Our naval needs are many and diverse and are ever being commented upon. Criticisms on present conditions of organization, supply and sufficiency are at hand in every direction, both within the service and without. We are confronted with the conditions of an official personnel far too small for the constantly increasing needs; and an enlisted force to be, as it were, created, trained and retained in the service. Our system of organization and methods of work are receiving assaults from all sides, by the press and from other sources, and, it is apparent that the actual present conditions are far from being all that is desired; nor do the present provisions for naval needs appear to be adequate.
The close rivalry between the various navies as to progress and new methods has developed a state where the striving after every possible improvement, or essential to progress, or superiority, is the aim of those interested.
It is under such conditions, where the powers of the organization and personnel are severely tested and stretched to something near their utmost capacity; where every one and everything is needed for all there is in them; that the defects and the bad features are more liable to show themselves. Likewise, under such conditions, the proper manner of supplying the needs and providing the remedies for these shortcomings can be better discovered. An unknown defect is not likely to be remedied. It is therefore not altogether a misfortune to find where our organization and supply of personnel and materiel is faulty. If defects exist they should be brought to light, and then the needed and most feasible and politic remedies could be applied.
A great danger produced by such conditions (where the present state of affairs is not viewed at all as satisfactory, and where shortcomings are being noticed on every hand) is that radical or ill-advised and unsuitable measures are more likely to be taken, which, designed to remedy by revolution, may only abolish what we have, and leave in its place something worse, thereby entailing a somewhat chaotic state which this nation cannot afford to have existing.
The general nature of the majority of our needs are known and have been known and pointed out by those who have given the matter thought, and who are those most interested in naval efficiency. It remains for those who have the power to produce and execute to set the remedies in motion, and for all others to aid in acquiring these ends by a united effort and not by disjointed working at cross purposes, generally engendered by disagreement on mere details.
ORGANIZATION.
The success and efficiency of any large concern depends largely upon its organization; the more complex the more need of system in carrying on its work. That the Navy Department is in need of an organization based on a more logical foundation than that under which it is at present operating, can hardly be gainsaid; but on what is actually needed there does not seem to be a unanimous and overwhelming opinion. There is, however, a tendency along certain lines which can be marked in many directions.
A general idea of what this is can be obtained by a perusal of Lieutenant-Commander Hood's prize essay contained in the March, 1901, number of the NAVAL INSTITUTE, and by numerous other articles appearing on the subject of naval administration. This would contemplate a general division of naval affairs; one relating to "Personnel and General Administration" and another relating particularly to "Materiel and Supply." In the first division would be embodied a general military staff, and several subdivisions, having direction of work now carried on by the Bureau of Navigation and by the Judge-Advocate General's office.
The division of materiel would have a head to be in charge of all matters of material and subdivisions under this division, corresponding to the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Equipment, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery, with the matters under the cognizance of these subdivisions somewhat more equitably arranged.
The desired outcome of the organization should be one harmonious whole though composed of many varied and diverse parts, but all fitting into the general mass and each doing its share for the benefit of the whole.
PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL.
Personnel and materiel are neither superior the one to the other. Though the fact of what "good men with poor ships" have done may be matters of history, it does not follow but what men as good as these in better ships might not have done more. But, moreover, if not limited by various restrictions, good men will have, and will cause to be produced, good ships. Poor men will cause good ships to deteriorate; while good ships will make good men doubly good.
Materiel and personnel are bound together, and they must be developed together; the neglect of points in either reacts on both. Both are appropriate attributes of the whole body, and defects in either will affect the whole. There is no such thing as the relative importance of the one to the other. Each is all important.
APPROPRIATE PLANS.
As before stated, general ideas on an appropriate naval organization are brought out in the general plan suggested by Lieutenant- Commander Hood, and from the discussions; likewise by the essay on Naval Administration, Admiral Luce, Naval War College; Navy Department Organization, Admiral Chadwick, No. 71, U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE.
The plan of the organization must be based on the actual and probable needs and conditions, and a consideration of the ends to be accomplished, and not on a hypothetical system that does not take full cognizance of actual facts present, disagreeable though they may be, but none the less material.
No RADICAL CHANGES.
One thing, however, cannot be overlooked, and that is a radical change should not be effected at once. Things must progress by gradual development; and a sudden change would simply bring all operations to a stand-still. But it would be well to know what the desired goal is, and then to work toward it by gradual evolution.
Perhaps, though the desired organization is never reached, if it is outlined and known, changes toward that end can be gradually made. If the plan aimed at is not definitely known, changes may be made tending to work in an opposing direction. Many of the radical changes sometimes proposed and elaborately worked out, though having much merit, are impossible of immediate adoption in toto. Such radical changes might paralyze everything, destroy in great part what has been developed during the past years, and, left in its place, might be a system but not the means, ability or experience for carrying it out. The fact must not be overlooked that the conduct of naval affairs cannot be stopped to acquire a brand new outfit in the way of organization, but must be always in operation, and must acquire its innovations while on the march.
There can be no immediately radical changes. We must consider what we have already, and produce means for diverting this in the direction we wish to develop. Viewing the desirabilities in this light, and having in mind those changes which, by gradual evolution, will produce a desired organization, there follows now a discussion of the needs, system and procedure for the training of officers fitted most efficiently to perform the various duties in the navy, while yet not making it necessary for any violent change that might disturb the operation of present naval routine.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFICIAL PERSONNEL.
To obtain the general and material requirements of the navy necessitates the product of many resources and entails the need of widely diversified knowledge, experience, talents and abilities; and though the whole must be under one system, controlled by one power, and tending to one end, its parts must be intelligently grouped in naturally-connected, suitable, general divisions in order that the various special features may be developed. Such division to be governed by the natural grouping of kindred parts and by controlling circumstances and conditions.
The immediate control of all matters is in the hands of the official personnel, and must there be apportioned.
In the production of the navy we must have vessels built, equipped and manned, provision for their care and manipulation, repair and sources of supply, and an executive and administrative control over all.
CONSTRUCTION BRANCH.
To produce the construction features of the vessel we must have a constructive branch in the official personnel. This entails a specialty of wide field, requires specially trained, general and technical, knowledge and experience. The groundwork of a general naval education and knowledge is best brought into being by a course at the Naval Academy and some experience at sea. The purely technical education must be obtained by a special course, and the special training by actual work in shipbuilding and designing.
The actual productive work of the constructor must, of course, be done on shore, and there also must be gained the experience in methods of building and designing. But in order to know the ends his work is put to and the practical limitations presented by service conditions at sea, he should spend, from time to time, periods at sea, in actual service. Unless this is done to some extent, he will not know intimately the conditions that his handicraft is put to, and cannot as well realize the necessities to meet them, or the comparative utility and sufficiency of various portions of material under his particular cognizance.
The duties of naval constructor at sea are now defined by the naval regulations, but none go to sea, owing to the extremely limited number. This number should be sufficiently large to enable certain periods of sea detail to be maintained and that all other work coming under the cognizance of this branch be efficiently carried out. The turning over to non-naval men any part of the direction of this work cannot but lead to the production and the fitting of vessels not best suited for the purposes required.
