THE STUDY OF STRATEGY
By Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U.S. Navy
The following paper was prepared and read as a lecture at the Fleet-War College Session, August 9, 1922, with the chief aim, by describing in outline the purpose, field, and requisites for the broad study of the art of war, to impress, especially on younger officers, the importance and advantage of systematic and wide reading as a foundation for applied study later.
One does not go far in any reading on strategy without realizing how closely strategic considerations are intermingled on the one hand with questions of policy and on the other with questions of logistics, or, in more general terms, how largely the method of accomplishment is determined by both the end in view and the disposable means. And so, in the arrangement of the course at the Naval War College, the Department of Strategy includes the studies of policy, strategy, and logistics.
There is fundamental need also, in almost any study touching the relations between countries, of some familiarity with international law. One must have a working knowledge of the rights and duties of nations, their exemptions and obligations established by accumulated experience as necessary and so recognized by the civilized world. Especially in a war study, one needs to understand what is normal practice and, when normal conditions are overthrown by war, what practices may be approved, tolerated, questioned, or condemned. The great force behind all manifestations of governmental power is public opinion, and international law is a formulation of that opinion in such matters and to such extent as discussion has settled down into agreement. All naval officers of the line by requirement, and many others through interest, study this branch of law in the course of service, and here at the War College one's interest in the subject is stimulated by the many and various situations that may confront a naval command. Specific questions in international law arise constantly and some of them are given special discussion at the College. This is only one aspect of the widely recognized influence of the Naval War College on the formulation and observance of international law. The subject is the work of a separate department of the college, but it needs mention here as the common groundwork of all our studies.
The basic concept of international law is agreement, as distinguished from the compulsory enforcement of a nation's internal laws. Outside a nation's boundaries there is neither a court for appeal nor. any common force to compel another nation. Arbitration has become of frequent resort but is not yet accepted for vital matters, in which the pressure and support for war might be wide spread and strongest. In the field of the world all nations claim equal right, with no restraint other than voluntary agreement by treaty, the moral influence of international law, and the limitations of their own power. And so the government has need to consider other nations' interests in the international field, if our own are to be so conducted as to gain the ends desired without clash or disaster.
As people multiply, their activities push more and more beyond the home boundaries, becoming more widely and deeply interwoven with the interests of other peoples. Racial, geographical, social, and other elementary factors influence a nation's development, gathering force so quietly yet so powerfully as often to exceed the control of government during the average life of one administration. But in the course of years, as the vitality of some tendency becomes manifest through the recurrence or persistence of similar indications, the administration formulates a corresponding attitude or course of action on the part of the government, to guide, foster, or restrain the tendency in question, as may best serve the welfare of the nation as a whole. Such are the origin and nature of national policy; and it is evident that between strong pressure at home and competitors of equal claims abroad, shaping a foreign policy is not a free choice but rather the discernment of the natural causes which underlie a national activity.
When such an external policy comes into competition with the valuable interests of other nations, the possibility of war may arise, and it is here that the study of strategy connects; for it is an obvious duty of government to consider whither a nation's policy may lead and, if persistence in it may bring on war, then to weigh the gain by war against the probable cost. To determine the possibility of such gain and the cost of it are questions of strategy.
The large idea conveyed by the word strategy deals with the ways and means to achieve the ends of policy. It is applied with equal freedom to broad schemes, such as a general plan for war, and to comparatively minor and more specific matters, as the disposition of the forces for a single engagement. Briefly, strategy answers the question how to do what policy requires, and in making the answer, it runs down successive stages, each one entering more into detail, to the final province of war preparation and tactical action. Mahan says, "How best to use naval power…is naval strategy, whether applied in peace or war."
How a force may be employed to best advantage depends of course upon the kinds, degrees, and places of the effects it can produce. To determine these we must consider not only the power and mobility of a force but also its maintenance, for to gain the ends of policy by war usually requires not merely a single blow but sustained military effort. Considerations of maintenance lie in the field of logistics, which in naval application embraces supplying, moving, and refitting the fleet in the best order and security. Under this head come matters of direction, distance, bases, supply, resources, lines of communication, and the degree of preparation during peace, considering how the enemy side will be affected by all these factors as well as our own side.
