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In time of war, it would take merchant ships—lots of them—to get U. S. weapons and supplies overseas. Our government is deluding itself if it thinks that it can meet wartime requirements by drawing upon the meager supply of National Defense Reserve Fleet ships in mothballs (some of which are shown here) and upon ships now in commercial service.
In the event of a major war, it is entirely conceivable that the United States would face concurren threats in both the Persian Gulf region and in NATU Europe. Unfortunately, we wouldn’t be able toge there from here, because—without question—°ur sealift forces could not support a two-theater commitment. Efforts are in progress to do something about the shortage of strategic mobility forces. Bn ■ even while lauding those efforts, we should not o deluded into thinking that they are sufficient to as
sure the development of sufficient sealift to implement national policies—and thus to guarantee national security.
Blame for the current shortcomings can be widely sPread, and that is part of the problem as well. The responsibility is so diffuse that many different organizations need to do an about-face. Parochial Maritime interests must end their extended periods of inattention and their Alphonse and Gaston act. f°o often, the buck has been passed among elements of the Department of Defense, the Commerce Department’s Maritime Administration, the Federal Maritime Commission, various committees of Congress, and the private sectors of the maritime industry—labor and management alike.
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Let’s take a case in point to illustrate the shortage of sealift readiness and the reasons for it. Fewer than 20 dry bulk carriers are operated under the U. S. flag, despite the fact that significant volumes of more than six dozen strategically important min-
erals and ores are imported by sea. That is deplorable, critics say. And yet no action is taken to build dry bulk carriers. Why? It costs $4 million to build a medium-size bulker in U. S. yards, only SI.8 million in a foreign yard. An American crew would cost S2.8 million a year, but the cost would be only $600,000 if a crew from the Philippines or Hong Kong were employed. No businessman in his right financial mind would invest in an American-built, U. S.-crewed dry bulk carrier on the basis of his responsibility to assure that such ships are available to serve the military in an emergency. However, the responsibility is his.
It says so in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which establishes U. S. maritime policy. Designed to encourage development of the merchant marine when the specter of Adolf Hitler loomed large on history’s horizon, the law states that the United States must have a merchant marine consisting of the . . best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its
commerce and serve as a naval or military auXI ,a,0 in time of war or national emergency, ultimately be owned and operated privately by the citizens the United States.” e
Despite the financial considerations cited a°° ,' bulk carrier operators, dry and liquid, receive 0 minor federal assistance. On the other hand, l|ae (scheduled ships that carry high-priority, high-vf ^ dry cargo) are heavily subsidized. Up to wage costs, congressional witnesses have said- ^ up to 55% of ship construction costs have been c pensated for by government subsidies. That is P vided for in the 1936 act. As a result, while f°re!jng flag ships carry 98% of strategic-list items, 'nC . jV6, 97% of energy sources, liners are more comped , About 25% of U. S. import-export trade is ca in U. S.-fiag ships. But U. S.-flag ships carfy than 5% of overall U. S. trade since bulk corn jear ities constitute 92% of that trade. The lesson's ue on U. S. maritime policy’s role in our depl° ^ shortage of sealift capability: “You don’t get you don’t pay for.” ^o4-
U. S. maritime policies, dating back to the e 1936 period and only superficially amended s. then, have produced a merchant marine > y try incapable of meeting either economic or mi e requirements. National policy is neither eite t nor related to specific national objectives, aa jn- only now is Department of Defense concer?. ijtary ning to be evident. Past commanders of the M
?eal'ft Command (MSC), notably Vice Admiral awson Ramage and Vice Admiral Arthur Gralla, ^ePeatedIy voiced their concerns in the 1970s that capability was already inadequate and dimin- q, !n8- Admiral Isaac Kidd, former Commander in cele^ Atlantic, has been another strong voice con- a ^n'n8 the gap between sealift requirements and liable resources. Their warnings were given l at” attention, for post-World War II planning has jnei? s'ngle focused—on a short, conventional war the NATO theater. Readiness measures taken triere based on rapid airlift deployment of reinforce- p|r n’s ar*d pre-positioning of equipment and sup- ases ’^cy would need. Sealift for the long haul was Urned to be available from the Military Sealift tp rtllaiand, the National Defense Reserve Fleet, the chrchant marine, and NATO allies. Plans have now as a resu,t ’he situation in the Middle Pent ^0v'et intervention in Afghanistan, and de- Asi- e°Ce industrial nations on Southwestern Chief0'*' ^‘ce -Admiral Kent Carroll, then Joint c0rTls Staff director of logistics and now MSC ear|jrnan<der* told several congressional committees SealifP year. U. S. mobility forces—airlift and Heed * must he flexible enough to meet projected no matter where the challenge may come, twilit- Present- the system moves large amounts of ^ exchange and commissary supplies, bev- riers ■*’ and troop support items. Commercial car- ransport the goods, and management of the
cargo flow is provided by a combination of com- merical vendors, installation traffic officers, inland cargo consolidation centers, and others. But for wartime, it is apparent that such a system will not produce readiness, will not produce flexibility, and will not produce surge capability.
