Motto: "For God and Country."
The question of preparedness has come to the fore during the past two years as never before in the history of this country, it has been the theme of public speakers and writers, political parties have used its tenets as planks in their platforms, societies of patriotic men and women have worked for its success, and teachers and ministers of the gospel have preached for or against it.
The greatest tangible result of all of this interest in the problems involved is seen in the enactment into law of a building program for the navy, to extend over a term of years, with the laudable object of giving us at the end of this term a navy of such quality and quantity that it will insure an adequate defence of the country and its policies.
The various offices and bureaus of the navy have taken up the question of preparedness in material in a more complete and systematic manner than has resulted from any previous efforts; the great manufacturing concerns are also earnestly interesting themselves in an intelligent endeavor to cooperate, and plans are being matured which will make practicable the mobilization and coordination of all of the industries of the country if the general call to arms should come.
In the army large appropriations have been made to perfect the land defences of the principal ports of our continental and outlying possessions and to provide a reserve of guns and munitions which will make it possible to put an army in the field.
While many millions of dollars are being expended to provide all of the material elements called for by this policy of preparedness, including warships of every class, great guns for ship and shore, aircraft of all types, and increased reserves of munitions and supplies, no law has as yet been enacted which will insure that a suitable reserve of trained men will be ready should war come and inevitably bring with it the urgent necessity for a very great expansion of personnel in both the army and the navy.
The growing interest of the leading thinkers of our country in the question of general preparedness and especially in the important element of the subject which has to do with the personnel is an encouraging sign. Even in the case of the writers and speakers who oppose any form of military training or universal service, their very opposition proves that the question is a live one, that it is before the public and must be decided for weal or woe.
It is probable that if as late as two years ago anyone had openly advocated universal military service in this country he would have been met by well-nigh unanimous condemnation, but the events of the Great War in Europe have written their lessons on the walls so that "he who runs may read," and the consideration of these lessons is bringing the conviction to many of our best thinkers that only by some efficient form of universal military training can our nation hope to be able to meet its possible enemies with fair prospects of success.
Reference to some of the written and spoken arguments and opinions of leading Americans upon this subject will serve to disclose the basis of their thought and the processes of reasoning which have led them to their conclusions, and will show what should be done to convince the doubting ones that only by some efficient form of universal military training may we hope to keep our country at peace with honor or to defend it in the hour of need.
The present Secretary of War, who has ever been an ardent advocate of peace, in a speech at Philadelphia on December 16, 1916, is quoted in the public press as follows:
Preparedness comes to us as the result of what is going on in Europe. Our standing army is in the nature of a small police force and is inconsistent with the steady growth of population in the United States.
We have realized by the European War that modern war is different from any kind of war which we have ever thought about or participated in, because of the intricate agencies employed in present-day warfare.
Preparedness includes a better coordination of the industries of the nation, the development of a spiritual attitude and a complete change in economic and social life.
We've learned the necessity of military training; that modern war involves enormously larger forces in proportion to the population; that it means a complete abstraction of men of all classes from occupations and business.
These concise statements should prove to the "peace at any price" propagandists who advocate disarmament and non-resistance, while hiding their inner cowardice behind a smug face of assumed righteousness, that the idea of universal military training is not incompatible with a keen desire for peace with all of its blessings.
The Honorable Champ Clark, one of America's foremost statesmen, in a recent article in the Independent, expressed the following opinions on the subject under discussion:
If we attend to our own business we will never have another war.
The people are not willing to see this country turned into an armed camp.
I do not believe there is a nation on earth that has little enough sense to attack us, I do not care a straw which one it is; and I have abiding faith that if one of them does attack us it will get licked in the end.
The first statement reminds us of the story of the countryman who, hearing his large watch-dog barking fiercely, went to investigate and found a stranger treed by the dog in the front yard. "Come down," said the farmer, laughing, "that old dog won't bite." With proper caution for his own safety, the stranger replied, "Perhaps he won't bite, you may know it and I may know it, but the dog, maybe he don't know it."
Agreed that we as a country will "attend to our own business" and never make war on any other country, can we promise that the other country will also "attend to his own business" and not make war on us?
Granted that at present the majority of our people "are not willing to see this country turned into an armed camp," it is possible, yes, probable, that, unless we are so thoroughly prepared in men, in material and likewise in spirit, as to preclude the possibility of an attack upon us having fair prospects of success for the attacking nation, we will see this fair country turned into an armed camp whether we are willing or not, for the enemy will decide the question for us unless we are ready.
If that should come and find us still unprepared, we may still have abiding faith that we will win in the end; but at what a frightful cost in the lives of our brave but untrained men who will have to meet the trained and disciplined armies of the invader.
"Sons of the sheltered city—unmade, unhandled, unmeet—
Ye pushed them raw to battle as ye picked them raw from the street.
And what did ye look they should compass? Warcraft learned in a breath,
Knowledge unto occasion at the first far view of Death?"
There is another class of American, and by no means a small class who say, "We do not want to hear of this terrible war, it is all too horrible, the papers should not be allowed to print the details of these horrors!" and again, "Thank God, all the horrors of this war are too far removed by the widths of two great oceans from our fair land; such a war can never come to our shores."
The mental processes of such persons must be akin to that of the simple little ostrich,
"I'll hide my head in the sand he said.
And they won't know where I am."