Thus policy, strategy, and logistics, on the background of international law, form one study, of the national purpose combined with the method and the means to effect it by military force if necessary. Policy, though the product of natural forces, must yet give heed to the warnings and advice of strategy. Strategy, though working in terms of life and death, must yet, as the servant of policy, aim at the objective dictated by policy. Logistics, which deals with necessities and possibilities, influences the decisions of strategy, often to a controlling degree. For example, in the late war, policy called for a mine barrage across the North Sea. Strategy tentatively chose the location Aberdeen-Ekersund, near the Skagerrak, but in that position constant support would have been necessary. The logistics for such support required a base in Norwegian waters. Policy could not stand for that, so Strategy moved the location far enough northward, away from the enemy, to dispense with constant support.
The course in strategy as conducted at the War College consists of four main parts—reading and thesis writing, problem solving, chart maneuvers, and discussion. Reading is supplemented by lectures.
The reading list issued by the Strategy Department, although far from comprehensive, includes many more books than the average reader can absorb during the eleven months of the course, but most of the officers in every class are already familiar with some of the works recommended, and many of them will of course continue their reading after completing the work here. Beyond outlining the reading course, inviting comments on it, and examining the theses turned in, the Staff exercises no direction over student officers' reading. But there is one important suggestion made, that, in reading on strategy some one or more works should be studied with deliberation, in order to get the authors' true meaning and fully consider their deductions and illustrations. This suggestion is made with Napoleon's oft-quoted avowal in mind, that his apparent flashes of genius were but inspirations arising from diligent study. Such painstaking, reflective reading is the best kind to stock the mind with information and develop the ability to apply it. Though several books may be read rapidly in order to get a wide range of view on some particular topic, the understanding of principles which is derivable from the works of Murray, Mahan, Corbett, Von der Goltz, Wilkinson, Clausewitz, Foch, can be realized only by painstaking study. "Sound military principle is as useful to military conduct as moral principle is to integrity of life."—Mahan.
In direct connection with the reading comes the writing of theses, one on policy and another on strategy and logistics. This part of the course seems at the outset very laborious, but with few exceptions the members of every class pronounce in favor of it, as the best means to clarify one's understanding and crystallize one's thoughts upon the subjects read. Clear understanding and clear thinking are indispensable for imparting to others a clear expression of one's own views and intentions, and, as Admiral Mahan says, "A man who thinks clearly will very soon want to speak clearly, and to have accurate words in which to express his thoughts."
Reading and thesis writing cultivate the powers of analysis, critical examination and comparison, reflection, and expression. One acquires some appreciation of the principles of war through observing how their correct application or their disregard has made for success or failure in the past, and wider reading shows more and varied instances of similar results from similar measures. The mind is thus broadened, the memory stocked, and the imagination stimulated, all of which are essential to preparation for high military responsibility. More than these are needed, however, for while it is important to know and to understand the past critically, the military commander must also, and above all, have constructive ability, to penetrate quickly to the essentials of a situation and thereupon decide with confidence. He must be able to grasp and to act appropriately in season.
In his book, The Art of Fighting, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske says,
The sine qua non of the strategist is imagination. He must foresee the circumstances under which the next great conflict will be fought, and prepare plans and appliances of the highest order of completeness and novelty to meet them with success. It is well to study the campaigns of the great commanders of the past, but not exclusively. The war that the strategist must win is not the last war but the next war.
and Spenser Wilkinson says:
…the clear eye, which sees…into the heart of the situation, can never be obtained except by a man who by repeated efforts has thought out to their very essence, and to their ultimate elements, all the problems of war, so that the principles of strategy have become incorporate with the fibre of his mind, and he is incapable of violating them.