The selection of candidates for this branch should be based on their fitness and special abilities for the position, which can be better ascertained at a period somewhat later than immediately after graduation from the Naval Academy.
ENGINEERING BRANCH.
Another division is the engineering branch. To this branch must be given the cognizance of all engineering matters, except some details which would naturally be more closely connected to other branches cited below. The personnel of this branch should be required to have a special knowledge, ability, training and experience. Owing to the fact that the material on board ship belonging to this branch is not passive, as is the case with the construction branch, but active, the peculiar services of this branch are more needed on vessels in service for supervision, care and operation.
These needs will require a larger percentage of officers at sea than on shore, and this makes it, what may be called, a sea-going branch. It has consequently more in common with the elements of life on board ship than has the construction branch, and the need of a more general sea knowledge and training can be seen. However, the nature and sphere of duties are in a very large measure quite distinct from those of the line, or executive branch. The need of a distinct branch and a separation of duties from the line in order to carry out this specialty is apparent.
The sequence of education and training for this branch would be general education and training through Naval Academy course, and for several years at sea, then selection and separation as far as duties are concerned only, from the line, a special course, and then confinement to engineering duty.
The same need for sea experience in those directing the design and building of engineering material applies as in the previous case, only in a much greater degree. This need is so important that any proposition to turn the direction of design and construction of engineering matters over to civil, or non-naval men cannot be considered; and this is one great flaw that can be found in a number of foreign naval administrations.
Because civilian engineers build merchant ships and their machinery, it does not follow that they make the most desirable persons to direct the construction of naval vessels. In order to know what to build, they must be intimately acquainted with the special needs and requirements, which are only fully learned by experience in men-of-war at sea.
ORDNANCE.
This branch is still more closely connected with matters of a sea-going nature and the executive duties. It requires peculiar technical knowledge in developing the design and constructive features which can quite monopolize the special abilities of a body of men. Hence for what may be termed "technical ordnance work," there should be a special branch, specially fitted for it, who would then always do this work on shore; and at sea, where it is concentrated sufficiently to make use of the services of an officer so specially fitted.
It is a branch that has as wide a field as the others, but its environments and requirements lie more closely and naturally with the duties and requirements of the executive, or line branch, and, owing to this fact, it is not believed to be necessary that those who are to carry on the special work of this branch must be separated from the executive. Above all it is necessary that those who are to design and produce the ordnance material should be intimately connected with the conditions on board ships in service.
NAVIGATION.
In order to develop the higher, or what might be called the more technical parts of the general subject of navigation, there should be certain officers who have made this more of a special study than would be necessary for the ordinary practical work of navigation, which all line officers must be familiar with. The work of such a branch would lie closely in the atmosphere of executive duties, and, as is the case with ordnance, there appears to be no special need for a separation from the line. But the special work under this branch, which is so greatly needed and important, not only to the navy, but to all sea-faring people, requires the direction of those specially trained for it, and for this reason certain officers should be selected to pursue this specialty, in order to insure the utmost development along this line.
The work of this branch would include, the supply and fitting of vessels with instruments of navigation, hydrographic work, pilotage, the compilation and distribution of nautical and other astronomical information.
The personnel of this special branch would go along the same lines as that of ordnance, except that there would be special training in navigation and confinement to this work on shore with executive duties afloat.
SIGNALS.
This question is full of vital importance; to investigate and develop most fully the problems it contains, and to provide for the most efficient systems and apparatus for doing its work, there should be officers specially trained for this purpose. In this term are to be considered the general subject of signal communication in all its attributes. It would thus include the development of wireless telegraphy, the development of all systems of signals, as well as preparation for and the direction and training of the signal force.
Those to specialize in this subject would, like the two last, not be separated from the line. They should be given such special training as is deemed desirable, and would carry on the special work, as well as being, in part, available for general line duty.
TORPEDO SERVICE.
This service requires special ability and training, and should have a special branch to perform its work, if any great progress or efficiency in this line is to be attained. Officers for duty in this service, and they alone, should take the special course at the torpedo school, and those qualifying there, and not others, should carry on torpedo work in its various branches. When not assigned to duty in general service at sea, torpedo officers should be confined to torpedo work, which would consist of duty with the torpedo-boats, mines, etc., the design and production of torpedo equipment and in charge of the torpedo outfit on large vessels, where the installation is of sufficient magnitude.
Torpedo officers need not be distinct from the line, but should have a special torpedo training, and it would suffice to assign a number of young officers, depending on needs and conditions, to this specialty. They should be so assigned within a few years after leaving the Naval Academy, for it must be borne in mind that torpedo work afloat can best be carried on by officers when they are still young.
If the navy is to have a well developed torpedo service, a definite torpedo policy must be present, and a definite torpedo training, for both officers and men, must be devised. The particular features of this subject have been particularly well set forth recently in the essay on torpedo-boat policy, Lieutenant Beach, U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, March, 1903.
EXECUTIVE.
We now come to the duties of the executive, or line branch. In the main, these are general and administrative. The officers to perform these duties are all those not selected for the separate divisions, and include the ordnance, navigation, torpedo, and signal specialists. In the beginning all line officers who pass through the Naval Academy do line, or general, duty, but, as they go on, certain ones are selected out for the various specialties. This produces the desired result of having a relatively large number of line officers in the lower grades. Where many are needed, and, by taking a considerable number away from the exercise of the higher line duties, it also serves to make it possible to reach these positions while not too old.
The executive branch would have charge of general administration, and on shore would be the means by which general naval requirements and policy would be executed. On board ship they would have the general control, the handling of the vessels, and the general administration of affairs. As far as the direction of general affairs are concerned, all branches must be subordinate to this branch, but the chiefs of the various special branches must be consulted and their recommendations and suggestions followed out.
It is seen that the greatest portion of such duties are in the main general, and that a larger proportion of officers is required at sea than on shore. It would, however, not be unreasonable to expect nearly every officer from also becoming proficient in one of the line specialties, ordnance, navigation, torpedo, signals, which are all intimately connected with the executive duties.
The exercise of the higher duties of the executive will consist in that which relates to naval tactics, general control and organization and direction, international law, intercourse, and policy.
To specially develop these matters we have the Naval War College, and it would appear that the most suitable time for taking the course there should be just previous to reaching the rank for detail as executive, or commanding officer. The subjects treated by the War College need not, of course, be confined to purely executive matters. Lectures by various specialists on special features would be one of the most important parts of the course.
It ought also to be recognized that any line officer who fails to come up to the essential requirements needed for a commanding officer should be retired or assigned to some duties that he is capable of performing. If any officer should be up to the best requirements, it is a commanding officer; yet in practice, how often, due to physical ailments and numerous other causes, is the opposite the case. In some other navies, officers for command rank are selected for promotion. This prevents those not qualified from reaching the higher grades, but it also prevents many deserving ones from obtaining promotion.
Retirements, under various conditions, where there is a failure to come up to all the desired qualifications, will prevent, both the deserving from being left behind, and the highest grades from being filled by incumbents not capable of properly performing all the duties incident to these grades.