In this line there is another fallacy that has had a widespread popularity since the days of '76, and that is that every American boy is a natural born sharpshooter and that "every farmer boy is born with a gun in his hand." Any officer of the army, navy or marine corps who has had occasion to superintend the training of recruits in rifle practice knows that but a small percentage of them can be found who have ever fired a rifle before enlisting.
In the early days of our country when the population consisted of a few millions gradually winning their way westward, when wild game shot by the hunter's rifle formed a most important part of the daily rations, and when every man had to be ready to meet the hostile Indian, it was doubtless true that nearly every man knew how to use a rifle; but with the increase in the population, the gradual settlement of the country from ocean to ocean and the occupation of most of the lands for towns or farms, the game became scarce, the hostile Indian disappeared and the rifle as a means of providing food or protecting the home fell into disuse, until to-day but a small percentage of our people have any knowledge of its use.
One of our noted jurists is credited with saying that "the laws of to-day are made up of four halves, prejudice, precept, opinion and precedent; different lawyers taking their choice of two halves to make a whole to suit their clients and themselves."
Be that as it may, the military reasoning of to-day is made up of but two halves, opinion and precedent, the precedent derived from the wars of the past and the opinion, formed after careful study of these precedents, as to the best means of applying their lessons to the problems of the present and the future.
Accepting this as a fact, it becomes necessary to review the methods employed during our past wars in order to determine the proper policy to be pursued in training the personnel of the nation to be ready for its defence in the future.
During the Revolution the American Navy was manned almost entirely by volunteers, the inducements offered in this service were far greater than those offered by the land service, the rich commerce of England presented many opportunities for profitable captures, and as a fair proportion of the value of the ships and cargoes so captured was divided among the crew as prize money, the possibilities of acquiring fortune while also patriotically serving the country were many.
In addition to these facts, the colonies had at the beginning of the war an immense number of merchant ships engaged in profitable trade all over the world, and as many of these were forced from their commercial routes by the war, a large number of hardy and well-trained seamen found themselves thrown out of employment.
In those days the principal difference between a man-of-war and a merchant ship consisted in the fact that the former mounted more guns than the latter, as the armed merchantmen was then the rule.
The conditions of the times are well described in that great work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, as follows:
As to the sea warfare in general, it is needless to enlarge upon the fact that the colonists could make no head against the fleets of Great Britain, and were consequently forced to abandon the sea to them, resorting only to a cruising warfare, mainly by privateers, for which their seamanship and enterprise well fitted them, and by which they did much injury to English commerce. By the end of 1778 the English naval historian estimates that American privateers had taken nearly a thousand merchant ships, valued at nearly £2,000,000; he claims, however, that the losses of the Americans were heavier. They should have been; for the English cruisers were both better supported and individually more powerful, while the extension of American commerce had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother country. When the war broke out, it was as great as that of England herself at the beginning of the century.—Mahan.
On the land we find that the colonies relied upon two classes of soldiery, the continental army and the militia; the former were supposed to be a federal force supported by the federal government but furnished pro rata by the several colonies. The Congress provided for a national army of continentals, but the colonies refused to give the Congress the authority to enforce enlistments; and the direct results of this short-sighted policy were that, although the several colonies furnished to the continental army during the war the grand total of 231,771 men, the greatest number that General Washington was ever able to lead into battle was not over 17,000, and the war was needlessly prolonged and the expenditure of blood and treasure made vastly larger than would have been required had a firm policy of universal service and conscription been adopted at the start.
In other words, the voluntary system was a failure, and to save the cause, the Continental Congress and the several colonies had to resort to the system of offering bounties to induce men to enlist. This system was used in obtaining recruits for both the army and the navy, and it has endured in one form or another to the present day. To-day we have it in the form of an offer to pay a postmaster five dollars for each recruit he obtains.
Any system of voluntary enlistments necessarily places a government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism no longer suffices to fill the ranks, resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits. Even at that early day the letters of Washington refer to the bad effects of this practice.—Upton.
The question of a standing army versus a volunteer or militia army came up early in the Revolution, and General Washington thus voiced his opinion on the subject:
The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia has been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter.—Washington.
Yet, in spite of the needs of the country so ably expressed by its greatest general of the time, we find that the country went into the War of 1812 still relying upon an army made up of volunteers and state militia. The inevitable consequences were that in the less than three years duration of the war there were enlisted or drafted into the armies of the United the immense number of 522,654 men.
In contrast with our reckless extravagance in employing more than a half million of men the largest force of British regulars opposed to us was 16,500.—Upton.
Fortunately for the salvation of the country it had been found necessary to establish a regular navy during the first decade following the Revolution, and at the opening of the War of 1812 we had a small but very efficient navy. That this navy was of inestimable value to the country, and that its very existence as compared with the non-existence of a regular army proves the necessity for a proper preparation of a personnel ready for war, is ably stated in the following quotation:
In the War of 1812 the discipline and victories of the navy alone saved the country from dishonor. On the land the historian of the army was glad to slur over needless disasters, to dwell on the heroism in the open field displayed by the regulars at Chippewa and Lundys Lane.—Upton.
The navy of 1812 consisted of a few fine ships built as men-of-war and manned by less than 5000 men, assisted by privateers manned by the hardy merchant sailors of the day; and it has been authoritatively stated by historians of the period that had that navy been "twice as large the war would only have lasted half as long."