That was proven in the Vietnam War. The Navy had to scrape the bottom of the maritime inventory to get ships to support troops in the early phases of that conflict. Intermodal carriers could not be unloaded since support facilities did not exist. Ships swung at anchor for months waiting for discharge, and that increased requirements for numbers of ships, with MSC (then called Military Sea Transportation Service) having nearly 600 involved at the peak. Once support facilities were built—an expensive, time-consuming program—the early problems were resolved and containerships in the U. S. maritime industry were able to meet requirements relatively easily. But that system has little value when troops need to be supplied over the beach, or through damaged or inadequate ports. The Department of Defense and the Maritime Administration, in advocating more complete dependence on commercial sealift, assume that problem away by increasing the probability factor of port availability and availability of in-port support facilities.
No matter whether assigned responsibility by statute or by DoD policy, a profit-oriented maritime industry cannot provide sealift readiness as a byproduct of its operations. It should not be expected to do so, especially not if the military is unable to establish specific requirements and to provide necessary resources, beginning with funding. Ships in the merchant marine are designed to be economically competitive, are highly specialized, non-selfsustaining, part of an integrated international ocean distribution system. Huge, costly ships aimed at minimizing turnaround time call at relatively few world ports with feeder ships used to transfer cargo to other destinations. Many of those feeder ships are foreign flag and may or may not be available for military support in an emergency. In such a situation, high losses can be expected, and each ship would take a lot of critical military cargo with it. Construction of replacements would be difficult given time needed, limited yard availability, and great costs.
Military Sealift Command: The immediate-response sea transportation force within the Department of Defense is the Navy’s Military Sealift Command. In 3 June 1981 testimony to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Rear Admiral Bruce Keener, then the commander of MSC, reported that his organization controls 131 ships] half or more “operated under various types
of contractual agreements with commercial companies.” About 78% of the command’s $1 billion in annual expenditures flows directly to industry for ships, shipping services, or systems. Sealift capability is represented by the 33 tankers and 33 dry cargo ships in the command-controlled fleet. MSC can rapidly increase DoD sealift capability by securing additional chartered ships from industry, by booking more military cargo on scheduled liners that carry it in accord with container and shipping agreements with the command, or by procuring shipping systems from industry. Examples of the latter are supplier-to-user intermodal service, tug-and-barge delivery services, or whatever other capability maritime technology makes available. MSC is responsive. Its fleet of breakbulk ships and roll-on/roll-off vessels is ideal for contingency support. MSC mariners, both Civil Service and contractor provided, are experienced in military operations and provide an officer cadre for emergency expansion. Communications are 20th century, via satellite, and the 32-year track record of the Navy command is good.
