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qUri
t1arr> W ~
aCa. War were drawn chiefly from
and ^T1*a‘ Men like Charles J. Hitch t|y oiain Enthoven,
n- tbe crucial decade of the Viet-
Jl5 but had never “worked in the tL. ctPlace. ” Most of them had spent
bright, energetic, eager, and ambitious.
of ‘*rnara himself, vocal to the point try) ' ness> snowed Congress with undetail and a statistic for every in V“)n’ and became the strong man %; °tk tbe Kennedy and Johnson nets- The “Whiz Kids,” an appel-
Th
V; e ^cNamara Strategy and the Bi2fnam ^ar—Program
'96(fet'n^ *n r^e ^entaSon>
^ 968
Q
G2f0ry Palmer. Westport, CT.:
Ind<'«T>0d Press’ 1978- 169 PP- Bib.
' * 15.95 ($14.36)*
H •
ev,ewed by Hanson W. Baldwin
\ca^a^U‘n' a 1924 graduate of the Naval u'"rkj^' ret>8ne^'from ‘he Navy in 1927. He l>tCg J ** The Baltimore Sun and later Tim/ Ul,tary Editor of The New York W,,T "m‘* *,‘s retirement in / 968. He has ‘,en 15 hooks.
t " '9b 1 > a new breed of bureaucrat Pres f°Wer m t*le Pentagon. Until leaj Cnt Kennedy’s inauguration, dee frs^‘P in the Pentagon and, ininln Washington, had been vested laP<d'cicians, business executives, ^()[^Crs’ and bankers. But when kiry1^ McNamara became Secretly Defense, the men who assumed (jht..r<Llns <>f power in the Pentagon
who were among t|er P^ncipal architects of the new or- ar$j\ had brilliant records of schol
lejr ,. r----
tanlc, S ln un‘versities or “think
iiy ,(.)llective|y, this group of “defense Ci tUals” was
MriWorking
PriCesdeta'ls on ordering books and special see the Book Order Service note in the of Interest department.
lation which not inappropriately implied a kind of statistic legerdemain, dominated the strategy, the management, and the operations of the Vietnam War to such an extent that it was often dubbed in Washington “McNamara’s War.” They became the symbol of the new computer age; all problems could be solved with systems analysis, game plans, and proper programming.
How such a group of men, with far higher I.Q.s than most of us, could go so wrong and help to lead our country to disaster is the basic subject of this short study. The author’s first sentence asks: "How did people who pride themselves on their pragmatism become slaves to an ideology?”
The ideology, Mr. Palmer explains, was the concept of “security (as) a function in international relations analogous to that of utility in economics.”
Essentially, the failure of these economic theorists who led us down the blind alley of defeat was their attempt to rationalize war, which is often an irrational act, and to quantify the imponderables. They argued with impeccable lucidity from erroneous assumptions to fallacious conclusions. The short answer to Mr. Palmer’s question is that the “Whiz Kids” were not pragmatists; they were theorists.
The author, a research fellow at the University of London, argues that PPBS (planning, programming, budgeting system), introduced by McNamara and his practitioners of the so-called rationalist approach, “dominated defense planning and played a large part in the escalation of the Vietnam war. . . .”
But the game plan employed, the assumptions made, and many of the inputs to the quantitative and qualitative analytical methodology used were often wrong, or as Mr. Palmer puts it towards the end of his five chapters,
"Vietnam shows that the real world is not like the model.”
The author demonstrates that PPBS, or the cost-effectiveness approach to war, with its centralized management and decision-making, clearly was a major influence in the war’s outcome. Time and again this reviewer found himself saying “amen” to many of the comments in this book—even though in disagreement with what sometimes seemed recondite reasoning, mistaken assertions, and minimization of factors other than PPBS.
Palmer exposes the failure of the off-again-on-again-make-the-punish- ment-fit-the-crime use of air power in Vietnam, but appears to agree with the publicly accepted but fallacious conclusion that air power, as well as methodology, failed. And certainly McNamara, his “Whiz Kids,” and PPBS were not only or even primarily to blame for defeat in Vietnam; the military made its mistakes. Congress abdicated much of its monitoring and advisory role until too late. The guns-and-butter policy of Lyndon Johnson and his concomitant emphasis on “Great Society” programs led, inevitably, to huge deficits, to today’s inflation, and to the protraction of the war. The policy of gradualism, which necessitated very slow escalation which the enemy could always match, was more the President’s concept than it was McNamara’s, even though it dovetailed into the PPBS concept.