Whether one possesses both the requisite grasp of the principles of war and the ability to apply them constructively can only be determined by test, and the solution of problems furnishes such a test. War College problems are based on an assumed general situation, which is known to both sides, and a special situation for each side, known only to that side. They are made as realistic and as true to possibilities as known experience permits. Existing types of vessels and weapons and existing fleets are used. In this way the problems serve to develop facility in applying the principles of the art of war to the forces of the present day, while by throwing light on current and proposed methods, these studies sometimes bring out the desirability of new or modified types or of greater numbers of existing types, or other apparent improvements, and furnish a test of them before any money is spent on actual experiment.
The strategist's real field of operations is the chart, or as Jomini said, strategy is "war on the map."
Stimulus comes from the opportunity to do a task large enough to arouse the interest, and efficiency from the freedom to bring one's personality to bear in a manner harmonious with its nature. Well scattered responsibility sobers and settles a force of executives, and develops and seasons their talents; for individual character is not developed by imagining responsibility, but by actually carrying it.—"Military History and the Science of Business Administration."—Prof. E.D. Jones.
Practical knowledge cannot be acquired in a hurry, it cannot be communicated by a process of cramming, for its valuable quality is the judgment in action which comes only from long exercise…It is by the exercise of authority under the weight of responsibility that character is formed. (Dilke-Wilkinson).
About half of our problems in strategy are accordingly given the further test of actual maneuver on the chart. Two officers are selected as the chief commanders on the two sides, each to put into effect his solution of the problem. Subordinate commanders are detailed, given their first orders, and shut up in separate rooms; communication is allowed only by radio, cable, or signal, allowing the lapse of time for transmission as it would be in reality; wind, sea, and atmospheric conditions are taken from weather charts; the officers concerned are conscientious in always making decisions with serious attention, not doing anything that could not or would not be done in actual practice, and not using information which has been received informally or contrary to possibilities in similar actual circumstances; and in all other respects service conditions are simulated as far as practicable. As soon as a little familiarity with the machinery has been acquired, the maneuver progresses in a very interesting way. Some artificiality is unavoidable, some decisions on contacts and minor engagements must be arbitrary, and the maneuver sometimes drags, yet with all its imperfections the chart maneuver impresses the care, the anxiety, the doubt, the tension, the unremitting responsibility, of naval commanders. With thirty to fifty experienced officers intent on the problem, during the maneuver and afterwards in the critique, the conduct of the forces is sure to undergo an instructive inspection. But the chief value lies in the demonstration, plain before all. There on the chart each officer can see his own work, his chief's work, every other commander's work. It is no longer a question of what you mould do. There is the record of what you and they did—where one can judge by actual results whether plans, orders, subsequent decisions, when put to a fair, open test, proved to be "the right thing, rightly applied, in time." Mutely but eloquently the chart testifies that luck favors good management and that "fate punishes errors of judgment as remorselessly as guilt."
The fourth means of training, frank discussion, is second only to individual effort on problem work. After the student officers' solutions of a problem have been read by the Staff, a written critique is drawn up, analyzing the problem, commenting on features of the students' solutions, comparing them with the treatment of similar points in a solution prepared by the Staff, and bringing out the important principles involved. A solution by the Staff is given out, not as the only correct answer but as one deemed acceptable which, so far as it withstands criticism itself—to which it is freely open—furnishes a standard by which to compare and criticize the others constructively. The moves of the chart maneuver are shown by lantern slides, and some situations are shown also as they would have been under the staff solution, for clearer illustration of the principles or suggestion embodied. This critique is the basis for discussion of the problem in all its features.
The discussion is entirely impersonal, aiming only at mutual and general benefit. Considerations of rank do not enter. Rank by itself confers no degrees of infallibility in war, but the recognition by high rank that the military art depends upon facts and principles, not opinions, goes far to foster that confidence in the leader on which success so largely depends. The fundamental characteristic of all higher institutions of study is freedom of thought and expression, which is indispensable in all investigational work. We are seeking for truth, to prepare ourselves to deal with cold, hard facts, in the face of an active, trained enemy doing his utmost against us. No test applied during our preparation can equal the stress of war. How then can we be satisfied with less than the severest test that is available? If my solution of a problem is not proof against the kindly criticism of my friend in the next room, what chance would it have in war? If my junior beats me on the maneuver chart, I should be thankful for the lesson. An enemy would not consider my feelings until after the battle. If there be any error committed, any defect, let it be revealed in time for remedy, and if the matter in doubt proves to be really sound, the question establishes it more firmly. Only weakness shuns the light.