Very often this incapacity may result from no fault of their own, and in these instances, retirement may work what might be considered some hardship on individuals, but in such matters the good of the service should be considered.
It is for the general work for the exercise of line duties and general naval knowledge, that the course of the Naval Academy should be designed. The specialties should be, and can be, much better developed later on. Only those who remain in the line could reach the positions for the exercise of high administrative control of ships or fleets, and stations on shore. For this reason suitable compensation might be made for those specialists who thus give up their chance of ever obtaining this goal to many ambitions.
FISCAL AND ACCOUNTANT BRANCH.
The duties of this branch may be considered as quite distinct from the others, but are yet intimately acquainted with all manner of service conditions. It is a sea-going branch, and its duties are peculiarly naval, and the need of general naval knowledge is at once apparent. It should be, as it is, a separate branch, but if the new officers of this branch would be given some preliminary naval training before being given their responsible duties afloat, it would certainly conduce to their general efficiency, and make it possible for them to enter upon independent duty with more confidence and fewer misgivings than is now often the case.
MEDICAL BRANCH.
The distinctness of the duties of this branch is at once manifest. The medical officers must be obtained from the civil medical colleges, but a comparatively short course, as has from time to time been established, in matters specially pertaining to the service, would do much toward preparation for duties at sea.
SPECIAL NON-MILITARY BRANCHES.
Certain non-military special abilities are required in conducting various matters in connection with the naval establishment ashore. These may require the services of several special professions, which it might be advantageous to organize into permanent and recognized corps. These are at present represented by the civil engineers, whose duties, in connection with the erection of buildings, and the general maintenance at naval stations, are manifest.
By astronomers for duties at naval observatory positions now in part supplied by professors of mathematics.
The professors in the non-military branches at the Naval Academy might be regularly organized into a special corps. Whether this would be advisable might be a matter of question to some.
In the process of development other special services may be needed, and it might be advisable to organize those who perform them into a permanent body.
GENERAL SYSTEM FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
In the general idea for a division into the various branches of the commission officers (except the medical corps, chaplains, and the special non-military corps), the needs of a common training and general naval knowledge, to a certain extent, is first to be recognized. Then the need of specializing in the various directions must be considered, and those thus specializing should be so recognized. Lastly an entire separation of duties when necessary and expedient.
The first training at the Naval Academy should be the same, a groundwork for naval education; then, general experience at sea, and finally a division into the various special branches.
PREPARATION AT NAVAL ACADEMY.
In order that one harmonious whole may be produced, those things that all have in common should be taken in common. The attainment of the common knowledge should be begun at the outset, and all should start at the Naval Academy. The standard of admission should be so raised that all elementary subjects should be covered by the entrance examination, and the subjects taught at the Naval Academy be those peculiar to the naval profession. This would result in discarding from the academy course a great many general subjects that are perhaps better taught in the various educational institutions throughout the country, and which candidates for admission should be required to know. The instruction should not go too deep into specialties and research, and should be designed to fit for the essential and practical needs of the service. Special features, and the intricacies of more advanced work, should be taken up later in the special post-graduate courses.
The duties of pay officers will require a less amount of the peculiarly military knowledge, and more of an accountant and commercial nature, considerably different from what the other branches need. It might thus be advisable for the candidates for the pay corps, if obtained through the Naval Academy, to be separated during the latter part of the academic course to pursue special study in their particular duties. On graduation they could be assigned for a time as assistants, and then to independent duty.
SELECTION AFTER GRADUATION.
The candidates for naval constructors should serve, after graduation, some period at sea in general duties, and then should take a special course in naval construction, and be permanently assigned to construction duties as a distinct branch.
The candidates for engineering should continue for several years in general service, and then those specially fitted for its duties be given a special course in engineering, and then assigned permanently to engineering duties.
The other special branches would be what might be called line specialties, since in their work on board ship they are more intimately connected with line duties.
Officers peculiarly fitted or adapted for any of these branches would be selected and given such special training, or course, to develop these specialties; and the special work would then be conducted by those specially fitted for it.
This assignment of the official personnel into special branches can be carried out, both under the present organization of the Navy Department, or under other systems contemplating a general staff and division of personnel and divisions of personnel and of materiel with various subdivisions. The special duties being simply performed by those designed to be best fitted to perform them. It is really what obtains now, in a haphazard fashion, brought to a systematic application. The great advantage is that it furnishes an incentive to excel in any one of the special branches and the knowledge that such excellence will be made use of, and in providing some means by which officers may be assigned to do that which they can do best. Under the present operation, how often are not duties performed on board ship by many doing that which they know least well while not being called upon for that which they do know? The patent fact of spoiling a good engineer to make a poor deck officer, and vice versa, is manifest in numerous instances.
RESULTS OF SUCH DIVISION.
Going on the above lines, the relatively large number of watch officers compared with those to exercise command would be provided for. As junior officers and watch officers they would be gaining the knowledge and experience that all need, and by then leaving to go into the special branches, a relatively large percentage of watch officers is obtained, and this would serve the means of obtaining billets for command while still some years before retirement.
The principles must be, to recognize all needs and to make a proper provision for each, putting each part or portion in the place and condition best suited for it, and where it may develop to the best advantage toward the upbuilding and general efficiency of the whole. The result of these measures will be to put, as near as possible, each one belonging to the personnel in the position that his talents best fit him for; to produce conditions tending to the development of the talents and abilities needed, and to use those abilities that naturally present themselves. General conditions must be met in a general way, special in a special manner.
Plans of any large organization must be based on an exhaustive knowledge of the ends to be accomplished, means at hand and the actual and probable conditions presented and not on theoretical hypotheses. Unless the ends sought are at least known in a general manner, confusion will, of course, result.
There must be a division into special branches, and this must be definitely recognized and provision made accordingly.
LEGISLATION.
To follow out these logical needs, new legislation is not absolutely necessary; it can be done by enactment within the Navy Department, if only some permanency can be promised. Legislation defining general terms might be better, but only the general outlines should be defined by laws. Laws are not elastic.
PROVISION FOR SPECIAL REWARD.
In order to provide suitable reward for special efforts, extra compensation for the performance of special duties, or the possession of special attainments, should be given. A special qualification, or rather a special result being the means of obtaining a special reward.
This is a detail that can be equitably adjusted unless the question of personal jealousy and covetousness can command more interest than the general efficiency. But if a gun captain receives so much more for special ability, a coxswain of a steam launch extra compensation while doing that work, why should the reward of special efforts and ability among officers incite envy in those not having them. If the rewards are the results of extra effort and work, jealousy or discontent should not result. There has been and is at present considerable inequality in pay, due to the provisions of various laws; no individual jealousy on that account is really apparent, but these present discriminations for the most part are not based on extra abilities, or the performance of special duties.
In considering these questions, the facts, and the actual conditions that apply, must be considered. These things cannot be based on sentiment, prejudice, nor on traditions. Temporary feasibility, individual ambition, or benefit, should not be the deciding point, although the presence of these matters must not be disregarded. The general good and efficiency of the service, and not that of the individual or of any one class, is the point that should decide methods of procedure.
