"Sir, the Assistant Commandant would like to see you.” It was in Washington on a beautiful spring morning when a messenger from Marine Corps Headquarters delivered the above message. A few minutes later the Assistant Commandant informed me that I was ordered on temporary duty with a Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. I was instructed to report the following morning at nine o’clock to Colonel X at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.
The next few hours were rush hours. Arrangements had to be made for my family to carry on during my absence, my field gear, bedding roll and other equipment had to be broken out, transportation to Philadelphia obtained, and other incidentals attended to.
At 9:00 A.M. the following day I found Colonel X, with his newly appointed adjutant, at the dock feverishly assigning officers and men to their regimental units and at the same time trying to keep a watchful eye on the Quartermaster who was busily engaged in loading the commercial vessel that had been chartered by the Navy as a transport.
The above was the customary procedure for forming an expeditionary force. It is cited merely as a sample of many others. The men who were to make up the regiment were arriving at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in groups of 200, 100, 50, and lower numbers. They came from stations on the cast coast while the officers came from varying stations and duties. All of this was in accord with the expeditionary force mobilization plan kept at headquarters. On receipt of a code message from headquarters men were sent out to arrive at the point of embarkation in less than 24 hours. Some commanding officers of marine detachments sent their best men on this duty, others were prone to retain good men who, naturally, were holding key positions at the post and could not readily be replaced. As for training, since the r6gime of Major General Elliott as Commandant of the Marine Corps, all marines had been highly trained in the use of small arms but their combat training did not extend much further.
Of course, the force thus hurriedly assembled was not an organization capable of meeting situations such as would develop in a war with a major power. However, the plan was entirely satisfactory for the protection of American interests or the suppression of revolutions in small foreign countries, for on the voyage to the port of debarkation, which usually consumed about a week or ten days, this crude force was organized and whipped into shape to make a successful landing against light opposition.
Occasionally a brigade was organized and exercised in landing operations but immediately following the maneuvers the brigade was disbanded, the men returned to their posts, and the exercises were not again held for a number of years and then with almost a complete change in officers and men. The only permanent or semipermanent force was a battalion of artillery armed with 155-mrn- which were practically unserviceable as the bores of the guns needed relining. But the greatest weakness of the mobilization plan was the lack of provision for a permanent leader and staff, the commanding officer and staff being detailed only when the emergency arose. The plan served to furnish the body without the head or brains.
Soon after my appointment as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps I brought this matter to the attention of the Commandant and recommended that a staff for the expeditionary force be formed with headquarters at Quantico, this staff to be composed of some of our most able officers who would familiarize themselves with the mobilization plans and be prepared to mobilize with the troops on short notice. The recommendation was adopted and a staff for the expeditionary force formed at Quantico. It immediately engaged in the study of plans for amphibious operations in possible theaters of war. This was a step forward but it did not go far enough.
For many years it had been my opinion that the Marine Corps should have a striking force, well equipped, well armed and highly trained working as a unit of the Fleet under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief. Consequently, in the summer of 1933 while Acting Commandant, I addressed a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations setting forth my views on this subject and suggesting that first, the term “Fleet Base Defense Force” or “Fleet Marine Force” be adopted to replace the term “Expeditionary Force.” Second, that this force be included in the fleet organization as an integral part thereof subject to the orders for tactical employment of the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet.
These suggestions met with quick and favorable response from both the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, the term “Fleet Marine Force” being selected. Proposed instructions for establishing appropriate command and administrative relations between the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force were drafted at Headquarters, Marine Corps, in accord with the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, and by letter transmitted to that officer. The last paragraph of that letter read as follows:
It is the hope and expectation of the undersigned that eventually the Marine Corps will be in a position to maintain at Quantico and San Diego the full Fleet Marine Force available at all times for operations with the Fleet and under the full control of the Commander-in-Chief.
On assuming the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps in March, 1934,1 was able to establish substantial forces at Quantico and San Diego and to bring them rapidly to the strength of brigades. Modern weapons, including the Garand rifle and A.A. guns, were obtained in limited quantities for this division and it soon became a well-trained permanent organization, as strict orders prohibited the transfer of any officer or enlisted man from the Fleet Marine Force without the authority of the Major General Commandant.
In fact the organization and training of this force progressed so rapidly that by the spring of 1934 it was able to hold exercises with the Fleet. At the conclusion of the exercises the Commander in Chief addressed a letter to Major General Charles II. Lyman, the then Commanding General of the FMF which in part read as follows:
The Commander-in-Chef considers that the Fleet Marine Force has earned a place in the U. S. Fleet on the same footing as the other forces into which the Fleet is organized.
The use of a Fleet Marine Force represents an important advance in Fleet tactics and gives to the country for the first time a Fleet composed of all arms and forces required for operations in any theater of war.
With the organization of the FMF it became evident that rules and doctrines covering landing operations were essential to progress. The preparation of such a guide was a Herculean task for the start must be from scratch. In realization of this fact, the task was assigned to the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico where senior officers were undergoing advanced instruction. In order that the Schools might devote their entire time to this important subject the regular school curriculum was suspended. An instructor was assigned to each section of student officers and each section was assigned a chapter in the contemplated book. Four months of highly intensive work resulted in the production of a comprehensive and most valuable treatise to which it was decided to give the title “Manual of Landing Operations.” This material was sent to the Office of Naval Operations and to the Fleet where some changes and additions were made and as thus changed the Manual was adopted by the Navy and issued to the Naval Service.
In the past few years the FMF has grown from one division to many and in its service in the Pacific during the recent war as a part of the fleet it has added many brilliant pages to the history of the Marine Corps. It was certainly anathema to the Japanese and in this connection it is interesting to note that Navy Department G.O. 241, establishing the Fleet Marine Force, was issued on Dec. 7,1933.