On the minus side of the ledger are limited ship resources, and the Military Sealift Command's past tendency to try to be all things to all people. An example of the latter is its insistence on full involvement in shipbuilding and ship repair programs without an adequate staff to monitor those functions. MSC has perhaps been overly protective of its sealift turf with somewhat less expertise than it claimed to have. It only recently kicked its habit of recruiting only maritime personnel and promoting almost exclusively from within. And, while the command now has young, able people with specific training in disciplines such as rate setting, engineering, contracting, et al, there has been a recent top-to-bottom change in both command and civilian management posts, primarily as a result of retirements. That unavoidably produces a lower level of corporate experience.
An encouraging sign is that the Navy would not have been likely to assign Admiral Carroll as MSC commander unless it is willing to push for sealift readiness programs he helped conceive and implement while in his JCS position. The change is only the latest in a series of signals that the Navy is finally accepting its responsibility for sealift rather than viewing the mission and MSC as competitors for Navy funds. The Navy seems to be facing up to a long-existing though not obvious conflict that has had a negative effect on sealift readiness. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and elements of Congress have been advocating readiness aspects of sealift, DoD’s office of Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics and the House Appropriations Committee represent an opposing force. The latter two have focused on peacetime needs, economy, and efficiency with industry providing the transportation system and the Army sup
plying traffic management. What the choosing-upsides situation illustrates is that objectives and requirements are secondary to the perceptions that prevail in the various organizations. In short, there is no coherent sealift policy.
In an emergency, domestic sealift needs would continue to exist, limiting responsiveness of a force with a limited number of ships. And, since business must make a profit, the law of supply and dernan will continue to be applied. The greater the military emergency, the higher the cost of commercial services and ships. That was demonstrated in the Korean conflict, in Southeast Asia, and in many crises in between. That is understandable, for the risks to shipowners can be great, and they expect to be compensated for both risks and investment. Unfortunately, the risks the Department of Defense takes by continuing to avoid its own investment in seah readiness can be even greater.
National Defense Reserve Fleet: The ND^F served well as a maritime piggybank in Korea an Vietnam. On occasion, mothballed ships have bee activated even to drive down increased transput tation prices for carriage of foreign aid. The ND^ ships, which average 35 years of age, might be bet candidates for razor blades needed by troops,ra!„ than sealift support, five years from now. About I of the 150 are World War II survivors. The ofmc* position is that NDRF ships can be activated in days, a claim few support when pressed. Consi ering shipyard capability and other work the yar would have, that is a very rosy estimate. Much mo responsive are the 25 ships in the Ready Kese^.£ Force, a part of the NDRF which is considered a
to be put into operation in 5 to 10 days. The Navy Provides funds for the maintenance of these ships, and the Maritime Administration maintains them. The Navy’s hope is to have 44 ships in the Ready Reserve Fleet by 1986. To assure achievement of that goal, new ships have to be built for the merchant Marine, creating RRF candidates. But few will be as Ipng as there is not assurance that cargo will be available to provide investors a profit.
Sea/iyjf Readiness Program: If merchant marine, RRF, and NDRF ships are not available in the right lumbers for an emergency short of mobilization, ae Military Sealift Command can recommend S^llup of ships committed by private carriers to a . Sealift Readiness Program administered by ^ C. Ships are contractually committed by carriers esP°nding to an annual MSC request for rates to arrV military cargo worldwide. In order to get ship. ln8 business from the government, the participates carriers agree to provide up to 50% of their fleets n a non-mobilization emergency. Ships built with j.r operated with federal subsidy also must be of- ,ered for SRP enrollment, a requirement set forth n each Maritime Administration funding authorial]01! bill since 1979. About 180 dry cargo ships ad 40 tankers are committed under the program. eV can be called up in a time-phased sequence. ^ similar program is the Voluntary Tanker Agree- trei^ jointly sponsored by the Maritime Adminis- t,at|°n and the tanker industry. In an emergency,
, e nnilitary services would make their requirements to participating carriers meeting at the call to ^arAd. Carriers would allocate their own tankers .meet those requirements, and charter rates would set by a third party designated in the agreement.