The Florida Indian War, lasting from 1836 to 1841, by its nature called for little action on the part of the navy, but it again showed the value of having a wide-spread military training, for it proved.
That for want of a well-defined peace organization, a nation of 17,000,000 of people contended for seven years with 1200 Indian warriors and finally closed the struggle without accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians, which was the original and sole cause of the war.—Upton.
The Mexican War found us with an efficient navy, but with little distinctly naval work to do since Mexico possessed no navy worthy of the name; and with a very small but very efficient regular army, which in the first campaign under command of General Taylor completely overthrew the power of the enemy in the great territory of northern Mexico, and enabled its commander to report at the close of that campaign as follows:
Our victory has been decisive. A small force has overcome immense odds of the best troops that Mexico can furnish—veteran regiments perfectly equipped and appointed. Eight pieces of artillery, several colors and standards, a great number of prisoners, and a large amount of baggage and public property have fallen into our hands. The causes of victory are doubtless to be found in the superior quality of our officers and men.—Taylor.
That this very efficient force was too small to finish the war, and by a second rapid movement capture Mexico City, is another proof of the extravagance of depending upon untrained volunteers in war. General Scott, ably assisted by the navy, landed at Vera Cruz and advanced upon Mexico City, but when he reached Puebla, within three days' march of the main objective, the enemy's capital, his force was reduced to about 5000 effectives and he was forced to halt there for several months awaiting reinforcements. Had he been furnished an adequate force and had the country possessed a large number of men with military training to draw upon, the war would have been concluded much sooner with correspondingly more gain to our prestige as a nation, and proportionately less expenditure of men and money.
During this war the United States Army employed 31,024 regulars and 73,332 volunteers, a total of 104,356; while the maximum strength of the Mexican forces never exceeded 35,000 men.
With all of this rich experience available at the opening of the Civil War the regular army had but 16,367 officers and men, and the navy consisted of 6 sailing ships of the line, 10 sailing frigates, 21 sailing sloops of war, 3 sailing brigs, 6 steam sloops, 4 steam side-wheel sloops, 8 second-class steam sloops, 1 second-class side-wheel steam sloop, and 9 third-class steamers; nearly all of which were wooden vessels and most of which were antiquated and of little use for war purposes. The personnel of the navy consisted of 8530 officers and men in the navy and 1287 officers and men in the marine corps.
While a large proportion of the officers of the army cast their lot with the Southern Cause, a comparatively small proportion of the officers of the navy did so; this was probably due to the influence of the life of the sailor, which took him away from the proximity of his native state at an early age and tended to break the ties that bound him thereto, while it correspondingly increased his allegiance to the central government.
Had the navy at this time been adequate in size and power to the needs of a nation of 25,000,000 people, the effect would doubtless have been to greatly lessen the duration of the war; and had the regular army been large enough to have enabled the President to send 20,000 regulars to the Battle of Bull Run, the war might have been stopped on that battlefield.
As it was, the war started with "two armed mobs" opposing each other; the hard school of actual experience made those who survived the ordeal the best soldiers in the world, and the history of the time is filled with the records of the gallant deeds of the brave men who volunteered on one side or the other; but the lack of a trained national personnel to draw upon for the necessary recruits to fill the depleted ranks after each campaign made it necessary to prolong the war until the stronger side won by the slow process of attrition.
This great war marked the passing of the privateer and the concentration of all of the sea forces of the country into a national navy under the absolute control of the central government; and it also saw the last of the bodies of irregular troops that had in other wars attracted many adventurous spirits of the free lance type, who, while brave and patriotic according to their lights, found the discipline of the regular service irksome.
The privateers on the sea and the roving- bands of irregulars on the land represented the very antithesis of discipline and the efficiency that comes from discipline; for discipline makes for coordination of all of the elements of a nation's power, for cooperation in its largest sense, and for concentration of effort in a common cause. These irregulars passed out both on land and sea not only on account of a growing respect for the so-called "rules of warfare" that the nations were evolving by treaty or common consent, but more because of their inefficiency when pitted against trained and disciplined forces.
The untrained volunteer is only one step higher than the "irregular," his preparation for military service is no better and his patriotism is probably no higher, but, since he is enrolled in an official force, there is a hope that he may ultimately learn discipline in the hard school of actual warfare.
The history of the Civil War should have convinced all thinking men of the futility of the volunteer system as a main dependence in war, and of the prime necessity for a universal training, in discipline, in military drills and duties, and in morale as well, that would have made the citizens of the country ready for the call to arms should such a course become the last resort.
The war with Spain came not without ample warning; for years the unsettled conditions in Cuba had led to discussions in the halls of Congress and in the press as to the advisability of intervention in that unhappy island; and the sinking of the Maine was but the match that lighted the fuse. Yet the opening of the war found us with an army of only 30,000 men widely scattered at many posts, and a navy of 8000 sailors and 2000 marines, a number too small to fully man the ships then in commission, not taking into account warships purchased abroad at the opening of the war and the merchant vessels and yachts taken over and converted to war purposes.
The first naval campaign of the war was quickly carried out and ended in a decisive victory; as our greatest naval historian so aptly expressed it:
On May 1, Commodore Dewey by a dash, the rapidity and audacity of which reflected the highest credit upon his professional qualities, destroyed the Spanish squadron at Manila, thereby paralyzing also all Spanish operations in the east. The government of the United States was thus, during an appreciable time, and as it turned out finally, released from all military anxiety about the course of events in that quarter.—Mahan.