In the above, there has been an endeavor to give only a general trend, the details affecting the various branches must, of course, each be worked up in time, and this should be done within the navy, and not require special legislation for every change. Legislation is, as a rule, an unwieldy weapon, and often results in defeating its own purposes.
PERSONNEL LAW NOT ENTIRELY ADEQUATE,
The personnel law provided much that was desired but it is not complete; it only goes part way and then leaves things to chance or further development. Further development is now what is wanted. The personnel law has reached nearly the desired point in providing for the general features, education and training. The next thing is to make proper and adequate provision for the special features and training. The direction in which this should be done is indicated above.
The development toward it should be immediately begun and continued at as rapid a pace as modified conditions can adjust themselves if progress is desired.
PARTS ALREADY PRESENT.
The embryo of the various special schools are all present. We have a torpedo school, a system of compass and navigation instruction, as well as a forerunner of an ordnance school and engineering school. It remains to gradually direct and develop these into something definite and systematic.
We have in the service our engineer, ordnance, navigation, torpedo and other experts; but they are all in the general mass, and a great many are likely to be lost in it. However, if these are brought into groups for the purpose of developing these specialties, the various specialties may not have to try a grab bag game to obtain those desired for their work.
TRAINING OF MEN.
The importance of a training service, is generally recognized, and means and systems are continually being evolved, submitted and discussed. In this connection there are a few points that ought to be recognized and considered in developing any system.
1. That the training should consist in training the men for the duties they are to perform and not for something else. There is sufficient work in doing this and it would seem that the training of men to do that which they are not likely to be called upon is a luxury that might be dispensed with. There are certain things and a certain amount of training that may be alike for all at the beginning, but a point is soon reached where paths must separate for there are too many things to develop to require all men in the service to have the same abilities and qualifications.
2. That the real and finished training is that which is received in actual service. That a certain amount of essential general knowledge and training can be obtained more quickly or more easily in barracks at a station or in special ships cannot be controverted, and it should be done. That better facilities can be provided at certain places for the development of special lines is likewise true; but that the development of the all-around man in the various specialties that he is needed to serve on vessels of war, is to be obtained aside from the regular service in regular cruising ships, is hard to believe.
The special training service can only teach a few general preliminary and necessary points of knowledge about naval life and duty. It is simply a preparatory school. The real training and development lie in the cruising ship.
3. The training service should be such and nothing else. The use of training ships for regular duty is destructive to their functions as training ships and it also produces a likelihood that duty, whatever it is, cannot be done as well as if by a cruising ship designed for the purpose. The tool must be fitted for the work.
4. That some definite and not ephemeral plan be arrived at. About the only definite system of training that now actually exists is the apprentice system and the system of training seamen gunners. These systems may have many shortcomings, but they are something definite and from them we have definite results. Though other schools, such as schools for mechanics, electricians, yeomen, etc., are established, they lack definiteness and though there are many causes for a lack of definite system, it cannot be gainsaid that the remedies lie within and not without the navy.
There have been many valuable plans of training proposed, but all cannot be adopted and the practice of having now one thing and then another as a new suggestion comes up, leads to nothing and serves only in many cases to discredit good and efficient systems through not being followed out. There must not be an endeavor to do too much. Something fairly feasible and simple can at least be adopted, and then, if necessary, can be modified gradually. Frequent revolutions of entire systems must be avoided.
The idea that a vessel can at the outset be supplied with a crew of veterans, of men experienced in all their duties, must be laid aside. The new men must be put on board of our vessels just as soon as possible and there taught and trained to do that which they are designed to do. It is only on board actual fighting ships that the knowledge and training desired can be obtained.
FLEET EFFICIENCY.
The efficiency of the fleet will of course be largely dependent on the character, armament and equipment of the vessels and the experience of the personnel. But these points of material and supply may be apparent, and still it may be a weapon that will fail ingloriously in its purpose.
Examples of this in naval warfare were perhaps numerous even before the dawn of history. The battle of Salamis, the naval battles in the Punic wars, show how in ancient times this fact obtained. Continuing to modern times we have the defeats of the Spanish fleets at the hands of the English during the 17th and 18th centuries, and the defeats of the French fleets somewhat later. In our own times we have a most striking example in the battle of Lissa.
The question may be asked, What is this great attribute that seems thus in many cases to bring victory to one side against apparent odds and that has enabled the less better equipped and experienced of the combatants to overcome the other?
Is it not that there are qualities productive of victory that are not so visible and manifest on the surface which cannot be weighed and figured upon in concrete terms with definite values? They are what may be termed psychic attributes, and their value is overwhelming. In their development lies a field for effective results.
Among these we have:
1. An effective organization.
2. A fighting spirit animating everybody and inducing everyone, from admiral down to the lowest man, to exert his greatest effort in the most effective and intelligent way.
3. A knowledge on the part of those in control of what is to be done, how best to do it with the actual means, a knowledge of those means, and a complete, definite, unvacillating execution.
5. The utilization of all methods, means and circumstances, both previous and during the engagement solely to the accomplishment of the result.
6. The dispensing with all matters subsidiary to, or which do not help to obtain, the point aimed at.
The reasons for defeat, on the other hand, have been:
1. Lack of system and plan of action.
2. Lack of a genuine fighting spirit.
3. Ignorance of the resources and abilities of the enemy and of own insufficiency.
4. Lack of general confidence.
5. Insubordination and jealousy, and the following out of individual desires and ambitions at the expense of all.
All great naval actions were largely won or lost in the days of preparation. To show how this obtained at the battle of Lissa, two extracts of Lieut.-Comdr. Sears' article on the above battle are given.
"The Rear Admiral (Tegetthoff) summoned all his captains on board, learnt their views and general condition of vessels. And then fires were drawn and the machinery put in shape." And
"Persano made a signal which was not generally understood by his captains; had it been understood it could not have been generally obeyed, several ships not being ready."
The conditions that produced victory and defeat are stated in these two extracts.
The efficient fleet must have a commander and staff who have natural abilities in the control of affairs, a wide knowledge of the conditions and limitations of both their own and the enemy's and of the general conditions underlying. The Commander must be one who will inspire confidence, obedience and fidelity in all; who is not antagonistic but whose influence will tend to produce something akin to what Nelson had when he describes his captains as a band of brothers; something that will engender the devotion that Napoleon inspired in the hearts of his marshals as well as soldiers.
The all-pervading spirit that attracts victory and knows not defeat is enhanced by patriotism, by the love and admiration for the proud traditions of the service, by general contentment, and, by the high conception of the performance of duty.
QUALITIES OF A FLEET.
The desired qualities of an efficient fleet may be grouped under the following general heads:
1. Fighting ability. This means expertness and accuracy in the handling of the offensive weapons; their care and their preservation in an efficient state; the supply of ammunition; and, in fact, the highest development of the art of naval gunnery.
2. Ability to move, maneuver, and act in concerted action. This implies expert ability in the handling of vessels; knowledge of their maneuvering qualities; the development of the best means of signal communication and the prompt execution of signals; the maintenance of the mobile qualities of the ship, and all matters and material that affect these qualities, in the highest efficient state.