The decision of 1965 to depend upon the draft rather than calling up the reserves was Johnson’s and had nothing to do with PPBS. The fundamental misconception which cast a long shadow across all the early Vietnam years and inhibited mining, bombing, or any vigorous sustained attack on the sanctuary of North Vietnam—the fallacious assumption that strong U. S. action against Hanoi
Vietnam in my library, c^es^ . jf works would be my choice. Pcr^
would tend to heal the Sino-Soviet split and would lead, perhaps, to world war—was a product of the State Department, endorsed by Johnson. And, finally, the tacit encouragement by the United States of the overthrow of Diem—which led, inevitably, to a long period of instability in Saigon—was not related to PPBS.
Nevertheless the sins that were committed in the name of cost- effectiveness were legion. Very few of the “Whiz Kids” had had any military experience yet they provided the inputs in the equations of power they manipulated. At a dinner in Washington in those years, I was told with great emphasis by one of the most distinguished of the "Whiz Kids that there was absolutely no cost- effectiveness rationale for the existence of any U. S. Merchant Marine. Later, an Assistant Secretary of Defense boasted that in the Vietnam War "supplies were going to come out even” to the last shell; there would be no huge residual surpluses, as there had been after World War 11 and Korea. The inevitable result was a dangerous draw-down of U. S. ammunition stocks around the world, and periodic shortages in field generators, barbed wire, some types of ammunition, and many other items.
PPBS also greatly encouraged centralization; all decisions, in effect, had to be bucked upwards—from the size or style of women’s bloomers to what targets could be hit, when, and how in Vietnam. Washington became a tactical headquarters, with arm-chair generals in civilian clothes issuing orders to commands in the field, requiring, for instance, the movement of one tank one block. (It actually happened in the Dominican Crisis.)
Prevalent in the Pentagon of those days was a cavalier disregard for the experience factor and for the professional knowledge of the man in uniform, a lack of understanding of the military ethos and of the principles of loyalty down the chain of command, and an over-weening intellectual arrogance.
This book is a valuable contribution, within the limited purpose defined by its title, of what went wrong in Vietnam.
America in Vietnam
Guenter Lewy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 540 pp. Map. Append. Ind. $19.95 ($17.96).*
Reviewed by Major W. Hays Parks,
U. S. Marine Corps
Major Parks has served in command and staff positions in the Marine Corps since he received his commission in 1963■ Previous contributions to the Proceedings include “If I Became a Prisoner of War ...” “Law of War Training in the Navy and Marine Corps,' and reviews of hooks dealing with American POW experiences during the Vietnam War. He is writing a monograph for the official Marine Corps series on the Vietnam War.
I was one of several hundred to whom Professor Guenter Lewy turned for assistance in giving perspective to the material on Vietnam he had researched. With special research status, he took advantage of the soul-baring era we experienced in the early part of this decade to review policy and operational documents of the government and the military services to a degree few authors are willing even to consider. He pursued infinitesimal details. He sought the experience and research of others in sorting and weighing those myriad details. The final product will not change the views of those who vehemently opposed the war in Vietnam, but it should serve as the touchstone for any other analysis of U. S. involvement in Vietnam.
Extensively documented, America in Vietnam first looks at the overall policy-making process for our involvement in Vietnam: how we got there, our tactical policies, and how we sought disengagement through “peace with honor” and Vietnamiza- tion. In the latter half of.the book, Lewy examines in detail U. S. military tactics and the law of war; terrorism, counterinsurgency, and allegations of “genocide;” war crimes and punishment; and the bombing campaign over North Vietnam. His analysis of each topic is complete. He neither whitewashes our actions nor is an apologist for them; in many instances, he is unsparing in his criticism of U. S. policy and actions. At the same time, he thoroughly refutes many of the canards regarding
U. S. conduct of the war created ^ perpetuated by those who opp°se£ war. That he touched a sensitive ^ in this respect is evident fr0™ ce criticism he has received tor ^ on government documents in ^ search from those prominent int antiwar movement. It is ironic the antiwar faction now questions^ credibility of government docum ^ recalling their heavy reliance °“ Pentagon Papers to support their a tions against the war. Jt
In the early 1960s, one of t e ^ popular books on the French experience in Vietnam was e Fall’s excellent Street With0" >5
(Schocken Books, Inc., 1972)- ^ 0f America in Vietnam is by no mea the same style, but in every n
sense is of comparable value. 1.5
the choice of having only two on the modern military histor
these tv\ PerhaP5
f Str“
more had heeded the lessons 0 Without Joy, America in Vietnam * have a better ending.