The following words of Corbett on discussion, published in 1911, seem prophetic of some difficulties of the late war:
How often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan lay? How often, moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability to analyze scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognize the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage.
In such connection, and on lower planes as well, discussion, in addition to its investigatory value, trains officers for staff duty, to present their views and estimates concisely and clearly, and trains a chief to grasp and weigh them. To retain the admiral's confidence, the staff must see that he is correctly informed, including views which differ from his own. To express such opinions may not always be easy to do, yet whenever an opinion is given, it should be genuine conviction, unbiased by different views held by others. In the chief's consideration before deciding, the opinions of his staff have weight. One of the maxims printed on Marshall Field's pay envelopes read, "Loyalty requires a subordinate to stand up for his own opinions to his chief and for his chief's policies to the world." Free discussion improves the quality of one's opinions and accustoms officers to express them acceptably as well as with due force.
Thus the course provides for reading on broad lines and on the particular, for writing on the abstract and on the concrete, for derivation of principles from the past and their application to problems of the future, for repeated and varied practical test of our own work by experienced hands, and finally, for the review of all in the light of full and open, first hand discussion and constructive criticism. "Reading maketh a full man, writing an exact man, conference a ready man." Military character requires all three qualities and it is on well developed character that efficiency fundamentally depends.
From the foregoing description it will be seen that the course combines the historical and analytical with the applied and constructive. From past performances we learn the apparent reasons for success or failure, but deductions from history must usually be taken with reservation, because seldom is our information complete and altogether trustworthy. Official reports conflict, first hand notes often lack essential details, and historical writings are inevitably tinged with the authors' views, sometimes intentionally colored. And in any case, it is never possible to reproduce a situation in its entirety nor to interpret exactly, after the event, the mind of another person who was a factor in it. The cold critic in his quiet study breathes a far different atmosphere from the active commander. Examination of the mistakes of others, while instructive, is negative, showing what not to do. The same kind of study also brings out the good and strong qualities of successful leaders, but one does not acquire practical skill merely by observing other players. One can learn, to be sure, more that way than by merely studying the rules and penalties, but constructive ability as an actor—as one who creates an effect—is developed only by practice under rules well understood. Our problems and chart maneuvers give this constructive practice and in so doing they introduce the human equation under the conditions of the man who must decide. These elements, the personal equation and the mental attitude of the man who faces responsibility—elements which are lacking in a merely critical course of study—are indispensable for true appreciation of the principles of war.
The purpose of our study, however, is not to dwell on the mistakes but to seek out their causes. How does it come about that, making due allowance for the fog of war, weight of responsibility, and pressure for time, decisions have yet not infrequently been made on certain courses of action, objectives, or distributions of force which the outcome shows to have been initially wrong? The repeated commission of similar mistakes seems a sure indication of the existence of some cause or causes of such errors. To discover what these may be is what interests us most, for in proportion as these underlying causes of error can be eliminated or diminished, we shall advance towards the successful conduct of war. Our problems and chart maneuvers reveal some striking indications of such fundamental causes of error.
First, as to the purpose of action. There is no cause without some effect. Military action is a cause employed by government to produce or hasten a desired effect. How important then for the commander to grasp thoroughly what the desired effect is, so that, among several courses of action that may bring it about, he may choose the one best suited to the purpose; how necessary that a vague or indifferent understanding shall not lead astray. This seems so obvious, why mention it? Yet history, recent as well as remote, and examples in our work here, show numerous instances where, instead of knowing the purpose of their instructions, military commanders misunderstood their purport, had only a feeble grasp of it, or were in the dark.
Against such lack of true directive force, a lack which fosters a tendency to pursue or accept a course blindly, the best corrective is the broad cultivation recommended by Mahan and by other authorities of our profession.
