punishment,” said Wells. But in view of the clemency recommendation and other circumstances, the President had mitigated punishment to a three-year suspension.
On 22 January, Law wrote to Gideon Welles, acknowledging receipt of the President's determination and saying, "At a future day I shall lay my account of the Galveston business before the Hon. Secretary and hope to show that the finding is unjust and the sentence unduly severe.” Exactly two months later, he would acknowledge receipt of another communication from the Secretary terminating his suspension. Back he went to active duty to command a sloop based at Panama, and he sailed until long after the war, reaching a captaincy in 1877 and retiring in 1886.7
As to the Harriet Lane, she had been badly damaged in the Battle of Galveston and proved to be of little use to the enemy. The ship that Farragut had feared would become a blockade-runner "as bad as the Alabama”x spent most of the war in port, until 1864, when she managed to carry one load of cotton to Cuba.
'Robert Means Thompson and Richard Wainwright, eds.. Confidential Cot respondent? of Gustavos Vasa Fox. 2 vols. (New York* Arno Press Inc.. 1920), vol. I, pp. 324-25.
■Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series 2. vol i. part !. pp. 59. 67. 99. 168-69. 195. 238. Guns might differ somewhat from the official record. In any case, skillfully manned as was the squadron, it was strong.
Reports as to the time the land attack began vary from 0300 to just before 0500.
JA court of inquiry established by Farragut soon after the battle said that the other Confederate vessels were not armed. From all the evidence, it seems most probable that the Unionists simply were not sure of the character of the Confederate tenders in the distance and early light.
■In his account, the captain of the Bayou City said that his proposition was the •'officers and crews” would be paroled, to be taken away on ”the sailing ships.” leaving all the steamers. Like some other details of that account, this seems implausible; the sailing vessels were only Corvpltens and two coal barks, which could not possibly have carried all the crew members. A mystery is why Law should have paid attention to the Confederate proposition had it not applied to the Union troops ashore.
‘No evidence was found as to what direction was given by Renshaw respecting the disposition of Burrell's land force. It is inconceivable that Renshaw would have ignored Burrell.
7Letters Received hv the Secretary of the Navy from Officers below Rank of Commander. 1802-84, Law to Welles. 22 January and 22 March 1864, The National Archives; Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers. 1798-1868, Welles to Law. 17 March 1864. The National Archives.
*Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, series I vol 19 pp. 481.489-90.
Major Sources
1. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies (New York: Arno Press. Inc.. 1976). series I. vol. 19. pp. 437-81.
2. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (New York* Arno Press. Inc.. 1976). series 1. vol. 15. pp. 199-227.
3. Charles P. Bosson. History of the Forty-Second Regiment Infantry. Massachusetts Volunteers (Boston: 1886).
4. Richard A. and Flelen Fiske Atkins, eds.. Civil War Journal of Private George M. Fiske, 42 Massaclwssetts Regiment (Syracuse: 1962).
5. Francis R. Lubbock. Six Decades in Texas (Austin: 1900).
6. Robert Morris Franklin. Battle of Galveston (Galveston: 1911).
7. James M. Day. "Leon Smith: Confederate Mariner.” East Texas Historical Journal. 3 March 1965. pp. 34-49.
8. Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Navy Department. 1799-1867. vols. 106-07. case nos. 3392 & 3409. The National Archives.
9. Of the several secondary accounts of the battle, the best are those by Virgil C. Jones in The Civil War at Sea (New York: 1960-62). vol. 2. pp. 317-27 and "The Battle of Galveston.” Civil War Times Illustrated, February 1967. pp. 28-38.
Author’s note: / am most thankful to Dr. W. S. Dudley, head of the Historical Research Branch. Naval Historical Center. Navy Department, and his staff for guidance and great help.
Mr. Westwood was graduated from the Columbia University Law School in 1933 and has been a partner of the law firm Covington & Burling since 1936. He served in the Marine Corps during World War 11; he has authored numerous articles for historical publications, including Civil War History. Military Affairs, and Civil War Times.