Guts & Glory: Great America War Movies
Lawrence H. Suid. Reading, MA-- Addision-Wesley, 1978. 357 PP- ^ ' Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $6.95 fP‘
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Jarne Shaw, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Admiral Shaw, a 1936 graduate of the ^
U. S. Naval Academy, served in destroy ^ cruisers, battleships, and carriers wot ‘ ^
His shore duty assignments included taur' Director of Current History in the Department and Director of Navy Pu" ‘ Information Planning. He wrote Wo’ ‘ ^
II naval history in association with ^ Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison. As ' advisor of the motion picture The Caine^, Mutiny, he made many suggestions. ,V' Jose Ferrars lines: ‘ / torpedoed Quee;(,• torpedo him. ”
A ati0u'r
Any military man concerned the image of his service in the w 0f the public should read this hist° ^ war movies. The author, a deft and painstaking researcher, haS /J ered the field from the 1915 Bit1 ^ ^ Nation to the present, including
I .
jas”
Humphrey Bogart, with steel halls in hand, discusses The Caine Mutiny with then Chief of Information Rear Admiral Lewis S. Parks, Producer Stanley Kramer, and the reviewer, who was the film’s technical advisor.
c°nt;
cle:
roversial crop of Vietnam and nu-
ance, when authors resculpted
(Je3r. rnov*es- Most significantly, he ,ac^s the unique cooperation, 01 tur °^same> between the motion pic-
hat^ throu8b the years, this “love- th relationship has often affected service’s image, for better or *°rse.
the "love” side of the ledger are niovipo j . p
th ” made in wartime, particularly
^°Se °f World War II, glorifying the deer‘Can military and giving full evi- ^J*ce tbat the services and Hollywood Picf6 Steam‘n8 'n formation to produce q Ures that would aid the war effort, th ot^er band, peace often brings
c°nflict of film versus service. For
_ St;
ious .
Qu Vers|ons of Captain Bligh into a ^°r dramatic, box-office, or
f ’'Military reasons, the services ^^8nt to head off or at least not abet 1CS <^etr'rnenta* t0 cbe military.
- en c^e moviemakers brandish a ‘a r.tr°Vers*al script such as From Here th ern*ly > they could threaten that if tservice did not cooperate, the pic- cfe w°uld be filmed anyway, which fnp to the disadvantage of the
t0o‘tary. But the services had weapons Pla' weaPons: warships, tanks,
| 1165 > and troops which could be g' e<J to good-image pictures such as ^^eRound or denied to implausible §af damaging pictures such as Fail
theWhether cooperating or opposing, th Serv'ces always have been aware of sorltT>l3act t*le s’lver screen on as- Cq ted “publics” be they taxpayers, ^0rifiressmen, potential recruits, f)Jrier'can families, news media °Ple, educators, school children,
s
-
and overseas friends or foes. They have also noted the effect of residuals, the repetition of films in theaters and on television from one generation to another. Victory at Sea, for example, is appearing before a third generation of Americans. A good show can be a never-ending fount of good will and understanding; a bad one will sour the taste ad infinitum. (Suid illustrates the effect of impact specifically in the case of John Wayne movies which have brought enlistment candidates running to the recruiters.)
Impact awareness has led the services to pay what might seem an inordinate amount of attention to movies which outwardly appear of small consequence compared to national defense matters. In the Pentagon, the Defense Department has established a special group to deal specifically with film production. Within each service, the information chiefs take care to scrutinize requests for cooperation, while keeping both military and civilian hierarchies informed on what is to be filmed. Further, Defense Department film reviewers and service information offices keep an eye on Congress which complains if taxpayers’ dollars are being used too lavishly in cooperating with commercial film ventures. The White House is also not exempt from involvement as witnessed by John Wayne’s personal appeal to President Johnson for cooperation in producing The Green Berets, and Francis Ford Coppola’s telegram to President Carter for help with his highly controversial Apocalypse Now.