Every naval officer should order his study, and his attention to contemporary events, abroad and at home, by the reflection that he may some day be an adviser of the Government, and in any case may beneficially affect events by his correct judgment of world-wide conditions. In Nelson's phrase, "An officer should have political courage." Political courage, to be well based, requires political knowledge as well. That you may more effectually concentrate upon this necessary knowledge, avoid dissipating your energies upon questions interior to the country…The sphere of the navy is international solely.
So likewise with subordinate commanders in successive lower grades. When leaders understand the main purpose, they may direct their efforts towards the desired result effectively, sometimes even when orders from higher authority no longer apply. Knowing the great purpose, each can see his own task not as a separate operation but as part of a larger undertaking, and the most decisive successes have come about where the chief's purpose and spirit found expression in the unity of his subordinates' actions.
A second lesson—obvious like the first, yet far from general observance—is to have a plan appropriate to the purpose. Often there have been parts of plans and plans of parts, but such looseness tends to confuse rather than to lead straight. The plan should be complete for accomplishment of the mission, with reasonable promise, barring resistance that cannot be foreseen, of carrying through to a finish. It is not implied by completeness that there shall be a mass of detail—quite the contrary. The dominant characteristic is not a strait-jacket but backbone, with the elasticity and flexibility, as well as strength, of an expert boxer. How to make such a plan, determining the kind, the place, and the strength of effort which the purpose requires, together with provision against enemy interference, can be attained only by painstaking study of war. To acquire such ability to plan is one main purpose of War College training.
The most expensive lesson of all history, yet the one most persistently ignored, is that for any plan there should be adequate preparation. Field Marshal Robertson says "It is a difficult and long business in war to make up for a bad start." Viscount Esher says "Naval supremacy cannot be extemporized. It must be forecast and carefully prepared." Cordonnier says, "In proportion as war becomes more scientific it comes less within the province of improvised soldiers." So much for the material side, but of all elements of preparation, the most important and the longest to develop is the professional training of officers. Our service furnishes experience and opportunity for study, but the higher results depend on the effort of the individual.
Instruction forced upon the mind by others is lazily and ineffectually received; few have been taught to any purpose who have not been their own teachers. (Sir Joshua Reynolds.)
A fourth great lesson is the importance of adherence to plan. The first requisite is that the plan must be made with a view to command confidence under the stress of conflict. Next, for its execution as intended, the surest guaranty, after character and training, is freedom from subordinate details in high places. In naval warfare it may often be impossible for the high commander to be detached from the hot fighting, and on occasion his mere presence may exert decisive influence. With due skill on his part, however, such occasions will come about in accordance with his plans, not in spite of them, for the wider their scope, the more important becomes adherence to them.
By reserving to himself no special function but, instead, committing the several parts of the conduct and support of his plan to competent hands, he is thereby relieved of all current detail, free to keep in touch with the situation as a whole, and on that impartial basis to decide any question that may arise. Such freedom likewise enables him to move about at will on the instant, without necessity for turning over local command. He still retains general command but there is no reason why he should control current affairs or the local fighting incident to support. His principal subordinates, and their subordinates in turn, are competent in their respective spheres to decide and act locally as their respective local situations require, viewed in relation to the whole plan. So long as they make good toward the plan—and as to whether they are doing so or not can usually be judged best on the spot—why should the higher commander interpose? Executive affairs in war take precedence over all else. Decisions on the battlefield cannot wait. Hence, when a general officer takes on also a subordinate function, some matters affecting the whole may at any moment be thrust aside by relatively minor yet imperative demands of a single part. The heat of action, interruption, loss of time, hurried thought, irritation, fatigue—some or all of these will surely impair sound deliberation. Where great decisions are made there should be leisure and detachment from temporary influences. According to a recent story, Foch, when asked how he won the war, replied, "By smoking my pipe."