Commodore Dewey's squadron consisted of ships which had been in commission for some time with but few changes in personnel, the men had been drilled together until they were thoroughly trained and disciplined, and had confidence in themselves and in their officers, and the results of the Battle of Manila Bay bear ample proof of the value of such training.
The ships of the Atlantic fleet at the opening of the war were likewise manned by well-trained and disciplined crews, and here again the value of such training and discipline was clearly demonstrated during the long vigil before Santiago and by the decisive victory over Cervera's ships when he attempted to run the gauntlet and escape.
But back of these first crews there was no trained reserve, and had the enemy gained a temporary advantage or possessed a navy superior in ships to our own, we would have been forced to man newly built or acquired ships with green men.
The army was not so fortunate, it did not have sufficient men to furnish garrisons for the fortified posts at home and at the same time equip a small field army for service in Cuba and Porto Rico, and additional men had to be obtained to meet the emergency.
As in other wars, the President's call for volunteers went forth and men in sufficient numbers volunteered, but, though by no means lacking in patriotism or personal bravery, they were untrained and undisciplined, and, as in our other wars, valuable time was lost in organizing, equipping and training the volunteers.
During this short war an outstanding manifestation of the serious results that follow in the wake of a lack of preparatory training and discipline was the spread of epidemic disease among the volunteers in the concentration camps, which proved far more deadly than the bullets of the enemy. It was only a repetition of history, again the volunteer system had failed.
In the Philippine Insurrection the volunteers were better prepared, since they had been given some training during the War with Spain to prepare them for war service; but it became necessary to reorganize the state troops into regiments of United States volunteers, in order that the power to appoint and commission officers might be vested in the President and the War Department, and not be left in the hands of the different state governors.
This was a step in the right direction, but after the subjugation of the Philippines we went back to the old system of state troops as represented by the State National Guards, and when it became necessary to send a force to the Mexican Border to protect American interests from bandit raids, the state troops were again called to the colors. The results are so patent and so recent that no detailed account is required here; it is enough to record that the volunteer system has failed again.
At the close of the Civil War the United States Navy was the most powerful in the world, but, torn by the internal strife of four long years and self centered upon the great work of reconstructing the nation from within, the people gave little thought to dangers from without the nation, and the proud ships were tied up at the navy yard wharves to rot while their crews went back to the pursuits of peace.
The rehabilitation of the navy began in 1883 with the authorization of the Dolphin, Atlanta, Boston and Chicago, and proceeded by irregular increments until the First Session of the present Congress passed the first act embodying an increase in ships in accordance with building program extending over a term of years.
It is estimated that upon the completion of this program the naval service should have a trained personnel of 210,000, including 175,000 in the line and staff of the navy and 35,000 in the marine corps. This is the first line and it must be ready for instant service at all times, but back of it there must be a second line composed of the land forces, and for this second line it is estimated that we should have an army of approximately 400,000 men.
We now have an authorized enlisted strength of 78,000 for the navy, 15,000 for the marine corps, and 138,899 for the army; and in the efforts to obtain the necessary men by voluntary enlistment we have three separate sets of recruiting agencies in the field, each conducting a campaign of advertising by letter, in the public press, and by brilliant colored posters that scream at the passerby from dead walls and billboards, each telling the people the manifold advantages of its particular service, and each having difficulty in getting the number of men required.
These three services in the field bidding against each other for the popular favor of the men who care to enlist in the service of their country for their own pleasure or profit, whether imbued by patriotic motives or not, may be likened unto a man selling his own goods at auction, bidding against himself to raise the price and then buying them in when the price has reached its upper limit.
An increase in the pay of enlisted men has been proposed as a means of obtaining the necessary enlistments to meet the increase in personnel authorized by Congress during its last session, but while this might answer as a temporary expedient the effect would not be lasting, since the bidding would still go on, and the other branches of the service would have to meet the rise and bid still higher to get and keep the needed men.
The difficulties encountered by the services in obtaining sufficient enlistments are shown by the statements of the heads of the various branches.
In the statement of Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, made on November 29, 1916, before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, the following appears:
Mr. Kelley: In view of the fact that there are only 14 capital ships out of a total of 37, in commission, does not that pretty clearly demonstrate that the greatest problem that we have before us now in the question of the shortage of men?
Admiral Benson: Yes; and officers as well, sir. If anything, we are quite as short in officers, if not more so than in men; but that condition, of course, will soon be remedied by the graduates from the Naval Academy. If we can get the graduates from the Naval Academy, the officer problem will be taken care of.
In the statement of Rear Admiral Leigh C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, made on December 4, 1916, before the same committee, the following appears:
Admiral Palmer: After the bill was passed steps were immediately taken to establish new (recruiting) stations, begin advertising, and to get the people in. It takes a considerable time to get the information out to the people and get results. In the month of November we made a net gain of 610; that is in the one month of November. These figures are not absolutely correct, because they are made up from the mail communications that we get in daily and the report of a man who enlisted a month ago on the Asiatic Station, for instance, comes in to-day with a man who has enlisted to-day.
Mr. Oliver: Right in that connection, do you recall how many men you actually enlisted and how many went out during the month of November?
Admiral Palmer: One thousand eight hundred and two came in and 1232 went out.