Guts & Glory is perhaps first in telling the Washington, D.C. story of making war movies. However, whether in the Pentagon or on the beaches of Normandy, the author’s history stems from his solid background of motion picture experience, in-depth research, endless reviewing of file films, and a staggering 300 taped interviews with admirals, generals, producers, directors, technical advisors, stars, and Pentagon officials.
Altogether, Suid has selected some 75 major films for analyses. Not all received or deserved service cooperation but in such cases the reasons are given. The reader probably will be surprised at how many of the features are familiar through name and memory—The Big Parade. What Price Glory, Wings, Destination Tokyo, Sands of lwo Jima, Patton, Midway, and even Dr. Strange/ove.
In summary, the book constitutes a valuable manual on how to get along with the filmmakers to a service’s advantage—or at least, not to its disadvantage. It is an informative, thoughtful, and entertaining account of what goes into the creation of a war movie.
American Caesar: Douglas Mac Arthur, 1880-1964
William Manchester. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1978. 793 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $15.90 ($13.50)*
Reviewed by Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Admiral Wadleigh served on hoard the USS Yorktown (CVS) and several cruisers in the South Pacific area during World War II. He has been a frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
“The flag, and the flag, and the flag,” these words which close a fascinating biography speak the theme of Douglas MacArthur’s half century of service. In an objective and very read-
97
°e®<lings / July 1979
landings and probably knew t e eral best. Yet, neither of these 15 guished flag officers receive su '^f. credit for their cooperation in a thur’s seapower strategy. i
From Japan’s surrender on battleship Missouri (BB-63) unt‘ aVy Communist attack in Korea, the appears infrequently in Mane es
•olean
The
division for Inchon was a Hero task done on very short notice- ^ ^
tasK done on very shuh . .
work of Major General O. P- ^ mentioned as his marine briga e withdrawn from the Pusan Perirn ^ expanded to division strerl|^j0uS trained, and landed in an atnph* ^ assault three weeks later. X soon recaptured Korea’s capita ^
• by
American Caesar, written
former marine about one o greatest soldiers, is a significant
Navy
dec"’
able work, veteran author William Manchester has brilliantly brought out the many personal details in this soldier-statesman’s career, illustrating his conflicting qualities. There is true professionalism versus failure to see reality; personal bravery becoming foolhardy exposure in action; patriotism degenerating into pure egotism; honor slipping to self-serving politics.
The book is dedicated to the 29th Marines (Manchester’s regiment), who stormed ashore at Okinawa and within 12 weeks had sufferred 80% casualties. That this former sergeant can be so objective is another tribute. At best, MacArthur was known as “Dug- out Doug” to Marine Corps “grunts.”
Relations between MacArthur and the Navy are of particular interest. While there was little love lost between the two, it was the General’s use of seapower that made possible his victories in World War II and Korea. Manchester emphasizes this frequently, as he notes how MacArthur’s antagonism flared early in World War II, when the Pacific Fleet failed to fulfill his unrealistic hopes for relief in the Philippines. The General continued to blame the "Admirals” in Washington for any lack of resources in subsequent campaigns.
The naval component of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command, the 7th Fleet, was traditionally short of ships, requiring support and, on occasion, augmentation from the Pacific Fleet of Admiral Chester Nimitz. The author notes the local coordination between the two commands as he traces MacArthur’s amphibious offensives in New Britain, New Guinea, and north to the Philippines. Personal coordination between the area commanders is described in their August 1944 Honolulu meeting with Franklin Roosevelt, a trip which was primarily political for the President. Manchester omits Nimitz’s trip to Brisbane to call on MacArthur prior to the Hollandia operation, an amphibious jump of over 400 miles along the north coast of New Guinea. Also omitted is the pre-invasion support provided by the Pacific Fleet’s fast carrier force under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher. But the author provides the background for the difficulties in the 1945 planned invasion of Japan, “Operation Olympic,” when MacArthur would command land forces and Nimitz sea forces.