3. Source of supply and repair. This is to ensure endurance. It can be easily seen that these features are even more important than the commissary is to an army in the field. Some of these features are contained in the vessel themselves, but they must be supplemented with such accessories as efficient colliers, supply and repair ships and facilities for repair and supply on shore. It is feared that there may be danger that consideration for these matters may be given on the basis of the needs of peace and not of war.
The system of supply must be simple and move with despatch, and to this end the multiplicity of papers, vouchers, etc., that may often be required in order to have work done or to obtain needed supplies, are handicaps that should be dispensed with wherever possible. The rendering of the correct account should not come to be considered of more consequence than the obtaining of the needed supplies or the performance of necessary work.
The needs of these features are, no doubt, generally appreciated, but care must be taken that the provisions supplied do not exist in name only. Providing a vessel and calling it a supply ship does not necessarily make it an efficient one; what is provided within that vessel and the facilities it has for bringing this to those who are in need, are the important considerations. Bases of supply must be something more than mere geographical points having strategic position. A barren island may be very important strategically, but if it cannot supply that which is desired, give succor in need—or which requires abnormal measures for its existence or defense—its efficacy may be very small. A base should be a place for refit and rendezvous, for obtaining supplies and making good deficiencies, and according as it is able to supply these needs is it valuable. The facilities are of more value than the position.
A few bases well equipped for the purposes of actual needs are much better than a great many that are bases but in name only, and which would be entirely unable to meet demands likely to be placed upon them.
With the development of navies on the present lines the relative importance of these fleet auxiliaries as they may be termed, will be increasing. They cannot be brought into existence at once. Their development lies mostly in shore work and must be prepared beforehand by those having knowledge of probable needs.
To put a fleet to sea without providing for these sources of direction, supply and maintenance would be like cutting the rope by which one is held suspended. That these parts are an important part of the navy, and require the attention and direction of naval people is a matter that ought not to be lost sight of.
If adequate provision for these matters are made in times of peace, the needs somewhat definitely known and means for them planned; they can, of course, be greatly augmented and brought into greater activity when needed. It is in this extension of activity that there lies a great field for the efficient utilization of a volunteer or temporary force. Work connected with these matters is not so much of a combatant nature and those ordinarily engaged in the pursuits of peace could at once turn their same handicraft to the supply of such needs. But the manner and means must be provided and planned beforehand, and they require time to produce.
INDIVIDUAL SHIPS.
The efficiency of naval power will depend in the main on the efficiency and sufficiency of the individual ships. Though the organization of the fleet may be excellent, if the vessels are lacking in their inert individual qualities that make them each individually and separately the most efficient fighting machine—the essentials are then lacking.
The ground work of naval strength is the ship, if each ship has attained the highest state of efficiency, the work of preparation for battle has, in a large measure, been accomplished.
This state of efficiency will depend almost entirely on those on board and on the commanding and superior officers will devolve the responsibility for it.
SALIENT POINTS AFFECTING SHIPS EFFICIENCY.
Indications of a more general awakening regarding the salient points of the ship as a fighting machine have been appearing. These various points are being continually called to our attention by the many practical and well thought out articles appearing in various service publications in which the special needs are discussed together with means and methods for obtaining the important results aimed at. But it yet remains for a great many of these things to be thoroughly recognized and intelligently acted upon by the general service.
That important items in connection with these matters have begun to receive their proper attention is shown by some examples cited below.
The renewed interest in gunnery is bringing into use thoroughly efficient, effective and feasible methods for its general development for actual service, as well as experience for arriving at the best way of fitting and handling the appliances connected With the working of the battery: and thus is making this the important point in a ship's work and routine.
A recognition that watch standing is not the all-essential duty of the division officers, that petty officers are something more than more experienced hands and that to them can be turned over some of the minor responsibilities and training of men in lower ratings, shows that there is progress in this direction.
The awakened interest and the resorting to the real, direct, feasible and productive methods to develop the essential things that produce fighting efficiency under present conditions must be extended to all matters affecting it and these developed together.
Besides her ability to shoot straight and handle her battery well, a ship must be well handled and this not alone by her captain but by other officers. Her mobile and maneuvering qualities must be experimented with, developed and known by all those to whom this may be entrusted. She must be able to send, receive, understand and execute signals readily by the most reliable efficient and handy means that can be devised. All her various parts, fittings and machinery must be kept in shape for actual use, and, the means and methods for their care and operation, developed to the highest pitch in the most improved manner. She must contain provision for accident and injury and repair, and the resources and appliances for these purposes must also be known and understood. There must be an efficient organization under which the various items that go to make up the whole are bound together in mutual support, and general harmony, and discipline that entails prompt, faithful and complete execution of orders.
ALL PARTS DEVELOPED TOGETHER.
In considering the efficiency of a ship, it must be regarded as a whole; every part, portion and detail must be developed to the highest efficient state; no one thing must be produced at the expense of others. When this is not recognized and followed out, the result is a one-sided or abnormal development, resulting in ability to do some certain thing extremely well, but perhaps lacking the necessity for bringing this ability into use.
Though specialists and special features must be most highly developed, the ship as a whole cannot be an ultra specialist except a specialist in the whole purpose for which she was built. Hence the one-hobby man will not and cannot develop an efficient ship; he may develop a certain line, but others are very likely to suffer. Every detail must receive all the attention possible, and it is to be found that perhaps each can best be developed by each affording to the others all the support and encouragement circumstances will allow.
SHIPS ORGANIZATION.
The organization of the ship should be such that (1) everyone knows what is to be expected of him and that he has a conception of what he is responsible for. (2) That the division of duties follows the most simple, natural and just order. (3) That all rules are simple, not difficult to understand, and that they require no hardship and as little inconvenience as possible. (4) That rules be a safe guide and that the regulation way should be the most convenient and effectual. (5) That all rules when once laid down be either strictly held to or abolished.
The first is perhaps the most important of all for unless any one knows what he is to do, how can he be expected to fulfill his duty well. Things must be easily understood; any great elaboration is useless when it will not be understood and interest in doing will be lost. The phrasing of any order with elaborate and long modifications, thereby making it less plain and simple, detracts at once from the likelihood of its being properly obeyed.
The organization must be elastic so that it can accommodate itself to various conditions and that, when new or unusual conditions are met, everything will not be immediately upset. Here again we are brought against the bad feature of undue elaboration and the utter uselessness of having a definite and inflexible rule for matters that are always variable.
The whole idea should be to have simple rules covering, as far as possible, all general questions affecting routine and duty and, to carry out these rules in all cases. Make these rules elastic where necessary. If a rule or order will not accommodate itself to the necessities of the case it will be violated and a generally violated rule had better be abolished since its violation engenders a general disrespect for all rules or orders.