In the statement of Major General George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps, made on November 27, 1916, before the same committee, the following appears:
Mr. Oliver: Do you find that the applications for enlistment continue large, and that you have no trouble in supplying the personnel?
General Barnett: I will not say that we have no trouble, but all I can say is that we have been as successful as any other branch of the service. We are working under very adverse conditions, because, as you all know, there is a very great demand for labor in every field of life to-day, and we have to compete against that, and there is no better barometer of the times than a recruiting record.
In the statement of Major General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, made on December 18, 1916, before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, the following appears:
The volunteer system cannot now, under the most favorable circumstances produce anything like the number of men required for the national defence. It is undemocratic, unreliable, inefficient and extravagant. It is undemocratic because it shifts the burden of national defence from the shoulders of the many where it rightfully belongs to the shoulders of the few whose financial condition in life or whose patriotism impels them to offer themselves to accept the risks and hardships of war. Furthermore, instead of unifying our people to the extent where all individuals are willing to undergo sacrifice for the national good, it affords great opportunity for the selfish and non-patriotic to stay at home in time of war and to fatten on the adversity of the nation and on the necessities of the families of better men who have volunteered for the country's defence.
It is unreliable as all history teaches us. It has never in times of great national stress in this or any other country been able to provide the number of men needed for the emergency. It has been tried and discarded by all of the other great nations of the world and to-day the United States and China are the only nations of size upon the globe which rely upon volunteers for the defence of national existence.
These statements of the highest naval and military officials of the government point out the difficulties that are met in all branches of the service in the attempts to secure a sufficient number of enlistments to keep up the establishments on a peace footing, and it seems reasonable to assume that these difficulties will increase in proportion as the services are increased to meet the nation's demands for preparedness in personnel.
They show that the maintenance of a sufficient force of men in the army and navy by means of voluntary enlistments depends upon the economic conditions of the country and upon the popularity that can be worked up for the services by advertisements and personal appeals, and not, as should be the case, upon the absolute military and diplomatic needs of the country as determined by the international relations and our own national policies.
They also tend to show the failure of the present national guard system as a reliance for war's emergencies. On December 21, 1916, during the hearing of the chief of staff of the army before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, Representative John Q. Tilson, a member of the committee, formerly an officer of United States volunteers during the war with Spain and now a colonel in the national guard, said:
I agree with you that voluntary military service is not an adequate system and probably would break down in time of war as it has done before. The national guard system in particular is economically unwise because of the dual control over the forces by the federal government and the states.
The experience of the author of this statement as an officer of the national army, as an officer of a state national guard, and as a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs should qualify him to speak authoritatively upon the subject, and if his statement is correct as applied to the land forces it must be equally true as regards the state organizations of naval militia.
The great Napoleon is credited with saying that "In war the moral is to the physical as three to one," and, however, true this may be, it is unfortunate that the prevalent opinion in America that our people are the bravest and most patriotic in the world should have given rise to the delusion that an army made up of a collection of men individually animated by the highest ideals of patriotism could go forth to battle without military training or study with prospects of overcoming a trained military force.
Patriotism, bravery, respect for the right and individual courage may make men ready to die in the defence of their country, but these virtues, great as they may be, do not make soldiers of men without that training and drill which teach them discipline, the powers and limitations of the arms they bear or man and the proper methods for employing such weapons, and, last but not least, give them that feeling of cohesion and interdependence that is called esprit—the soul of an army.
We have been called "the most warlike and the least military nation on earth," and if anyone doubts the truth of the statement let him look through the columns of our daily papers and listen to the speeches of our fire-brand orators, bristling with defiance to the world and bold assertions that "we can thrash any nation on earth," that "no country would dare to go to war with us and if they did they would be obliterated," that "any army landed on our shores would be driven into the sea," and other vainglorious boasts of a like nature; and then let him count up what proportion of the male population of the country has had any training whatever in military duties.
It may also be said that if we were more military we would be less warlike, for then we would be better able to view things in their true proportion and to realize that to put a uniform on a man and give him a rifle to carry does not make a soldier of him over night, that the trained man of one country is no better than the trained men of another country except in that his training has been more careful or more thorough, and that no race or nation has any monopoly of courage or bravery.
We have been called an undisciplined nation and not without cause, since from a military standpoint discipline may be defined as the cheerful, unquestioned and implicit obedience to the orders from higher authority in such a manner as to secure systematic action and cooperation of all the component parts of a military force.
Many of our people do not like to take orders or obey them, when a traffic policeman on the corner holds up his hand the motorists and drivers stop with grumbling and criticism, the theory that one man is as good as another if often mistaken to mean "one man (myself) is better than the other," liberty is often mistaken to mean license, and the volunteer dislikes to salute the officer under whose command he finds himself suddenly thrust, although this salute is only the outward manifestation of discipline.
The needed discipline can only be secured by a complete system of universal military training, extended over many years until our people learn that discipline and obedience to just laws and regulations made for the good of the people, which means the state, work as surely for efficiency and profit in the arts of peace as they do for victory in war.
What we have to strive for, then, is a condition where every man will be ready in training and in esprit, and eager to be a sailor or a soldier to defend his country as a paramount and righteous duty and not for the wage his country gives for the service nor from fear that he may be handed the white feather if he does not so serve.