Admiral William Halsey, whose South Pacific forces worked closely with and at times under MacArthur, was an exception to the typical naval officer in the General’s opinion. As combat commanders, the two had similarities. Halsey’s 1943 visit to MacArthur in Brisbane resulted in a personal friendship. In an excellent coverage of the Leyte Gulf operation, Manchester quotes MacArthur’s refusal to criticize the hard-charging 3rd Fleet Commander. When a staff officer faults Halsey’s delay in returning to protect MacArthur’s shipping, the General retorts, “Leave the ’Bull’ alone. He is a fighting admiral!” Lieutenant John Bulkeley, whose PT-41 took the 61-year-old General from Corregidor two years earlier, also seemed to win such admiration, as shown in a vivid description of that physically and emotionally exhausting voyage.
MacArthur’s relations with 7th Fleet subordinates are noted only briefly. Admiral Thomas Kincaid, Fleet Commander, was often a “whipping boy,” brunting the General’s anger and frustration with the “Admirals” elsewhere. Vice-Admiral Daniel Barbey, 7th Amphibious Force Commander, conducted almost all
appears uurcijucuujr »** ------- . ^
accounts. Instead, MacArthur is as statesman, administrator, ^ would-be national political figure ^ June 1950, he returns to comba<£ofpS three months later lands the X , at Inchon, a risky but brilliant uS seapower. His assault troops are ^ 1st Marine Division, veterans o 1943 Cape Gloucester landing. ^ the only Marine Corps division ^ serve under MacArthur. Preparing
and once again sealift was used to the Corps to Wonsan on Korea5 ^
coast from where they swept nor the Chinese frontier. Two r001^. later MacArthur was forced to use ^ power for the last time, to b 1 ^ gf embattled 1st Marine Division °u u Wonsan after they had fought thf° the Chinese at Chosin reservoir- }
oUf
add>'
tion to the history of the U. S- William Manchester has told in u'i the story of an American hef° p champion, one, who despite n j frailty, in the final analysis hve ^ died to the code he had learned birth, “duty, honor, country.
A Fresh Air Sailor
:d“>
There was a shortage of submarine personnel during World War II because the physical and mental requirements ^ extremely high. On board ship we had a machinist’s mate who met all the requirements but for some reason rcf^ volunteer. Our executive officer worked on him day after day, overcoming his objections one by one, pointing out all , advantages of submarine duty—the pay, the leave provisions, the chow, and the glory. Just when he thought Jimmy convinced, the sailor came up with an objection that stumped the officer.
“Sir,” said Jimmy, “I like to sleep with the windows open.”
A. H. Living51'
ha°
0(1
10
if
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
Naval affairs
k c's'°n at Sea: The Convoy Escorts
Vork^p ^cter ^emP. Royal Navy (Ret.). New Bih i Elsevier-E>urton, 1978. 184 pp. Illus.
. • ,nd- *8.95 (18.06).
D,
'Volu
Series
-v, me m Dutt°n's new "Men and Battle” illy” 0n World War II provides a concise, tjc *trate<l history of the Battle of the Atlan-
y a noted British naval historian.
Ei
EQl°P°rt 78: Naval Construction and U 1f>ment Conference
Ttnt'rr^arri’ Netherlands: Europort Bih °')nstellingen B.V., 1979. 232 pp. Illus. '*>00.00 paper. rhe
c°hin
22
papers contained in this volume
c Prise the proceedings of the Europort e nfetence
V 'Potent held Vember 1978.
The
srence 0n naval construction and
Mqu'Pment
‘NO
in Amsterdam in
Pavid
e ^en of War
Howarth and the Editors of Time-Life
°o0U .
' Alexandria, VA.: Time-Life Books,
^ ■ >76 pp. ii|us. Bib. Ind. $10.95 ($9.86).
centf^ree Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th eS(UrE were notable for some of the fierc- CentSea battles ever fought. They are the attent‘on ‘n this superbly illus-
r"an account of the development of the Series
war, a volume in the Time-Life The Seafarers.”
and the Global Threat—What
> be Done
'Vce c
raf. ' Larson, Editor. New York: National
, .. . ----------------------------------------------------
4B„e®7 Information Center, 1978. 48 pp.
pNnd 4s ei.
^ *5.95 paper.
mujS v°>ume records the proceedings of a ,Vt,nanonal conference convened by the
hi
at‘onal
Strategy Information Center at
r,8hto
>s
'he w,
Eos L •arsaw Pact buildup. Among the frj ' ' 'ties raised is the creation of a djat)Cean Alliance in the Atlantic, In- thr ’ anc> Pacific Oceans to contain the °f Soviet expansion.