To support the Rapid Deployment Force in the Persian Gulf, a Near Term Prepositioned Force was created. Below left, the USNS Jupiter and LJSNS Mercury take on rolling stock before heading for Diego Garcia. On this page are the Mercury and part of her cargo of tanks which were offloaded at Okinawa earlier this year for maintenance following a stay in the Indian Ocean.
Participation is strictly voluntary. Numbers of ships available would depend on carrier commitments and resources, as well as the gravity of the situation.
The Sealift Readiness Program is a non-asset, as illusory as a Hollywood set. Invoking the SRP would begin with an MSC recommendation, followed by CNO, Defense review, and JCS coordination. MarAd, which is the agency most concerned with the economic impact of any callup, would then review the recommendation. In effect, however, MarAd would determine both the validity of a military requirement and whether callup of the SRP is the best way to meet that requirement because it has the authority to approve or disapprove. The authority has been delegated by the Navy in an attempt to allay industry fears of an unwarranted invocation of the program. The industry is MarAd’s constituency. The industry in fact feels MarAd to be a part of its own family. Many in Mar Ad appear to share that feeling, as some have freely admitted. Industry officials also have freely admitted they have committed ships to the SRP because they do not feel it ever can be invoked. If it is, they can test the validity of the contract with the Navy in court, effectively delaying a callup in any situation short of a major threat to U. S. security.
In a recent military command post exercise, an SRP callup was recommended prior to the exercise start. When it had ended, after ships had been requisitioned and were “operating,” the SRP recommendation was still being reviewed. It can be a long process, with much opportunity to delay a decision. But, even if it moved rapidly, MSC would need to negotiate ship charter terms with the carriers after approval is received. Navy and DoD procurement policy says "no contract, no pay,” and ship owners are unlikely to risk a great investment without assurance of an adequate return. Obtaining ships via the SRP route could take 30 to 45 days at a minimum, a delay that should not be acceptable if the goal is to provide a limited number of ships rapidly in an emergency short of one warranting mobilization.
The Military Sealift Command has recommended changes in the program, including having industry offer ship hire rates in advance based on carrier costs, with MSC to add an award fee. That would assure quick payment and improve responsiveness. Recommendations include predesignation of ships by type and number for phased callup, which would help industry plan its own moves, and making Defense—rather than MarAd—responsible for deciding when requirements warrant an invocation of its contractual arrangement with the carriers. It is doubtful that all of these will be accepted. MarAd opposes a workable Sealift Readiness Program, as indicated by its position on proposed legislation to make permanent the requirement that ships built or operated with the aid of federal subsidy be offered for enrollment in the SRP. In a May 1981 letter to David Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget, MarAd opposed that bill. Its letter claimed “prolonged litigation” could result from differences between MSC and the carriers if the SRP was invoked. The agency said it viewed the “very existence of two essentially duplicate schemes [SRP and requisitioning] as undesirable.” One must wonder what is so undesirable about expecting ships subsidized for national security purposes to serve that purpose.
While never an advocate of the SRP. MarAd did not oppose it until its “veto” authority was questioned. That attitude typifies the reality of conflicts existing among federal agencies—Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, Transportation, and others— concerning ocean transportation. A similar conflict of interest exists between the military and industry.
It is understandable since each serves different objectives, each has its own constituency. But, it is appalling, for example, that the Navy or Defense Department should be pressured to agree in advance that ships to be constructed by industry for military use, or ships to be transferred from the reserve fleet to the Navy for operation, be manned by union mariners as a condition for approval of construction or transfer. Like many of the so-called congressional “compromises,” such dealing can have an adverse impact on the overriding objectives of national security—both economic and military security.