A plan that is the result of deliberate study must not be lightly put aside, neither by the high commander himself who made it nor by a subordinate in his own sphere. It is not sufficient merely to fight ; the fighting in each area must accomplish towards the plan. The skilful leader shapes his tactics accordingly. As General Hamley says:
The commander of a detachment has often a very difficult task to perform. To carry out his task satisfactorily he must have a thorough knowledge of the broad situation and the plans of his general-in-chief. He must constantly remember that success at the decisive point is everything—that his every act must be directed towards, and subordinated to, that end. He must strive to gain the ends in view without exposing his detachment to defeat or unnecessary loss, but when the end cannot otherwise be gained he must not hesitate to fight, even in the face of certain defeat.
and Clausewitz:
Modern war calls for an intelligent use of initiative by subordinates, and it is certain that the subordinate who grasps the broad situation most clearly will solve the local situation most intelligently.
Another lesson impressed by the late war is the necessity for competent staff work. In his report on Features of the War, Sir Douglas Haig said:
The experience gained in this war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterized the fighting. There was required also the sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our training manuals and staff colleges.
The principles of command, staff work, and organization elaborated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are sound. The military educated officer has counted for much, and the good work done by our staff colleges during the past thirty years has had an important influence upon the successful issue of the war. In solving the various strategical and tactical problems with which we have been faced, in determining principles of training and handling of troops, and in the control and elaboration of army organization generally, the knowledge acquired by previous study and application has been invaluable. Added to this have been the efficiency and smoothness of working resulting from standardization of principles, assisted in many cases by the previous personal acquaintance at the staff college of those called upon to work together in the field.
The course of the war has brought out very clearly the value of an efficient and well-trained high command, in which I include not merely commanders of higher formations but their staffs also.
…commanders have been faced with problems very different to those presented by the small units with which they have been accustomed to train in peace. That they exercised their commands with such success as most of them did shows, I venture to think, that their prior training was based on sound principles and conducted on practical lines.
Similarly as regards the staff, the magnitude of our operations introduced a situation for which no precedent existed…on the expansion…many officers had to be recruited for staff appointments—from good regular officers chiefly, but also from officers of our new armies…Though numbers of excellent staff officers were provided in this way, it was found, as a general rule, that the relative efficiency in staff duties of men who had passed through the staff colleges as compared with men who had not had that advantage was unquestionably greater.
Good staff work is an essential to success in all wars and particularly in a struggle of such magnitude as that through which we have just passed. No small part of the difficulty of achieving it lies in the possibility that officers on the staff of higher formations may get out of touch with the fighting forces, and so lose sense of proportion and become unpractical. Every endeavor was made to avoid this by a constant interchange of such officers with others from the front, so that all might keep abreast with the latest ideas and experience, both in the fighting line and elsewhere.
Admiral Jellicoe, Field Marshal French, and our own high commanders speak in similar terms of the importance of competent staff work, and the German and general European view is well known to be the same. Foch is pre-eminently a staff-trained officer.
The function of the commander may be summed up in the words, consider and decide; the function of the staff is to submit for consideration and then to translate the decision into the detailed instructions requisite for execution. Said Count Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen in his letters on strategy.
Much importance attaches to the technical preparation of orders, certainty of their transmission, clearness, precision, completeness, and brevity of written orders and dispositions.
and Admiral Custance, in The Ship of the Line in Battle, says:
Quickness is of great moment in war, but a clear and rapid judgment is often more important than a fast ship.
Safe to say, in matters where only the chief can decide, his judgment is most likely to be clear and rapid when his mind has been set free from distractions by the good work of his staff. Hence the value of such training as acquired at the War College for lieutenant-commanders as well as for higher grades, nor can younger officers begin too early to lay a good foundation of studious reading, in anticipation of a command course as early as it can be obtained.
The supreme lesson which all studies of war force home is that, collectively and singly, all of us, on the experience of yesterday should prepare for tomorrow, and that we must do the work today. Again quoting Admiral Custance:
A man who has not pondered over the acts of the great leaders in wars of the past almost inevitably assumes the mental attitude of the bad workman who complains of his tools. He naturally asks for better ships and weapons, and relies on large ships, on thick armor, and on big guns…It is only by study and reflection that an officer can come to know that victory does not depend mainly on such things but on the courage, the will, and the intellect of the admiral, and on the spirit with which he inspires the officers and men of the fleet. If this be accepted as true, then the war value of a navy is measured by the capacity of the admirals who control it, and by the spirit which animates the captains, officers, and men, rather than by the size or special characteristics of the ships.