^ava] r, .
D rower in Soviet Policy
cUsst0n> England, in June 1978 to dis- a>ternative Free World reactions to
^ Murphy, Editor. Washington, D.C.: Pp , Government Printing Office, 1978. 341
Thi
append
$5.25 ($4.73) paper.
Political role and war-fighting
capabilities of the Soviet Navy are assessed in a collection of papers by a distinguished panel of Western naval analysts and academicians. This is Volume 2 in the “Studies in Communist Affairs” series published under the auspices of the U. S. Air Force.
Super Destroyers
Anthony Preston, Editor. Greenwich, England: Conway Maritime Press, 1978 (North American distribution by Sky Books Press Ltd., New York). 72 pp. Illus. L'2.50 (Approx. $7.95) ($7.16) paper.
Between the world wars all the major naval powers—the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, France, and Italy—built series of abnormally large destroyers variously described as "scouts,” “flotilla leaders,” and “special destroyers.” The technical characteristics and operational effectiveness of these designs are treated in a solidly researched, illustrated monograph.
Tug of War
Joe Richards. New York: David McKay, 1979. 213 pp. Illus. $10.00.
A spritely narrative relates the author’s adventures and misadventures in sailing a top-heavy Army tug from New Orleans to Honolulu in World War II.
U-Boats
Anthony Preston. London: Bison Books, 1978. 192 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $17.95 ($16.16).
A pictorial history chronicles the activities of the German submarine arm in both world wars. Anthony Preston is editor of the British naval quarterly Warship and deputy editor of Warship International.
USS Massachusetts (BB-59)
Norman Friedman, Lt. Cdr. Arnold S. Lott, USN (Ret.), and HTC Robert F. Sumrall, USNR. Annapolis, MD.: Leeward Publications, 1979. 32 pp. Illus. $3.95 ($3.56) paper.
Number 8 in Leeward’s "Ship’s Data” series sets forth the technological and operational history of the battleship Massachusetts. Commissioned in May 1942, the Massachusetts served in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of World War II, during which she participated in 35 engagements and downed 18 enemy aircraft
without the loss of a single man. Today, she is one of several World War II vessels preserved as memorials at Fall River, Massachusetts.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
The Last Tall Ships: Gustaf Erikson and the Aland Sailing Fleets,
1872-1947
George Kahre, Edited by Basil Greenhill. New York: Mayflower Books, 1978. 208 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $12.50 ($11.25).
In the 1920s and 1930s, Gustaf Erikson (1872-1947), a Finnish shipowner in the Aland Islands, built up and successfully operated the world’s last sailing fleet. This book, the edited translation of a work originally published in Finland in 1948, explains the conditions that made this possible and describes the ships themselves. It is illustrated by more than 200 rare photographs.
Nordatlantik-Renner: Der Schnelldampfer mit den drei Namen: Deutschland, Victoria Luise, Hansa (North Atlantic Racer: The Steamer with Three Names: Deutschland, Victoria Luise, Hansa)
Hans Jurgen Withoft. Herford, West Germany: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978. 99 pp.
Illus. DM 14.80 (Approx. $8.00).
The Hamburg-American Line luxury liner Deutschland, launched in 1900, captured
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The Killing Zone: My Life in the Vietnam War
Frederick Downs. New York: W.W. Nof
the North Atlantic speed record in 1901 (New York to Plymouth in 5 days, 11 hours and 5 minutes). Converted into a cruise ship and renamed the Victoria Luise in 1910, she became the Hartsa in 1920 and was broken up in 1925. This is her story.
Spencer Fullerton Baird and the U. S. Fish Commission: A Study in the History of American Science
Dean Conrad Allard, Jr. New York: Arno Press, 1978. 424 pp. Bib. $25.00.
Assistant Secretary and later Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, Spencer Fullerton Baird (1823-1887) was responsible for the creation of the U. S. Fish Commission, thereby launching the first sustained study of marine biology in the United States. This is the first complete account of his career to appear since 1915.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon
Gunther E. Rothenberg. Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1978. 272 pp. Ulus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $12.50 ($11.25).
Modern warfare began in the Age of Napoleon, 1793-1815, when the concepts of the nation in arms and the battle of annihilation swept away the ritualistic conventions of the neoclassic era. This insightful study examines the changing face of warfare during that period. A founding member of the U. S. section of the International Military History Commission, Dr. Rothenberg is a member of the faculty of Purdue University.