Requisitioning: When a state of national emergency exists or when the President proclaims that an emergency is sufficient to warrant requisitioning of merchant vessels, the Department of Defense can theoretically obtain ships by requisitioning. U. S-- owned, foreign-registered ships would be included- except for those registered in NATO countries that would not release them. Ships can be requisitioned selectively by type and number and would be assigned to the Navy or operated by the National Ship' ping Authority which MarAd would activate. The National Shipping Authority would also operate ships for domestic purposes or to support military requirements. Requisitioning could produce abou 236 dry cargo ships and 159 tankers considered useful for military purposes. Fifteen dry cargo ships and 54 tankers operating under foreign registry are considered to have military potential. However- domestic requirements would compete against mi' itary needs and limit ship availability. If all of these resources are insufficient, the National Shippin^ Authority can recommend that the President as NATO for merchant ships needed for U. S. milita^ support. About 400 have been committed, the only resource NATO countries pool. f
Are ships available from all of these sources su ficient in number and type? Again the answer is nodepending, of course, on the scale of the emergency- The more minor the emergency, the more apt seall resources are to match requirements. The proble is that no one can validly predict what those r® quirements will be. That makes planning more di ficult, readiness more uncertain. .
In March 1981, Admiral Thomas Hay^at warned a House Armed Services Committee su committee that "without adequate and reliable sea^ lift, literally none of our military plans executable.” That is rather like saying that if the is a major war involving U. S. interests, the nation armed forces might be unable to attend. But, som thing is being done to help assure sealift reading Other actions, however, are being taken that cou well produce an opposite result.
, . M ini
Readiness Initiatives: On the positive side. Joint Chiefs of Staff have initiated a series of re
•ness programs. They cover three general areas: modernization of reserve fleets and Military Sealift Command capability, acquisition of additional reserve capability by procuring privately owned ships and pre-positioning of combat loaded ships for support of forces deployed by air. The Rapid Deployment Force was established by the Carter administration in response to instability in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. To support deployment of RDF troops the concept of pre-positioning troop equipment and supplies in ships was dusted off. A §ood idea’s time had come. Vice Admiral William Cowhill, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), has told Congress that the Navy wants “new instruction ships designed specifically for this purpose or large, existing roll-on, roll-off ships acquired a°d modified as necessary.” Four can carry all efluipment required by a Marine Corps brigade of *6-500 men for 30 days of sustained combat. The ships have been designated T-AKXs. Six are to be huilt, and six more will be conversions to a roll-on/ r°H-off mode. Fiscal year 1981 money is pro- and the Navy plans to add two more tankers and four breakbulk ships this year. Five more will be activated from the NDRF, loaded with munitions for the Rapid Deployment Force, and pre-positioned near potential trouble areas. Also in the fiscal year 1982 budget amendment is a request for Navy acquisition of a seabee, a barge carrier that can deliver 38,000 long tons of cargo loaded in barges that are put aboard and discharged from the mother ship by a large stern elevator. To be designated an auxiliary lighterage ship (TALS), the Seabee can carry helicopters, DeLong piers, and other bulky cargo. Three are operated by Lykes Brothers Steamship Company.
A final readiness innovation is Navy acquisition of eight SL-7 containerships from Sea-Land Services, Inc. The 33-knot ships are fuel gulpers, no longer commercially competitive, but highly useful for providing rapid-response sealift capability. Congress has approved funds to buy the ships, convert them to combination roll-on/roll-off/containerships, and to anchor them in port areas near troops they
jammed for design work, and the Navy is seeking Ul}d'ng in fiscal years 1983 and 1984 for three more. tln early 1980, the Joint Chiefs directed the Mili- Sealift Command to establish a Near Term ,^Positioned Force for deployment in the Indian *a». MSC chartered two roll-on/roll-off vessels, ^eakbulk ships, a tanker to carry water, and jeed a ro/ro of its own as well as a bareboat charred tanker. The ships were loaded, sailed, and on tj5tl0n in mid-1980. Vice Admiral Cowhill has tes- j. ed that the seven-ship force carries “equipment Well1 ^ar'ne Corps amphibious brigade of 11,200 as fu I ^ s some Army and Air Force munitions and e ■ The NTPF is funded through fiscal year 1982,
W(K
/ 0c,ober i98i
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would support in an emergency. Present plans call for buying six this year with two more to be purchased with fiscal year 1982 funds. The ships will be maintained by small civilian crews, contractor provided, and could swing into action in five days.