Besides military writers, other fine minds could be cited for this as for other lessons of war. Time permits but one such quotation, taken from that genius of art and morals, John Ruskin. Though addressed to voting army students at the Royal Staff College, his words are pertinent to the duty of every grade. He said:
…While for others all knowledge is often a little more than a means of amusement, there is no form of science which a soldier may not at some time or other find bearing on the business of life and death…Never waste an instant's time, therefore; the sin of idleness is a thousand fold greater in you than in others, for the fates of those who will one day be under your command hang upon your knowledge; lost moments now will be lost lives then, and every instant which you carelessly take for play, you buy with blood.
No good soldier in his old age was ever careless or indolent in his youth.
This limited discussion of strategy can barely touch upon many important points, but in the study of any campaign, the more we go into details, part by part, the more do two features stand out prominently side by side—the condition of material and the advantageous employment of it.
In a prolonged contest, the side which is numerically inferior initially may count largely upon losses by the other side through attrition. In such a situation we should take care then lest the enemy derive more help from our shortcomings in material upkeep than from his own exertions. The degree with which a force maintains its strength as it advances will have profound effect on both sides and among neutrals as well, just as our fleet's world cruise in 1908-09 turned doubt and indifference in some quarters into respect and friendship. In a campaign far from our home coasts, distance from usual docking and repair facilities would soon bring us into difficulties, but as the great Spanish Marquis de Santa Cruz said, "If difficulty were an objection, nothing grand would ever be achieved." In the self upkeep of ships, our Navy has an unequaled tradition. On that inspiration we may develop our abilities to surmount tasks that will tax them to the utmost.
Not by material fitness, endurance, and economy alone, however, shall we achieve success. Our means must be employed to the best advantage throughout. We have no material to waste and our men have the right to be competently led. Centralized effort being always important, an enemy would try by every means to cause our effort to be diffused. Let us therefore study and plan to keep our strength central, for in dispersion lies our greatest danger. In many operations of many kinds our forces will seldom have more strength for their tasks than just enough properly employed. Small losses here and there, perhaps of little moment by themselves, when summed up would cut deeply into our total strength. To avoid them, even the most junior commanding officer must be something of a minor strategist in order to be a competent tactician for his degree of command, as well as a good ship captain. The most perfect ship will count for nothing if not in the right place, great speed may in emergency fail to bring a powerful battery into action through ill-considered original dispositions. In his book on The Art of Fighting, Admiral Fiske says:
In speaking of speed, one naturally thinks of the speed of the material units…but there is another kind of speed—the speed of thought. The victories of Caesar, Frederick, and Napoleon are instances of the value of speed. This speed is mainly evidenced by the quickness with which their troops arrived at certain points. The reason usually given for the quickness of their arrival is the speed at which they marched but let us not overlook the super-important fact that, antedating the speed of their marching, was the quickness of their starting, and that this was due wholly to the speed of thought of their great commanders.
Twenty years ago, half our battleship strength was scattered over the globe and the whole was brought together only against some opposition. The officer then virtually corresponding to the Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral H.C. Taylor, who had formerly been President of the War College, said "We have held too much to the single ship idea. We shall not be strong until our officers learn to think in squadrons." We have since gone a long way on that road, yet it still leads far ahead, especially for the young officer. And hostilities of the late war are not yet so remote, nor the world's affairs yet so well settled, as to take away the pertinence to all naval affairs of the parting words to his command of the great Japanese naval officer, Admiral Togo:
Naval strength does not depend merely on possessing ships and guns, but mainly depends on an invisible but real power, the effective power of the men who use the ships and guns…In war display strength, in peace accumulate it…Heaven gives the laurels of victory in war to those only who keep themselves in training during peace and win the battle before it is fought.
Tighten your helmet string after a victory.