It must not be overlooked that the observation of rules and regulations is not the end, but that the rules are simply a method for better obtaining the end. It is the blind and literal following of rules without consideration of the end in view that is the cause of so much useless and inefficient work, inconvenience and often useless hardship. There may be even cases where it has been stated that this or that work would be done just to follow out orders or that there would be plausible grounds for making a desired report. Anything done in such spirit, simply to follow out the wording, while violating in every way the whole spirit and intent, is worse than undone. Any regulation that tends to produce such obedience is likely to be faulty and, superiors that regard such performance in carrying out orders in a better light than a frank admission of non-performance with reasons therefore, cannot expect to have duty performed and obedience supplied in the spirit that it should be done, nor the proper respect and fidelity of those under them. Any conscience that the literal obedience of an order will pacify which, while in doing so, knowingly condones a violation of the spirit, purpose and intent, is akin to the hypocritical.
The cause of faulty performance lies largely in the way excusable failure to perform and a bluff at performing are regarded. All men are human, and the natural line of least resistance is very likely to be followed. The solution is to make the line of least resistance the right line.
CARE AND CONDITION.
The responsibilities for the care of the ship will devolve on the higher officers of the ship; the aim in this respect should be maintaining all parts in the most efficient state, providing for their preservation and preventing deterioration. This must be intelligently recognized and understood. Often the very efforts originally designed for these purposes have been developed, so as to produce the opposite result; an example of this is the wear on gun mechanisms by mis-directed cleaning of bright work. These counter effects are often lost sight of, and the desire for superficial appearance is responsible for an innumerable amount of deterioration. How much unnecessary and laborious work has been done to secure a good appearance, while the overhauling and preservation of parts has suffered. By the way the commodity, paint, is often used, an observer would hardly recognize the fact that the primary reason of its application is for preservation and not for appearance.
Often the outer surface of certain appurtenances is kept profusely bright and pretty while the inner working of the concern, I the reason for its being, is practically unknown and not looked at—likewise the appearance of various mechanical devices and not their efficient working may appear to be the chief point. How often has not the matter of looks in various devices prevented their efficient manipulation? The effect of a desire for superficial appearance may be illustrated by an extreme case. On a small vessel, a young officer was placed in charge of the Engineering Department. Having due regard for the points that would impress the Captain, he gave his orders to the chief machinist that he did not care whether anything down below was in working order, but that bright work must always be kept in good shape. On inspection, this officer may have received the compliments of the Captain, but the proper working of the machinery may have been a different question.
The craze for smart appearance is a most potent cause for the deterioration of many appliances on board ship; a lack of real practical mechanical knowledge governing conditions and a conception of its importance is another.
The proper care and preservation of parts and appurtenances on board ship can only progress when those officers who are responsible for them and operate them are intimately acquainted with their needs of service and the proper methods to be used in maintaining their efficiency. In these things there is great room for development; much has and is being done, but a greater and more general recognition of these facts is necessary.
The work of overhauling and repair is most important in keeping a vessel in efficient shape, and those who are responsible for its care should be allowed ample time and facility for doing it and must be encouraged, not hampered in their work by out of date restrictions as to the time, manner and place of doing it; nor should the overhauling be the province of extra duty men, or apportioned to odds and ends of time. If a vessel is well cared for while at sea, the necessity for navy yard repair is decreased, and the practice of allowing things to go until completely gone, with the idea of having the whole thing renewed at a repair station, is hardly conducive to the desired results.
This should not be encouraged by such a state of affairs that often the only way of a vessel being relieved from arduous and undesirable duty is the necessity for repairs, and the maintaining in an efficient state a reason for the continuance in such duty. Such practice merely sets a reward for neglect, and a punishment for proper care and zeal. It must also be recognized that the preservation and care of a ship does not consist solely in scrubbing decks, cleaning bright work, and applying paint.
The care of ships appliances must be learned in general by the petty officers and men, and must not be allowed to remain solely in the charge of a few mechanical specialists who are not supplied in sufficient number to do all the elementary work, and can only care for certain special features. The men of the crew must be brought up with the idea that ships work is for the purpose of care and preservation and retention in efficient condition, and not simply for appearance and the execution of certain orders. With the new development in all classes of ships material, means and methods for the care and preservation are new and changing. The transition to the more mechanical has progressed far and will go further. The practical mechanical scientific considerations governing care and preservation must be generally recognized, and given by the directing officers the attention that their importance warrants. General knowledge of these matters must be dispersed.
It should be considered as a principle that, those who are to handle the appliances and whose reputation and even life depend on them would be most interested in their proper condition and would do most toward their being kept in good shape; and among such must be distributed knowledge and training in the manner of applying means for preserving such efficiency.
ROUTINE AND DRILLS.
The routine on board, the nature and extent of drills and the apportioning of the ship's work should be governed by the intelligent application of the means available for the end sought. Therefore the non-essentials should at once be put aside, the heirlooms of the past, though they may have been well in their day, must be dispensed with. That modern production, the ship of war, cannot be well controlled by the ways and methods of years ago. The general principles, the basis of organization, the general features for the attainment of efficiency do not change; in the course of time the knowledge and conception of them changes. But the methods and means for their attainment, the conditions governing their application, are varying continually and are ever developing along new lines.
There should be no reason why old rules, methods and traditions should be adhered to when the causes for their existence and the things which they regulate have disappeared.
The routine should be adjusted that the really essential things viewed from the latest and most progressive standpoint are the ones that receive the major consideration. The spick-and-span outside appearance, the whiteness and spotlessness of the quarter deck, immaculate paint work, and mirrored bright work, the ultra-dressy appearance of the crew, the exactness and stiffness of military functions, may be all right when in striving after them the really important things do not suffer neglect. But they are not the aim, the essential points that should be mostly looked out for. We may laugh at the Chinese soldiers, armed with gongs and flags, but are there not many things that we civilized people retain which have about as much efficacy for fighting purposes? Broad-sword, pistol drill, and setting up exercises may be good gymnastics but certainly should not take the place of essential drills designed to train for action; these things do develop qualities of handiness and alertness, are a good exercise but should only be made use of in this light.
The routine should provide for working, drill and also recreation periods, and the latter should be as little encroached upon as the others. It should be capable of modifications to suit changes in weather and governing conditions, the same detailed routine may not be well carried out both on a first-class battleship and on a small gunboat; in the arctic regions and in the tropics.
WORK AND WORKING PERIODS.
The constantly present work should be determined and then apportioned out both as to times and division of labor, so that everyone may know what they are to do and the proper times for doing certain work. If there are regular times set for the doing of routine work it is less likely to be neglected or to interfere with other matters.
DRILL.
The important matters to be developed by the ship's company by means of drill may be stated as follows:
Drills for Developing Offensive Qualities.—Under this will come all matters of drill connected with gunnery, the supply of ammunition, the exercise at general quarters and clearing ship for action. These are the drills that ought to have the major consideration and on them should be devoted special attention.
Drills to Provide for Emergencies.—These are fire and collision drills, abandoning ship, handling of life boats and rescue of drowning and the organization of fire and rescue parties. Though not directly concerned with fighting efficiency they serve to train for quick, rapid and concerted action in emergencies and guard against the worst features of disasters liable to occur.
Landing Party and Boat Work—These matters are connected and are taken under one head.