Manpower: Critically important to sealift readiness is marine manpower. MSC-created jobs —about one of every four U. S. oceangoing billets—total 6,000. That figure includes nearly 4,000 Civil Service employees of the Navy and 2,000 union-provided crewmen on board chartered or contractor-operated ships. Altogether, nearly 47,000 mariners fill not quite 20,000 oceangoing billets. MarAd Administrator Samuel Nemirow told the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on 3 June 1981 that this is a “ratio of 2.35 seafarers to every billet.”
“It is this peacetime reserve of over two active seafarers for every job that provides the reserve we depend upon to meet the increased demand when ships in the reserve fleet are activated,” Mr. Nemirow said. However, he and other witnesses also reported the average age of seafarers to range from 50 to 53 years, depending on the types of jobs they filled. That average has not dropped significantly in many years, suggesting that bloc obsolescence of the work force is as likely as that of reserve ships. As Admiral Keener put it, “there will be a dramatic turnover in the marine work force in the 1990s as present employees retire.” There were manpower problems, he said, in Korea and again during the war in Southeast Asia, and they will be present in any future conflict. “We no doubt will have difficulty in meeting ship activation schedules. We no doubt will have delays in sailing. The greater the scale of the emergency, the greater the manpower problem will be.”
The Public Interest: One big problem in addressing sealift readiness has to do with compromises arrived at to satisfy special interests rather than overriding public concerns. An example is the negotiations now going on for acquisition of the Sea- Land SL-7s. If the Navy pays the entire amount appropriated by Congress for the ships, about $35 million each, is that a fair deal for the taxpayer? The ships’ residual (after-depreciation) value has been reported to be well below 50% of that figure. What is their true market value, and what is their value to the military services? The cost of converting the containerships has been estimated to be as high as $100 million per ship.
Ro-ros, barge carriers such as LASH and Sea- bees, and other types of carriers built by private industry, aided and abetted by MarAd support and subsidies and seemingly without a profitable market for their services, have been offered to the Navy from time to time. Almost always the requested price for either charter or purchase has been high, unkindly referred to by many as a bail-out of carriers for unsound capital investment decisions. That is a major reason why only eight subsidized liner operators are now in business compared with the 15 operating ships a few years ago. Just as the military should not—and cannot—depend solely on the maritime industry for emergency capability, neither can industry use national security needs as a source of financial transfusions to change red ink to black, to cancel out their own mistakes in management.
The same holds true for maritime unions that have been lobbying the Navy, Defense, Congress, and the White House to turn over more if not all support- type ships to private industry for union manning- They claim it will create more jobs. The truth is that Civil Service mariners and union seafarers are interchangeable. They can move from one employe1- to another, and MSC mariners pay union dues since most are union members. The real reason for union pressures is that the mass retirements anticipated in the 1990s will put heavy pressure on union Pen' sion and welfare funds. Private carriers contribute to those funds, but government does not. The difference in the cost of operating a Navy fleet oiler if it were manned by other than Civil Service Per" sonnel, for example, would be an additional $1 t0 $1.5 million per year. In effect, union proposals f°r broader union manning of military support ships are another attempt to increase subsidies already Pal by the taxpayer. And it’s done in the guise of Pr° moting national security.
Conclusions: Add up the resources provided V the Military Sealift Command, the merchant maflne' National Defense Reserve Fleet, Sealift Readine^ Program, Voluntary Tanker Agreement, a NATO, and only about 1,050 ships might be ava^ able to support military projections of U. S. Pov\ —if there were no competing domestic demands ships. But there would be, of course. The shortaS for two major contingencies might be as high as ^ to 80% of requirements. Readiness measures under way will improve responsiveness but not pability overall. In World War I and World War ^ similar problems were resolved by major shipoul ing programs. A future war might be history e before a shipbuilding program could be launc What, then, is to be done? s.