This ideal can be obtained by the enactment of laws which will require every male citizen to undergo a course of training in military drills and studies, in discipline and in morale which will fit him to serve his country as may be required in the capacity to which he is most suited. The details of such a general scheme must be carefully worked out after a study of the methods employed by other nations and due consideration of the conditions peculiar to our country and our people, and while a discussion of them has no place within the scope of this paper, some of the salient features may be noted.
In a country like ours, where so much attention is given to the education of the young and where compulsory attendance at schools is required by law, the necessary military training should be given in a manner to interfere as little as possible with the general educational scheme. This might be accomplished by a wide extension of the system of military education and drill now in force at many schools for boys, and the application of such a system worked out in accordance with the laws to all of the public and private schools of the country, such early training being supplemented by actual service with the colors aboard the ships of the navy or in the coast fortifications or regiments of the field army for a term long enough to give the necessary finish to the training, but not so long as to seriously interfere with the ultimate employment of the great mass of the young men of the land in their peaceful pursuit of a livelihood on the farms, in the shops and factories or in the business offices.
This first period of service completed each man would pass into the reserve and in subsequent years would be given periods of training service to keep him fit in a military sense, the length of such periods of training growing shorter with the years of service. In the course of the training the physically unfit would of course be excused from strictly military training, but they should still be held liable to serve in the factories or on the farms according to their aptitude and physical ability.
In the case of an army and navy made up entirely of volunteers the underlying motives which have induced the individual men to enlist are many and varied: love of adventure, a desire to travel and see the world, the choice of the service as a profession, or to get away from unpleasant associations at home are some of the reasons given for enlistments in time of peace; while in time of war the two great motives are a patriotic desire to serve one's country be she right or wrong and the fear of being ridiculed or branded as a coward if one should stay at home in safety while his fellows are going forth to fight.
With universal training an accomplished fact a navy largely manned by professional sailors would still be required and all of the motives which now apply to peace times would still actuate those men who might wish to remain in the service for considerable lengths of time or to make it their life work; and a regular army would still be needed to perform the permanent duties and to furnish the cadre for the training and organization of the greater forces that would be called to the colors from the trained reserves when war should become imminent.
With universal training in force all of the young men of the country would be to a considerable extent acquainted with the duties, responsibilities and emoluments of the regular services and the field from which to obtain the men for the permanent services by voluntary enlistment would be greatly enlarged. Hence, there would be no difficulty in obtaining by voluntary enlistment the men required for the peace time establishments of the army and navy, and in addition, these recruits to the regular service would come in with their preparatory military training completed, thus making it possible to do away with the courses of training now maintained by the regular services in naval training stations and at army recruit depots. This would result in a saving of money and time and an increase in the efficiency of the regular navy and army.
With a volunteer system alone in force, in time of war only the most patriotic enlist, and these are not necessarily the most fit for the duties for which they so gallantly volunteer. With the system of universal training and liability to service in force, each man would be appraised according to the value of his services to the government, and accordingly, he would be sent aboard ship as a sailor, into the forts as a heavy gunner, into the infantry with a rifle, into the railway service back of the lines, into the shops to make munitions, or onto the farms to produce food for the fighting forces and for those who must stay at home.
With a volunteer system in force, an able bodied man who does not "go to the front" during war is looked upon askance, and to "stay at home" soon comes to be considered a disgrace; while with the universal service system in force, it would be no disgrace to "stay at home" provided one were serving the country in that position where his services would be of the greatest value.
In all of our wars of long duration the volunteer system has failed to supply the number of men needed and recourse has been had to the obnoxious system of drafting men by lot; obnoxious because after the ones patriotic enough to volunteer have been exhausted the draft draws the unwilling ones, and they go to the colors to be looked down upon by their comrades who have volunteered. Such a condition is distinctly harmful to esprit and morale since it draws a line of demarcation where none should exist and prevents that cooperative spirit of brotherhood in arms which results in discipline.
Where all are ready for the duties and subject to the call when the necessity arises there can be no line of demarcation between one class and another and the government receives the best service that its citizens can render; and none but the best service will avail against the persistent attacks of a brave and tenacious foe carefully trained and imbued with the spirit of his own country's "rights," however, different these "rights" may be from our conceptions of our own rights.
There is another effect that arises from voluntary service that would be entirely obviated by the universal service system. The volunteers that go forth with the cheers of their friends at home ringing in their ears to distant service under trying conditions, with little chance for any real action to enliven the ennui, as has been the case with the militia recently sent to the Mexican Border, may soon lose enthusiasm and begin to wonder why they should do the drudgery for the nation while their fellow citizens at home enjoy opportunities for added profit on account of the lessening competition due to the absence of the volunteers.
As a result of this many of the home-coming volunteers exclaim, "Never again for me, no more volunteering; if everyone is subject to the call I'll do my share, but I don't intend to do it all while brother Bill stays home and draws down the pay for my vacant job."
Many of the most pronounced advocates of the policy of disarmament are to be found among the ministers of the gospel, and the advocacy of this policy carries with it a firm opposition to any increase of the army or navy, either in materiel or personnel.
A text frequently used as the basis for argument by these extreme pacifists is from Christ's Sermon on the Mount:
"Whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also."
Yet, among these same ministers of the gospel we also find those who fearlessly advocate preparedness in men and material as the surest means of maintaining the peace of the nation and of the world.