Defender of the Chesapeake: The Story of Fort Monroe
Richard P. Weinert, Jr., and Col. Robert Arthur, USA. Annapolis, MD.: Leeward Publications, 1978. 293 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.46).
Designed by a one-time aide-de-camp to the Emperor Napoleon, Fort Monroe was the largest American seacoast fortification built before the Civil War. Subsequently the home of the Coast Artillery Corps and today headquarters of the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, it has been a major post for over 150 years. The story of the fort itself and the prominent
personalities who have been ass°c with it—Edgar Allen Poe, Robert • Chief Black Hawk, Jefferson Davis’in a innumerable others—is recounte readable narrative.
Kesselring: The Making of the Luftwaffe
Kenneth Macksey. New York: David Mc^ ^ 1978. 262 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $ '
Bavarian-born Field Marshal Al Kesselring—whose toothy gnn le jn
lied forces which served against 1___________
Italy to christen him "Happy A1 er^e[, was one of the most-gifted German g ^ als of World War II. Although the ^
this work suggests that it concentrat ^ ^ his interwar activities as a founder o< ^ Luftwaffe, it is in fact a full-sca e ^ raphy. The marshal's adopted son. Rainer Kesselring, cooperated wit author.
1978. 240 pp. $9.95 ($8.96).
Frederick Downs served as an Army 1 n^,, try platoon leader in the Vietnam from September 1967 until badly w° ^£| ed by a “Bouncing Betty" anti-pers mine in January 1968. During ^ months, he won the Silver Star am 1 ^ Purple Hearts. His part of the war i lated in a compellingly candid and P spoken narrative.
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Add $1.50 for postage and handling to each order for Naval Institute books, book selections,
insignia items, or special order books from U. S. publishers..................................................................................
Add $2.00 for postage and handling to each special order for books from foreign publishers------------------------
For delivery in Maryland, add 5% tax ....................................................................................................................
Enclosed is my check or money order for the TOTAL . ................ ...................................................................
Narne____________________________________________________________________ Membership No.
Address-— ----------------- ——........ ' .............. ....... —---------- ——----- —----- ——--------------------
City, State, FPO ____________ _____________________ ——--------------------------------------------- — ZiP Code-
100
Proceedings / July
tlSNaval Institute
1979 SOMMER BOOK flAT.g.
For Members Only All Books Reduced50%
his year’s Summer Book Sale features more than /ty books, over half of which have never before been ered at these prices. The list offers something for ^Ve<7one. For example, World War II buffs will go for
.. kS like Crisis Onnunv At/intilr nr Dnprntinn
Convoy, Narvik, or Operation ^Ptune. Naval historians are sure to be enthused ^ 0ut Naval Policy Between the Wars or On the jjPanish Main, and for anyone serving in today’s navy ere is The Naval Engineer’s Guide and From a mQH Naval Observatory. But that’s just a sampling.
b'V- Title
Nt
The complete list of titles included in this year’s sale is printed below, and each book is fully described in a brochure that you will soon receive in the mail. An order form will accompany the brochure, or you may use this page to send us your order, but don’t postpone your decision. The sale ends September 14 and quantities are limited on many of these fine books.
For gift-giving or summer reading, the Naval Institute’s Annual Book Sale can’t be beat. Send in your order now, though. The sale ends September 14.