In boat work we have what is left to-day of what may be called the old seamanship, and it offers a means for developing the true seaman's acquaintance with wind and wave and the forces of nature on the sea. By boat work coolness, judgment and alertness are developed and the efficient handling of the ship's boats is still, as it always will be, one of the telling qualities of the efficient man-of-war. The handling and the appearance of the boats shows the state of things in general and in boat work we have the means of developing the old hard-fisted, clear-headed seaman, qualities so often sighed for. As long as a vessel's boats are intelligently used there will not be any special need for producing something artificial to obtain the qualities that sail and spar drill did produce in days gone by.
The landing party should be organized primarily for landing under actual service conditions and to this end it should be fitted out and the men instructed. Precision in the manual of arms and parade should not, however, be the chief points to have in view.
Instructional Drills.—Under this would come matters of general and special instruction, which do not contemplate the general idea of work ensemble. There will be drills to develop special features. A certain amount of general and rudimentary instruction should be given to all, but the major portion of instructional drill should be instruction to particular classes in special matters. This in order to impart the special knowledge for the development of special features to the fullest extent. To make an efficient use of special instructional drills, the men must be taken by classes and not in a general body; not as is sometimes done, inviting a whole division to a lecture which may be a mere repetition to the experienced members while the new arrivals are entirely unable to grasp the subject.
Accordingly, the signal force should be specially instructed in signals; the gunners' mates in the care and overhaul of battery; the quartermasters, boatswains' mates and coxwains in their special line; the seamen in theirs. The various ratings of the engineer force and other mechanics of the ship should likewise each be specially instructed in the sphere of their particular duties.
Much in the nature of instructional work can be done by the leading men and petty officers during the working periods. Instructional drills should in a great measure make use of the services of the leading men and petty officers each in their special lines. These men having acquired the practical experience and skill are specially fit to instruct and inform in practical work those who are newer to their duties.
DRILL PERIOD.
Drill periods should not be too long, and something to keep up interest should be going on all the time. The practice of keeping men for long periods idly in ranks or standing at stations awaiting orders is tiresome and demoralizing. A quick short drill in which things are done thoroughly and ,with snap, and where the men are constantly and actively employed is much more beneficial than some of these long drawn out affairs where everyone is wearily longing for the sound of retreat and where interest in doing work has been lost, though in the latter a longer time is consumed.
The nature of governing conditions, the state of the weather, etc., should be considered in apportioning drills and drills under adverse circumstances or where there is an impossibility of doing things thoroughly, are not likely to be beneficial. If the conditions are such that a drill cannot be properly carried out it ought to be changed to suit conditions.
INSPECTIONS.
Inspections are of great value, but in conducting them the essential working and the points that should be arrived at in development are the matters that should have scrutiny. When inspections develop simply into scrutiny on matters of superficial appearance and smartness their value disappears.
It has in the past been often the case that the knowledge of an admiral's inspection was the signal for extra paint and bright work and the preparation of matters designed chiefly to delight the individual personal taste of the inspecting officer. The aim of the preparation in such cases has been for mere appearance at inspection and not to produce the best state of affairs for fighting efficiency. The obtaining of a good report being the result aimed at, while the real matters affecting the fighting capacity of the ship are knowingly neglected. The trouble would seem to be with the nature and manner of the inspections; these should be made with a view of determining upon the efficiency and sufficiency of the vessel in all its various directions, for the purpose for which she is designed and on the efforts and means the personnel of the ship has made and used, and the results they have accomplished.
HANDLING OF VESSELS.
The handling of the vessel should not be confined to the captain and the executive officer. All line officers should have an opportunity to acquire this skill while young and the practice of not allowing officers to get a chance to do this important part of their profession until they have become aged and have lost their vitality is only conducive to a general inefficiency in this. important matter. In the days of the sailing ship the officers of the deck had a chance to acquire it by actual test in maneuvering ships under sails and that part of their training was not neglected, but now an officer in many cases hardly ever has even a chance to give an order for changing speed or moving the helm of his own volition. That the changing of the speed of the engines or the putting over of the helm should require greater responsibility of rank than tacking or box hauling a sailing ship seems hard to understand. That these matters should be the particular province of the captain only does not seem to be founded on good reason.
Skill in this art should be acquired while young if it is ever to be thoroughly acquired. If the officers acquire this skill while yet young and full of vitality they will have the ability when older. Should the only chance to learn be as an old man it never will be learnt. It should not be asking too much to expect that every officer to command a ship or squadron should be capable of handling ships well. Not all have these abilities, some never attain them, though they may have high attainments in other lines. It would seem that the place of such is not in command, responsible for the maneuvering of ships; though there are many equally, perhaps more, important duties that they could perform with great credit to themselves and to the service. Some such positions are the technical and administrative positions. It is just as important to select for the commanders of vessels men fully capable of handling them, as it is important to select men specially fitted for conducting technical work.
When an officer, under present conditions, reaches the rank of commander it does not necessarily follow that he is thoroughly competent, as we should wish to have him, to command a ship. Officers while still young should have abundant opportunity to develop these abilities if they have them. If they are lacking, that will also soon develop, and in such cases they should be allowed to devote their attention to something toward which they have a greater natural tendency.
The handling of vessels by the captains and those succeeding them in the day of battle will have an overwhelming import. Should there be such a condition as to have on some ships a setting up drill twice a day while no officer except the captain is ever given an opportunity to handle the vessel? Both matters are required by the regulations; why should the important, the one thing on which victory or defeat may hang, be overlooked while the mere matter of routine is held to so strictly? Is it because it is more difficult or can it be that the breadth of view is so narrow that only the sufficiency for the limits of the day are thought of?
There is a saying that every man views the earth from the limits of his own horizon. Let there be an endeavor to broaden the horizon generally.
There is greater danger in compelling a superior to do a subordinate's work than in allowing a subordinate to do a superior's. In the one case the point of view is ahead, in the other backward.
DISCIPLINE.
Discipline is an all-important desideratum of all organization and on it depends its very life and the efficient execution of its purposes.
To maintain real true discipline is an art that the great leaders of history have been the masters in; though their methods have not been alike, it will be noticed that they generally conform to the men, the conditions, purposes and the temper of the times.
Under present conditions we have the general high average of intelligence and the governing instincts of American citizens in the naval service. Better discipline will prevail where convenience, expediency, facility and efficacy are controlling factors in the issue and carrying out of orders; and will be engendered by the recognition of the need, justness and efficacy of all orders, and on the other hand the futility and perverseness of disobedience both in spirit and in word.
The regulation way should be the most convenient and effectual. Rules and regulations should be a guide and not a handicap. When they are thus their observance can be more counted upon.
Proper discipline is not to be confounded with blind literal obedience, where the end in view is often defeated, or with harshness and unnecessary restrictions. The discipline of convicts in a prison is not real discipline. It is simply a blind recognition of the necessity of yielding to force, and receives only such obedience as the power of force can produce. Wherever this power recedes, obedience and compliance vanish. The methods of the martinet are not productive of true discipline—if anything, they are subversive to it.