In a sermon at the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the opening of St. Paul's Chapel, at New York, on October 30th of this year, the rector of that church, the Reverend William Thomas Manning, S. T. D., most ably advocated these views in the following stirring words:
We need a great reawakening of the spirit of true Americanism, and a great reconsecration to our national ideal. There are influences at work to-day which are operating definitely to weaken the spirit of patriotism. The word pacifism has come much into vogue in recent time. If by pacifism is meant only a desire in every way possible to remove the causes, and lessen the likelihood of war then we are all of us in sympathy with it. In this sense our most earnest pacifists are the officers of the United States Army and Navy, who know what war means, and who would be the first to give their lives if war came.
But if by pacifism is meant the teaching that the use of force is never justifiable, then, however, well meant, it is mistaken, and it is hurtful to the life of our country. And the pacifism which takes the position that because war is evil therefore all who engage in war, whether for offence or defence, are equally blameworthy, and to be condemned, is not only unreasonable it is inexcusably unjust.
The effort to identify the Christian religion with ultra-pacifism is a misapprehension of the truth and injury to religion. The Christian religion no more enjoins us to leave our shores unprotected against some brutal but efficient invader, than it enjoins us to leave our homes unprotected against murderers and thieves. If the Christian religion meant that we are not to protect those dependent upon us, and to make every effort to do this effectively, then I say that normal men everywhere would reject the Christian religion, and they would be justified in doing so.
But the Christian religion holds up no such mistaken ideal. The Christian religion is true to all the facts of life. Our Lord Jesus Christ does not stand for peace at any price, but for righteousness and truth, first and at all cost.
No one in this country wants war. As never before, we see its cruelty and its horror. By every means that may be we want to see its livelihood lessened and its causes eliminated. But evil as war is there are still deeper evils. Bodily discomfort, physical safety, material prosperity are not the greatest things of life. War may hurt and kill the body. There are things that hurt and kill the soul. Every true American would rather see this land face war than see her flag lowered in dishonor, or her name touched with disgrace. Every true American would rather see this land involved in war than see her false to those principles of right, of freedom, and humanity upon which our life is built, and upon which the hope of the world depends.
We need in every part of our land, and among all classes of our people, a great reawakening of our sense of the responsibility which rests on us as citizens, of the duty that we owe to our country, and of the service that we owe to the state. In every true citizen of a republic there must be something of the soldier spirit the spirit of self-sacrifice, of devotion to duty, of willingness to give time and strength and, if occasion requires, life itself, in the service of his land. This spirit is of our very soul as a nation, but it seems to be less strong among us than it once was. It does not seem to burn in the hearts of our people as it once did. There are many of us whose thought seems to be far more of what our country owes to us, than of what we owe to our country.
And on this notable anniversary, in the presence of the representatives of our government, speaking with all possible care and deliberation, I wish to say that, not only from the standpoint of a citizen, but from the standpoint of a minister of religion, whose duty it is to advocate only that which is for the highest moral and spiritual good of our people, I believe there is nothing that would be of such great practical benefit to us as universal military training for the men of our land. The assertion that this would lead us into militarism need not be seriously considered. This assertion is made by those who are opposed not only to militarism, but to any adequate measures for military preparedness. The danger of a democracy is not that it may be carried into militarism, but that it may be found unprepared to defend itself against militaristic aggression.
I advocate universal military training because of its military effectiveness. It will make our land practically secure against invasion.
I advocate it because it is the only military system that is truly democratic. It puts all on one common footing. Its effect is a people trained and prepared for their own defence.
I advocate it because it will weld our nation together and help to make of our many races one united people.
I advocate it because of its moral and spiritual value. It will give us needed discipline. It will develop in us those high qualities of orderliness and system, of respect for authority, of obedience to law which are not the strongest points in our national character. It will tend to make our young men better Americans, better citizens, and better Christians.
The statement that any form of universal military service is not compatible with a republican form of government and that it is an attribute of monarchical institutions has been repeated so often by the advocates of a small army and navy that it has come to be accepted by the great mass of our people as axiomatic.
To demonstrate the fallacy of this conclusion requires but a brief survey of history, for if we consider the evolution of government from the early days of civilization to the present time, we see that a regular or standing army of hired professional fighters has been for centuries the means employed by despots and oligarchs to maintain their sway over the great masses of the people, while the best conception of a republic in arms for the defence of what it conceives to be its rights is that every man in the nation should be so trained and educated as to be ready and able to perform his share in the general defence, and to perform this share of the work where his efforts will most avail in the general plan, whether these efforts be expended on the battlefield, in the workshops making munitions or in the fields raising food supplies.
As a matter of fact it was the intention of the founders of our government to have no standing army or navy; the very idea of such a force was abhorrent to them as it savored too much of the monarchial ideas from which we had broken away in the Revolution. They believed that as "all men are created free and equal" it should devolve upon all men to support the country's burdens in peace and war, and to this end the Militia Act of 1792 required all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 years to be given military training to make them ready for service in the army or navy in case of need.
This act provided no penalty for failure to carry out its provisions and carried no money to pay for the necessary arms, equipment and supplies; but, with the idea of states; rights then generally accepted, left all of the details to the several states.
The result was that the training of the militia was carried on in a desultory manner for a number of years with no concerted effort and no uniform equipment or method of drill; so that when it became necessary a few years later to protect our growing commerce on the sea from the depredations of pirates and barbarous states, a regular navy was perforce established to be paid for out of the national treasury, and a national standing army had to be organized and paid for from the same source to perform national police duties and protect the settlers from Indian depredations as "westward the star of empire takes its way."