"-------- AMERICA SPREADS HER SAILS (CN8)
--------- AMERICAN STEEL NAVY (UQ2)
"—— arms. MEN AND MILITARY BUDGETS (209)
"-------- British submarines at war (EG7)
"-------- CLOSING THE OPEN DOOR (E03)
---------- COMMAND, CONTROL, COMPROMISE (ET5)
CRISIS CONVOY (FA8)
CRUISE OF THE LANIKAI (FB2)
ESCAPE OF THE SCHARNHORST AND GNEISENAU (GI9)
--------- FIRST ACROSS! (GQ1)
---------- first SOUTH PACIFIC CAMPAIGN (GQ3)
~~------ FROM A SMALL NAVAL OBSERVATORY (cloth) (HE9)*
— GRAND STRATEGY (paper) (HX5)
--------- HARD-LYING (IR3)
— H.H. ROGERS COLLECTION OF SHIP MODELS (IW7)
HISTORY OF SEAFARING AMERICA (096)*
------ — JOHN ROACH (KJ6)*
— LETTERS & PAPERS OF A T. MAHAN (K03)
— MC CULLY REPORT (LT6)
— Narvik (MQ7)
— NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP in THE PACIFIC (MT8)
~~------ NAVAL AND MARITIME CHRONOLOGY (MV9)
—- NAVAL ENGINEERS GUIDE (ND8)
— naval policy between the wars, voi. ii (NX2)
"------- NAVAL REVIEW 1975 (OG1)
~~----- NAVIES OF THE WORLD (OY1)
--------- NIGHT ACTION: MTB FLOTILLA AT WAR (PBO)
— NO NEED OF GLORY (PC7)
'—— NOTHING TOO DARING (PB5f
"------- ON THE SPANISH MAIN (PK3)
--------- OPERATION NEPTUNE (PL1)
"------- PEPPER. RICE, AND ELEPHANTS (PPO)
-— PRISONER OF WAR SHIP MODELS (QB9)
PRIVATEERS AND VOLUNTEERS (QC2)
--------- Q-SHIPS AND THEIR STORY (QC5)*
--------- READY FOR SEA (QG8)
--------- ROYAL NAVY IN AMERICA (QU8)
'----- — SAILING AND SMALL CRAFT DOWN THE AGES (RDO)
--------- SCAPA FLOW 1919 (RZO)*
— SHIPS, SEAS, AND SCIENTISTS (TM2)
■—--- SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY (UI2)
--------- THE SAILOR’S WIFE (RW1)
— THREE-MILE LIMIT (VH7)
--------- TWO-BLOCK FOX (V04)
- WINGS FOR THE FLEET (XAO)
_ Very limited stock available: order early.
List Price | Member’s Price | Sale Price |
$ 11.00 | $ 8.80 | $ 5.50 |
35.00 | 28.00 | 17.50 |
5.95 | 4.75 | 2.98 |
10.00 | 8.00 | 5.00 |
14.50 | 11.60 | 7.25 |
13.50 | 10.80 | 6.75 |
9.95 | 7.95 | 4.98 |
13.50 | 10.80 | 6.75 |
6.00 | 4.80 | 3.00 |
11.00 | 8.80 | 5.50 |
14.50 | 11.60 | 7.25 |
5.50 | 4.40 | 2.75 |
7.50 | 6.00 | 3.75 |
8.95 | 7.20 | 4.48 |
12.50 | 10.00 | 6.25 |
30.00 | 19.95 | 15.00 |
9.00 | 7.20 | 4.50 |
95.00 | 76.00 | 47.50 |
14.95 | 11.95 | 7.48 |
8.50 | 6.80 | 4.25 |
13.00 | 10.40 | 6.50 |
16.00 | 12.80 | 8.00 |
8.50 | 6.80 | 4.25 |
19.95 | 15.95 | 9.98 |
10.00 | 8.00 | 5.00 |
11.00 | 8.80 | 5.50 |
10.95 | 8.75 | 5.48 |
13.95 | 11.15 | 6.98 |
17.50 | 14.00 | 8.75 |
10.00 | 8.00 | 5.00 |
7.95 | 6.40 | 3.98 |
14.00 | 11.20 | 7.00 |
22.50 | 18.00 | 11.25 |
17.00 | 13.60 | 8.50 |
12.00 | 9.60 | 6.00 |
10.95 | 8.75 | 5.48 |
12.50 | 10.00 | 6.25 |
12.50 | 10.00 | 6.25 |
9.50 | 7.60 | 4.75 |
17.50 | 14.00 | 8.75 |
11.00 | 8.80 | 5.50 |
5.95 | 4.75 | 2.98 |
13.50 | 10.80 | 6.75 |
11.00 | 8.80 | 5.50 |
15.00 | 12.00 | 7.50 |
°Rder now. quantities limited!
®°°k Order Department
■S. Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402 Please send me the books I have checked off above at the special Book Sale prices.
^ ) Bill me
( ) Check or money order enclosed for total amount of order plus $ 1.50 for postage and handling. (Add 5% sales tax for delivery in State of Maryland.
^ame________________________________________
Address_______________________________________
C'ty, State, Zip____________________________________________________________________________________ __
Membership No. _____________________________________________________________________________________
ZQ