Sometimes we see pointed out and cited as an example of heroic discipline, some useless sacrifice of life in the literal obedience of an order perhaps misunderstood. Such sacrifice may be heroic and is undoubted contempt for fear. When such sacrifice has been the accomplishment of a great end, as was the action of the Japanese soldiers who in blowing up the gates of Tientsin blew themselves to pieces, but allowed the allies to enter the city; or the saving of the lives of fellow men, as the man who stays by a sinking ship to avoid the overloading and foundering of the last boat; then it is truly courageous and heroic and shows a bright example of discipline. But the useless giving up of life, the courting of danger, where the doing of it has neither directly nor indirectly the accomplishment of any good or end, is more of the nature of spectacular suicide. To such influences can be attributed the over-abundance of England's dead in the campaigns of the Transvaal.
Needed sacrifice is deserving of the highest praise and may be an example of discipline and devotion to duty. But needless sacrifice is simply foolhardy and results in the setting up of a wrong standard toward which to look.
MATTERS AFFECTING DISCIPLINE.
A foundation for proper discipline is the general recognition that orders when given are intended to be obeyed and mean what they say. This is capable of being partly nullified by the way an order is issued. An order should imply just what is wanted and tell this plainly. If an order is not to be insisted upon in all respects it should be modified before it is promulgated. Often orders have the very essence of their not being complied with in the manner in which they are promulgated.
Secondly, an order is nullified by failure to obey. Such failure to comply must be immediately run down and means taken to prevent its recurrence by efficient punishment.
Nothing can be more subversive to discipline than the lax observance and carrying out of orders. Orders should be required to be obeyed fully and without question and in the spirit more than in the literal interpretation that may be placed upon them.
The giving of orders for more than is really wanted, in the hope that some part will be complied with, would appear to be rather questionable.
If a rule or regulation has become a dead letter it should be removed, not allowed to be continually violated, as such practice will engender a violation of all rules.
PETTY OFFICERS.
To ensure the prompt observance of orders the authority of petty officers must be real, unquestioned and respected, and petty officers should be backed up by all the power at hand to ensure respect and obedience. Disregard for the orders of a petty officer is a vital and most serious offense, for by the disregard for the orders of a petty officer of even the lowest rank the proper orders of the captain are nullified. On the other hand, the petty officers must be taught and trained that exceeding their authority and making it the subject of personal matters, the exercise of cruelty, needless harshness, prejudice or extreme officiousness, are things not to be tolerated. An officious search to make reports and a desire to secure punishment to as many as possible are not the signs of executive ability. The good petty officer, as well as officer, will have to make but few reports and produces obedience and observance by his real ability to handle men.
PUNISHMENTS.
Discipline will be largely affected by the manner and means in which punishment is awarded, and on the conduct of affairs at the mast depends in a large measure the general discipline of the ship.
Justice here should be impartial and uniform, adequate and equitable, neither cruel nor prejudiced. Indications of prejudice or a loss of temper, against any offender, shown by a superior officer, are extremely bad handicaps to obtaining proper respect.
Clemency, though often proper, should be impartially distributed. Severity is not good and neither is the general or repeated condoning of offences; but worse than all, an erratic, partial, prejudiced or invective meting out of punishments.
General rules regarding the punishments of ordinary offences can be drawn up and if these are adhered to, the danger of partial justice is largely eliminated; besides, the violators of the rules will know about what punishments to expect.
DISPERSING OF KNOWLEDGE.
The process of making anyone do things blindly without knowledge of the ends and purposes can never lead to best results, and though it is manifestly impossible for anyone to know all the whys and wherefores of what he is called upon to do, a wider knowledge of the reasons and principles will conduce to more intelligent and hence to better work.
The necessity for the instruction of our crews in order that they may work intelligently and awaken that interest which the knowledge of what any work is for will bring into play, is one of the apparent fields that must be exploited in the ship.
How is this general dissemination of all-around practical knowledge most easily and efficiently accomplished? Something of course will be done by the divisional officer in his instructions to the men during the drill periods, but this would be far too meager to be the chief source. Other means are necessary and must be supplied. Some ways of doing this are by means of books written in language to suit the average understanding of the men; by means of bulletin boards where important matters are published within reach of all; by the general instruction and giving out of practical information by the petty officers and leading men of the ship during both working and recreation periods. What must be done is to excite interest in attaining knowledge and to provide easy and accessible means for supplying it. If this is done a great deal will be as it were unconsciously yet effectively attained.
Often books, pamphlets, etc., are kept on board which would be very useful in giving men general and special information but in many cases these books are not easily accessible as they should be, and the result is they are not looked at.
The general distribution of the petty officers' drill book and blue jackets' manual is a great step in the general distribution of correct information. Various other means similar to this in the different lines that our men on board ship should become well informed in must yet be supplied.
Information must be placed where the men will get it and absorb it. If it is put away and not easily gotten at it is almost useless.
The acquiring of information should progress conjointly with the acquiring of practical ability to do—each as a help to the other. Practical ability gives means for usefully applying knowledge obtained, while greater information makes this ability more keen and effective.
The school of experience and practice supplemented with constantly acquired information on the subjects dealt with is the practical education and training that will give the desired and lasting results.
PROMOTION TO DESERVING.
The desire for reward, being one of the greatest levers to move human action, deserved promotion to those who are entitled and competent gives an incentive for renewed effort and a desire to excel.
If excellence is but complacently contemplated and not adequately rewarded the great cause for extra effort is at once removed and a state of lethargy and indifference, is the likely result.
Advancement in rating should be governed by the ability to fill the positions and when they are specially able they should be certain to be advanced, whether there are vacancies or not. The chance of vacancies being made on any particular ship should not be the only route for advancement. Every man should be advanced just as far as his abilities, experience, worth and usefulness entitle him. If there are not sufficient vacancies the excess should be sent to other vessels. And then the general service would benefit from the result of men placed where they would be worth the most.
If by the selfishness of some officers certain vessels have kept on them more than their share of experienced men, competent for advancement, other vessels are caused to have inferior men. This is neither conducive to the good of the general service nor fair to the men affected.
The present dearth of men to fill the higher ratings is so great that there is a place for everyone competent to fill the positions and those who are capable should be advanced without special regard to the vacancies on board any particular ship.
Such a system carried out would make the men know that their advancement depended on their efforts to acquire the requisite ability and not on mere chance, and would give a corresponding stimulus to good work.
Art. 515 of Naval Regulations makes provisions for this but might it not be made more use of?
Extra pay or reward for extra or special abilities will bring out these abilities and gives semblance to the principle that reward depends on what is accomplished and ability to do.
CONCLUSION.
The ship in its ideal of the most efficient fighting machine with all its attending attributes is the aim of naval development. Upon it should be concentrated all the attention, all the intelligence and all the abilities present or that can be produced. Every detail that may be of possible use in action should be developed each in its highest possible manner. To have all these various means to the important end organized in a system where there is no friction but mutual aid and support; this is a field open for development to all within the service. And the creation of conditions and matters tending towards this result would seem to constitute the magnum opus of our naval activity.
Above all, naval efficiency is not, can not and never will be, gained by the development of any one thing. If any one feature be unsupported by attending matters it is but like a dead branch of a tree. Matters must be developed conjointly and simultaneously and the whole ultimate end in all its various parts must be ever in view.