For one thing, all those who are part of the tra ^ portation industry can no longer afford simp - defend the status quo; to try only the ehcap- solutions; or to assume away realities. It is high t for courageous action, innovation, creativity- ceptance of national goals, and of striving to ac those goals. . tj0n
In August of this year, the Reagan adminisu moved responsibility for ocean transportation to. Department of Transportation from the Depar
Military Sealift Command from 1969 to 1980.
of Commerce. That is a sound idea, another whose j'tne has come. So is the enactment of legislation, 'n August 1981, that allows foreign-built, U.S.- owned merchant ships to receive operating subsidies. A few small strides already have been taken to assure that special maritime interests are no longer predominant over national objectives and interests. There are a number of other proposals that merit consideration. We should do some or all of the following:
£ Require that DoD budget for subsidies, defense features built into merchant ships, and other programs intended to improve sealift readiness of the ^erchant marine.
Pass proposed DoD build-and-charter legislation hat would provide for congressional review of programs which encourage industry to build ships for military purposes on the strength of an advance £°rnmitment to charter those ships.
Ruild ships designed for military support purges, putting them directly into the National De- ense Reserve Fleet to revitalize that resource— or, an alternative, leasing those ships to private in- ustry for operation in peacetime with a commit- y ^nt to make them available in an emergency.
Implement a suggestion by James Amoss, chair- j an °f the National Maritime Council, to allow in- Ustry to build ships in foreign yards without sub- y at lower prices than available in U. S. b'Pyards. Those U.S. yards could be kept busy ,lU| ^'ng new combatant ships needed to revitalize f'Navy. P
^ peate a civilian reserve program to enroll young Ijj5n and women who are attracted to a seafaring as? atl(f those who have left seafaring jobs to work jn0re- We should pay them for time spent in train* °n board reserve ships and in classrooms and give them a small pension at the end of a specific number of years in return for their commitment to go to sea in merchant type ships in a major emergency.
► Appoint a blue-ribbon panel with a congressional and presidential charter to establish specific national maritime objectives, and then to draft a complete legislative program to achieve those objectives. Since this would take years, the commission should have a statutory life extending beyond any single administration, and which requires full consideration of its findings.
These but scratch the surface. Many other recommendations can and should be made. Unless they are and unless they are acted upon, the United States might well be forced to consider the previously unthinkable—nationalizing the maritime industry so that it can be wielded effectively as an instrument of both economic and military power and not merely be kept alive by federal welfare. Unless we have both adequate airlift and sealift, unless we have strategic mobility for our armed forces, the United States may have only one alternative as the result of the inability to deploy conventional forces. That alternative would be reliance on our arsenal of nuclear weapons for our survival.
Mr. Manning, a graduate of Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida, served in the Army during World War II and in the Air Force during the Korean War. He was a writer for the Stars and Stripes newspaper and subsequently worked as public affairs officer for the Air Force's Strategic Air Command and Military Airlift Command. He was public affairs/legislative affairs officer of the
.The Merchant Marine a Century Ago.
Our Navy may be sufficient now to protect our commerce, in the present stage of its development, for we can hardly be said to have either Navy or commerce worthy of consideration But as our surplus Productions are annually increasing and must be transported to foreign markets or become a total loss in our own hands, the question whether or not the Navy shall be improved so as to prov^fortbs state of anticipated development must quickly be decided. And it is well to remember, that if the freights paid by our people to vessels under foreign flags had been retained at home and allowed to become part of our national wealth, our ability to meet and overcome the embarrassments of trade would have been greatly increased. It is very clear that we cannot afford to continue our dependence npon foreign nations for the transportation of our surplus products to the market^^e ^ J=nefi,s a„d profit of our own carrying ,fade
them. We are certainly the great "middle kingdom and nave . •
stand on the face of the globe. From our geographical position and temtona a van ages we may j y
aspire to commercial supremacy, which if we fail to achieve we cannot expe^ \0 r^a'nta'n a P° ,
ln the front rank of nations. From the whole of our vast country comes one universal wish fora ,
American marine.