From the first it became evident that a militia navy was not practicable but it was still expected that the naval personnel would be composed of volunteers, and while such a method may serve to obtain the number of men required for an army and navy for peace times and small wars, it will not furnish an army or navy upon which any reliance can be placed for a great war, since the number of men obtained by voluntary enlistment is always dependent upon the number of men who are willing to serve, and not, as it should depend, upon the number required by the problems to be solved in the conduct of the war.
Then again, the great mass of the men obtained by voluntary enlistment are untrained and undisciplined and hence not ready for service, in spite of their unquestioned individual bravery and patriotism.
We hear much discussion in these days as to the right of suffrage, as to who should or should not vote, as to limitations of immigration and qualifications for obtaining citizenship, and all of this shows the deep interest that the average citizen takes in his right to have a say in the administration of his nation's business.
It is only fair to assume that any man who is anxious to keep the right to cast his vote and thus take an active part in controlling the government of his country will also be anxious to take his part in the defence of the policies of that government when these policies involve the country in war.
To take an effective part in such defence requires the preliminary training in physique, morale, discipline and military technique that will make every able-bodied man ready in body and spirit to take up arms and follow the flag when the country calls.
Hence, it might well be considered just to make the acceptable performance of the necessary military training, or of some other form of special training that would best fit the individual to fulfill his highest duty to the state, one of the prime qualifications for the suffrage.
The nation by its laws requires every man to perform certain duties to the state, to serve on juries and to pay taxes for the support of the whole community, and it tells him he must do these things for the country's good; then why should not the laws require every man to pay the ultimate tax of his military service, or even of his life, if it becomes necessary for the salvation of the nation?
It is the nation's duty to see that its men are trained in readiness for this tax of service just as surely as it is the nation's duty to see that its citizens are educated to make them fit to cast a ballot and perform their other duties of citizenship.
No sophistry can excuse the slothful cowardice that hides behind the pet phrase of a music hall ditty and in syncopated chorus sings, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier." The jails of this country are filled with men who never had a fair chance to be good citizens, whose mothers did not raise them to be soldiers, did not by example and precept inculcate in them a spirit of discipline, but allowed them to learn the music hall and bar-room songs, while failing to teach them at their knee that brave old war hymn,
"Onward Christian soldiers,
Marching as to war,
With the cross of Jesus,
Going on before."
But patriotism still lives in the land, from Maine to California and from the cold northland to the sunny south, there are still patriotic mothers who bravely exclaim, "Yes, I did raise my boy to be a soldier, ready to fight for the right and his country's honor."
Rich in all that goes to make up material prosperity, our banks filled with a world's golden treasure, our granaries replete to bursting with a rich store of grain, and the produce of our mills and farms selling at bumper prices, we Americans are lulled by the siren song of this great prosperity into a fanciful sense of security that cannot be supported by the experience of other nations nor by the histories of other times.
In the histories of all times there are not lacking illuminating examples of the dire results that follow in the train of a lack of national preparedness to meet the attacks of any possible enemy.
In all of our own wars the volunteer system has broken down under the strain of actual service and we have had to resort to the "draft" to fill the ranks, but with no organized and legalized system of preparatory training in force, this eventual dependence upon a draft or conscription system has served only to bring to the colors untrained and unwilling men, and has resulted in inefficiency and the unnecessary prolongation of our wars.
Two solutions of the problem here presented are offered by the statesmen whose duty it is to shape our country's policies and by the naval and military leaders whose duty it is to enforce these policies.
First. The maintenance of a regular army and navy so large as to deter any possible enemy from attacking us with prospects of success, raising the pay and the bounty for enlistment high enough to attract recruits in sufficient numbers.
Second. The training of every able-bodied male citizen in military duties and in discipline so as to make him ready for any service that the nation may demand.
Of these two possible plans, the first is manifestly impracticable from an economic standpoint, since its cost would be well-nigh prohibitive and it would take the cream of the nation's manhood away from the productive pursuits of manufacture and commerce and thus greatly reduce the earning power and prosperity of the country.
The second plan, which calls for universal military training, is practicable, easily within the limit of cost which the nation is able to pay, and, in addition, it would undoubtedly improve the whole personnel of the country physically, mentally and morally.
It is, of course vain to except that the great majority of men should attain even an elementary knowledge of what constitutes the strength or weakness of a military situation; but it does not seem extravagant to hope that the individuals, who will interest themselves thus far, may be numerous enough, and so distributed throughout a country, as to constitute rallying points for the establishment of a sound public opinion.—Mahan.
The natural leaders of the movement for the establishment of a public opinion which will demand the enactment of the necessary laws to put the universal military training of the manhood of the country into practical effect are the officers of the army and navy, who, by their training in the military life as a profession and their intelligent studies of the great wars of the past, are best fitted to judge of the requirements of the future.
Then let us be up and doing as a service and as a nation in a manner befitting our place in the world and our status as a great people, preparing not only on the material side, but also training the personnel of the whole land to be ready, both physically and spiritually, so that when comes the day of need, we may.
Flaunt our starry banners high,
Lift united voices to the sky,
And make our lordly battle-cry,
For God and Country we fight
To win or die.